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In the United States, the emergence of an outpatient-centered, drug-based model of mental 
health care was physically feasible from the 1950s onward, with the introduction of 
thorazine and other first-generation antipsychotics. However, it was not until 1981, with 
President Reagan’s veto of the Mental Health Systems Act, that American mental health 
policy tipped over definitively into the outpatient-centered, drug-based model. In this 
quantitative study of the formation of policy preference, the delay between the feasibility 
of the  outpatient-centered, drug-based model and its adoption was explored through five 
research questions answered through corpus analysis and time-series statistics: How do 
shifts in (1) the sentiments of the American public; (2) the opinions of psychiatrists, 
psychologists, and other mental health experts; (3) formal and informal lobbying efforts by 
pharmacological companies and other commercial stakeholders in mental health; (4) the 
policy of individual states; and (5) the policy of the federal government explain the delay 
between the appearance of thorazine and the adoption of the current model of American 
mental health care?  These questions were answered through techniques such as Chow 
breakpoint analysis, Markov switch models, vector auto-regression (VAR), and auto-
regressive distributed lag (ARDL) models1. It was found that both the outpatient-centered, 
                                                
1 VARs and ARDLs are time-series procedures that, among other functions, test the degree to which 
variables are co-integrated in terms of changes over time. Thus, VARs and ARDLs are means of testing 
relationships between two or more variables that change over time.   
xiii 
 
drug-based model of mental health and community mental health centers viewed for 
popularity with the public, Congress, and mental health professionals for several years, 
thus delaying a transmission of a firm preference for the outpatient-centered, drug-based 
model of mental health from the public to Congress. This finding was explored through the 
theories of multiple streams and disjointed incrementalism. The study demonstrated the 
existence of a robustly democratic period of policy articulation and explanation followed 




CHAPTER 1. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
1.1 Introduction 
The 19th century saw a momentous shift in American mental health policy. At the 
beginning of the century, there were only a few mental hospitals in existence, including 
Pennsylvania Hospital in Philadelphia (Shorter and Marshall 1997) and the Asylum for 
the Insane at Bloomingdale in New York City (Earle 1848). However, by 1890, there was 
at least one mental hospital in each state, housing roughly half a million patients in all—
roughly one out of 125 Americans then living (Edmondson 2012). The emergence of 
mental hospitals was in contrast to the laissez faire attitudes about mental health that had 
dominated American policy and thinking in the 18th century, a century in which mental 
illness was widely considered to be an incurable and divine affliction (Dain 1976). 
 The years from 1890 to the early 1950s were marked by revolutionary 
developments in the scientific understanding of mental illness, including the further 
articulation of a fully neurophysiological theory of mental illness (Tesak and Code 2008, 
Binder 2009).  The medical and pharmacological developments of the 1950s and 1960s 
represented a paradigm shift in the treatment of mental illness (Tesak and Code 2008, 
Binder 2009). Until the middle of the 20th century, the science of mental illness was 
limited by researchers’ insights into the nature of the brain (Wan et al. 2014). Scientific 
understanding of the brain developed in fits and starts; it was not until the late 19th 
century, for example, that there was a working theory of the relationship between injuries 
to the brain and certain kinds of mental illness (Binder 2009, Meuse and Marquardt 1985, 
Gavarró and Salmons 2013, Wan et al. 2014, Fridriksson, Bonilha, and Rorden 2007). 
Even as a physicalist account of mental illness took hold, psychiatry and allied fields 
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remained under the profound influence (Williams 2010, Bion 1984) of Sigmund Freud 
and other scholars who had created a largely qualitative account of mental illness that 
was based more in the experience of the mentally ill person than in facts about brain 
function.  
One key development of the pharmacological revolution in patient care was the 
1951 discovery of what would be the first widely used antipsychotic medication, 
marketed as thorazine in the United States and largactil in Europe (Stewart 1957). At the 
time of thorazine’s discovery, American mental health policy supported a single form of 
therapy for severe mental illness, that of institutionalization (Levine, LaFond, and 
Durham 1995).  
With this background in mind, the central question addressed in this dissertation 
is why a period of roughly thirty years elapsed between the technical feasibility of the 
current mental health model (a model that is outpatient-based and rooted in 
pharmacology) and its institutionalization through policy. When President Reagan vetoed 
the Mental Health Systems Act in 1981, he essentially ended the idea of the dedicated 
institution—whether as mental health hospital or community mental health center—as a 
solution to the mental health needs of Americans (Thomas 1998). However, in terms of 
infrastructure and technology alike, there was no stark difference between 1981 and 
1952, the first year in which thorazine was formally administered to a mental patient. 
Indeed, in France (the land of origin of the discoverer of thorazine, Dr. Henry Laborit, 
and many other key researchers in the field of antipsychotic medication), there had been 
no long delay between the discovery of thorazine and the wholescale shuttering of French 
mental hospitals (López-Muñoz et al. 2005).   
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 An assessment of American mental health policy from 1951 (the dawn of the 
thorazine era) to 1981 (the vetoing of the Mental Health Systems Act) reveals many 
possible answers to the question of why contemporary American mental health policy 
took so long to form, despite the early availability of its basic components. None of these 
answers is, on its own, definitive. However, considered collectively, the possible answers 
to this question offer a means of understanding a vital shift in American mental health 
policy from the perspective of multiple stakeholders, including the federal government, 
the mentally ill, state governments, psychiatric interest groups, the public, 
pharmacological companies and lobbyists, and others.  With this approach in mind, the 
main purpose of the literature review is to survey previous empirical studies on American 
mental health policy from the 1950s to the 1980s to see how the research question of the 
dissertation has been answered by other scholars.   
 
1.2 Historical Overview 
 The historical review of the literature has two purposes. The first is to trace the 
history of mental health policy to its roots in early modern Europe. The second purpose is 
to offer an overview of developments in American health policies from the 1950s to the 
1980s. Each of these purposes has been addressed in its own sub-section.  
1.2.1 The Concept of Mental Illness and Mental Hospitals 
 The idea of a mental hospital dates from the 17th century, when, according to the 
French historian/philosopher Michel Foucault, there was a paradigm shift in the 
understanding of mental illness itself (Foucault 1988). This paradigm shift was closely 
related to the evolution of policy. As modern nation-states evolved, they began to 
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regulate states and concepts—including mental illness—that had once been untouched by 
law (Foucault 1988). In this context, the evolution of policies relating to mental illness 
are inextricably intertwined with policies addressing homelessness, as both mental illness 
and homelessness threatened states’ powers of control (Foucault 1988).  
 Foucault was among the first scholars to call attention to the cultural construction 
of mental illness. This process unfolded in Europe over several centuries, as elites came 
to understand that the mentally ill were potential political threats and had to be brought 
under social control. In fact, the whole notion of mental illness came about in the early 
modern era. As Foucault argued of conceptions of mental illness during this time, mental 
illness per se did not exist. Mentally ill individuals were considered to be either touched 
by God or demonically possessed (Foucault 1988).  
The emergence of mental illness as a political threat, and therefore as an 
appropriate subject for policy, can be considered in terms of English land law.  In 1529, 
Henry VIII of England, as part of his general war against ecclesiastical authority, 
prevented the clergy from taking land to farm (Marti 1929), beginning a series of policies 
that would create important precedents for how mentally ill people—who would come to 
be made homeless by the privatization of English land—could be treated in early modern 
states.   
In conjunction with earlier stipulations in the Magna Carta that the clergy could 
not appropriate land, Henry VIII’s actions emphasized that the only landowner in 
England was now the state (Marti 1929). For over seven centuries, the Church in Europe 
had been a landowner alongside the monarchy; in Henry VIII’s actions, however, one 
sees the origin of the modern nation-state, which claims sole sovereignty over land and 
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property. By his actions, Henry VIII was responsible for creating the first truly landless 
class in England; perhaps the first people who were legally, not just factually, homeless, 
thanks to the desire of the Tudors to impose what Trevelyan has called an economy of 
enclosure on what had been “an open country; one part wilderness of heath, turn, or 
marsh; the other part unenclosed plough-fields...” (Trevelyan 2002, 32). In the old, open 
England, a roofless wanderer—like a traveling beggar—did not draw censure from 
people, as the open country mentioned by Trevelyan did not fully lend itself to modern 
ideas about homes and property. The commons still existed and were considered the 
property of all. That began to change under Henry VIII, and what Trevelyan described as 
the economy of enclosure picked up pace all throughout the seventeenth century and 
beyond. 
Interestingly, Henry VIII was not just the initiator of the modern era of 
homelessness, but also of the modern era of mental illness. “Prior to the establishment of 
the Court of Wards and Liveries by Henry VIII...the jurisdiction over Idiots and Lunatics 
was entrusted to the Lord Chancellor...[they were] afterwards transferred to 
the...Secretary of Lunatics” (Scargill-Bird 1908, 57). This transfer of power was the 
beginning of the era of institutional approaches to controlling mental illness. In the early 
eighteenth century, the first asylums opened in England, shortly to be followed by 
asylums in the United States (Levine, LaFond, and Durham 1995).  
1.2.2 Overview of the 1950s to the 1980s in American Mental Health Policy 
 In 1951, the French physician Henri Laborit and colleagues released the drug 
thorazine for clinical tests in Paris. Laborit believed that this drug, initially intended as a 
sedative to address the problem of surgical shock, would have antipsychotic properties as 
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well; in 1952, Laborit’s colleagues administered thorazine to a schizophrenic patient 
named Jacques L., who was discharged three weeks later (López-Muñoz et al. 2005).  
Jacques L. had not merely been sedated; his exposure to thorazine had rid him of 
hallucinations and delusions as well. To the shock of the French medical community, and 
later the global medical community, a pharmacological cure for psychosis appeared to 
have been found (López-Muñoz et al. 2005).     
 Shortly afterwards, thorazine was introduced to the United States (Moncrieff 
2013, Shen 1999, López-Muñoz et al. 2005, Edmondson 2012, Shorter and Marshall 
1997). In fact, the brand name thorazine was developed for the U.S.; in Europe, this 
medicine was known as largactil (López-Muñoz et al. 2005). The United States was not, 
at the time, fully receptive to the concept of antipsychotic medicines. The country’s 
model of treatment was tripartite: chemical sedation for the unruliest patients, 
institutionalization for all those who were deemed to fall outside the social bounds of 
sanity, and talk therapy for the neurotic but functional.  
By the time largactil crossed the Atlantic and became thorazine, French 
deinstitutionalization was already beginning (López-Muñoz et al. 2005). Dr. Laborit and 
his colleagues had worked hard to demonstrate the efficacy of the new antipsychotic 
drug, and hospitals and clinics throughout France were utilizing it in trials on their 
psychotic patients. To a French state still reeling from the costs of World War II and the 
loss of its once-vast overseas holdings, largactil seemed to be a blessing—a means of 
reducing the already staggering medical expenditures shouldered by the state. 
At around the time that thorazine was introduced in the United States, John F. 
Kennedy was coming to the end of his 6-year term in the House of Representatives and 
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preparing to contest the 1952 U.S. Senate election. Eleven years before that Senate 
election, John’s sister, Rosemary, had been lobotomized. The lobotomy had been 
approved by  Joseph P. Kennedy, Sr., as a response to his perceptions of Rosemary’s 
willful behavior and mental retardation (O’Brien 2004). Eleven years after the Senate 
election, now-President John F. Kennedy signed the Community Mental Health Centers 
Act, setting the stage for the widespread deinstitutionalization of mentally ill Americans 
(Rochefort 1984).  
Until that time, the paradigm of care for the mentally ill had been inpatient 
treatment in government-run psychiatric hospitals (Cutler, Bevilacqua, and McFarland 
2003). Afterwards, mentally ill people were transferred en masse to outpatient settings in 
their own communities (Sharfstein 2014). In a statement accompanying the Mental 
Health Amendments of 1967, President Johnson wrote that “In 1963, we invested in a 
totally new idea: the conviction that community centers could bring treatment of the 
mentally ill out of the darkness; out of isolation--into places where the people live” 
(Johnson 1967, 285). Johnson heralded the triumph of the legislation by noting that, in 
just 4 years, 145,000 mentally ill Americans had been transferred from mental hospitals 
to the new community centers. The country seemed on the verge of a new, compassionate 
paradigm of care for the mentally ill, one that was made possible by thorazine. The 
symptoms of someone like Rosemary Kennedy no longer required either 
institutionalization or lobotomy; thorazine made so many violent, angry, incoherent 
mental patients into “acceptable” members of society that, by the early 1960s, the United 
States appeared ready to accept what France had accepted years ago: the age of the 
mental institution was at an end.  
8 
 
 Just thirteen years after the Mental Health Amendments Act of 1967, the idea of 
the community mental health center itself was coming to a close, insofar as President 
Reagan refused to sign a renewed version of this bill upon entering office in 1980. 
(Sharfstein 2014). The rapid demise of the community mental health center was a 
startling development in medical history as well as medical policy. From the early 1960s 
onwards, the availability of thorazine (and the other antipsychotic drugs that emerged) 
was taken to support a concept of care in which (a) dedicated institutional resources were 
not needed to route medications to patients and (b) the oppressive and depressing 
atmospheres of institutions could be plausibly replaced by the warmth and normalcy of 
ordinary American communities.     
Just as the last bill signed by President Kennedy was the Community Mental 
Centers Act, the last bill signed by President Carter was the Mental Health Systems Act 
of 1979. However, whereas the Johnson administration amplified Kennedy-era policy on 
the mentally ill, the incoming Reagan administration did the opposite (Torrey 2013). 
President Reagan did not sign the Community Mental Centers Act, and, only a few years 
later, what had been a trickle of homeless mentally ill people on the streets of major 
American cities became a flood (Torrey 2013).  
The volte-face in American mental health policy that took place between the mid-
1960s and the beginning of the 1980s has been understood as an extension of the 
Reaganite agenda of smaller government (Torrey 2013). Torrey has argued that Reagan’s 
politics manifested themselves in a disdain and fear of the mentally ill, in turn providing 
the impetus for the defunding of community mental health centers and, over time, the 
transfer of the mentally ill from care settings to homelessness and incarceration.    
9 
 
However, Torrey’s account is, at best, incomplete. While there is ample evidence 
that Ronald Reagan was dismissive of the concerns of the mentally ill, Reagan’s last year 
in office was 1988. However, as of 2016, American mental health policy is on the same 
trajectory as it was when Reagan refused to sign the Mental Health Systems Act (Jones 
2015). Clearly, there are strong structural forces that have helped to shape American 
mental health policy independently of President Reagan’s individual influence. 
One overarching theme in American mental health policy considered from 1963 
to the present day has been the decline of the idea of inpatient treatment for the mental 
health patient (Adair et al. 2014). Before the Community Mental Health Centers Act of 
1963, the mentally ill were treated primarily in state hospitals, where they had dedicated 
beds and medical resources (Dear and Wolch 2014). After the Community Mental Health 
Centers Act, the mentally ill began to transition away from hospitals and into community 
mental health centers and an outpatient paradigm (Adair et al. 2014). Community mental 
health centers were venues at which mentally ill people checked in intermittently for 
medication and support, but were, with a few exceptions, expected to see to their own 
housing and daily care (Dear and Wolch 2014). Finally, in the aftermath of the collapse 
of community mental health centers, there began an exodus of the mentally ill into 
homelessness and prison, where the concepts and standards of care deteriorated even 
further (Dear and Wolch 2014). 
Thus, over the past several decades, there was a transition away from the concept 
of the mentally ill as unwell individuals who deserved inpatient treatment and towards a 
concept of the mentally ill as either (a) outpatients or (b) beyond-the-pale individuals 
who could not count on treatment at all. This evolution was not marked by a flurry of 
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policy. Indeed, only two federal legislative acts—the Community Mental Health Centers 
Act of 1963 and the failed Mental Health Systems Act of 1979—bracket the change in 
official policy. 
The current state of mental health policy can be understood through Figure 1 
below, which is based on data from the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH 
2003).  
 
Figure 1. Distribution of Mental Health Expenditures by Service, 2003. Original figure 
based on NIMH data. 
 
Current mental health policy in the United States favors reimbursement to physicians and 
pharmaceutical companies as opposed to other treatment paradigms. Note that the role of 
mental health hospitals (specialty hospitals), which once accounted for nearly all of 
mental health care exposures, has been de-emphasized. The question investigated in this 
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study is not why mental hospitals no longer play a predominant role in mental health 
policy, but why it took so long for the status quo to come about, given that it was feasible 
to adopt in the early 1950s.  
 In conclusion, it is important to be able to approach the history of mental health 
policy with a view to appropriate classification of what took place at each stage. The 
central research question of the current study is why there was such a long delay between 
the debut of thorazine in the early 1950s and the debut of a mental health policy favoring 
the combined use of pharmacology and outpatient management.  
 
1.3 General Explanatory Themes 
 There was a gap between the debut of thorazine in the 1950s and the codification 
of an outpatient- and drug-centered mental health policy paradigm in the 1980s. The 
reason for this gap can be understood through an examination of the costs and benefits of 
the new mental health policy as understood by key policy stakeholders. One plausible 
explanation of the rapidity of the decline of mental hospitals from 1946 to 1963 is that, 
over and preceding this period, key stakeholders perceived the greater benefits, and 
lowered costs, of moving to a model in which mental health care was administered 
through community centers rather than through mental hospitals. If this cost-benefit-
based theoretical account, understood as an extension of bounded rationality theory, is 
explanatorily powerful, then it is possible that the period from the early 1950s to the early 
1980s might be explained by delving into the costs and benefits relating to two possible 
states of affairs: (a) the status quo, in which mental health treatment was administered 
through community mental health centers; and (b) the alternative, in which mental health 
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treatment was administered on an outpatient basis in various settings (including mental 
health hospitals, traditional hospitals, private physician practices, and even prisons). 
Again, the purpose of examining the literature in this context is not to try to build an 
objective case for the actual costs and benefits of these two states of affairs, but rather to 
examine how key stakeholders might have approached these issues given goals, prior 
assumptions, and time and energy limitations related to determining how best to treat 
mental health patients.        
1.3.1 Costs Related to Side Effects and Incomplete Treatment 
 While antipsychotic drugs are now widely accepted for their role in treating 
mental illness, there were, and continue to be, dissident voices on this topic, with several 
doctors and other scientific experts claiming that pharmacological treatment is not as 
efficacious as it might appear. Some physicians have taken the position that the ability of 
antipsychotic drugs to pacify patients has been confused with treatment. Others have 
argued that the administration of antipsychotic drugs is accompanied by the fresh costs of 
side effects. According to one such report, “these drugs provide undesirable neurological 
side effects, including dystonia, akathisia, parkinsonism, and tardive dyskinesia...” (Otte, 
Audenaert, and Peremans 2004, 111).  
The ability of antipsychotic drugs to curtail symptoms did not work in all mental 
health patients, and, in many cases, required years of follow-up (and combination with 
other forms of therapy) to be effective (Shadish, Lurigio, and Lewis 1989). Shadish et al. 
argued that the invention and widespread dissemination of antipsychotic drugs created an 
unmerited sense of security among policy-makers, who did not wait to conduct the kind 
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of longitudinal studies necessary to determine the long-term effectiveness of 
pharmacology. 
1.3.2 Social Costs of Institutionalization 
 Mental hospitals of the eighteenth, nineteenth, and much of the twentieth 
centuries were little better than prisons for the mentally ill. In fact, some scholars have 
characterized what went on in such institutions as torture (Levine, LaFond, and Durham 
1995). Mentally ill people in institutions were routinely lobotomized, punished, and 
otherwise tormented (Braslow 1997). Such conditions also prevailed in many American 
mental hospitals, as unforgettably dramatized in Ken Kesey’s One Flew Over the 
Cuckoo’s Nest, a 1962  novel (Kesey 2002) whose central incident is the lobotomy of a 
man in a mental hospital. Many Americans had, by this time, come into contact with the 
mental health system, either through their own institutionalization or through the 
institutionalization of friends or relatives, and they had formed overwhelmingly negative 
impressions of such institutions, which, as depicted by Kesey, were often arbitrary and 
inhumane (Domino 1983).  
 The social costs of institutionalization are very difficult to quantify, not only 
because of the lack of data but also because of conceptual difficulties related to 
quantifying what society lost through the mass commitment of tens of thousands of 
Americans. Nonetheless, the literature (Mosher and Menn 1978, Sharfstein and Nafziger 
1976, Polak and Kirby 1976, Drake et al. 2003, Shen 1999, Shorter and Marshall 1997) 
does appear to suggest that, in a general way, Americans became more aware of the costs 
of institutionalization in the years after World War II and were less willing to pay this 
cost going forward.   
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1.3.3 Economic Benefits of Deinstitutionalization 
 Perhaps the most important American policy development of 1965 was the 
passage of the Social Security Amendments of 1965, which created Medicare and 
Medicaid and, in so doing, transferred vast amounts of financial responsibility for 
healthcare from the states to the federal government (Achenbaum 1987).  At the same 
time that the federal government was shouldering the increasing cost of healthcare, 
doctors and administrators were also keenly aware of the cost savings involved in 
deinstitutionalizing patients. La Fond and Durham related that “In 1968 dollars, the state 
of New York saved an estimated $585 million per year by discharging patients from 
hospitals and switching them to other sources of income supports” (LaFond and Dunham 
1992, 89). Thus, by the 1960s, the existence of various pharmacological treatments or 
pseudo-treatments for some forms of mental illness had provided both clinical and 
economic relief for individual American states, the federal government, and healthcare 
leaders. With drugs widely available, with the federal government eager to cut healthcare 
costs after Social Security Amendments of 1965, and with the Mental Health 
Amendments of 1967 on the books, there were numerous cost pressures towards 
deinstitutionalization.  
1.3.4 Political Costs of Institutionalization: A Hardening of Attitudes 
American mental health policy in the 1970s and 1980s can be understood as part 
of a larger Atlantic shift in the idea of a democratic government’s responsibilities. The 
1970s saw the political ascendance of two remarkably similar ideological figures, Ronald 
Reagan in the United States and Margaret Thatcher in the United Kingdom, who both 
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championed a laissez faire state in which the rights of the underprivileged—including 
mentally ill and homeless people—were largely neglected (Thomas 1998). 
In policy terms, perhaps the most important development related to mental illness 
during the Reagan administration was not a positive act of legislation, but rather the 
defeat of existing legislation—the Mental Health Systems Act (Hogan 2003). The Mental 
Health Systems Act had been signed by President Carter just before the Presidential 
election of 1980, with the intent being to continue the funding of federal community 
mental health centers that had first been institutionalized under President Johnson in the 
1960s (Hogan 2003).  Carter had appointed a Presidential Commission on Mental Health, 
which created a National Plan for the Chronically Mentally Ill (Hogan 2003). However, 
as incoming President, Reagan allowed the legislation to die (Hogan 2003). 
1979 might have been the beginning of a new era of both homelessness and 
mental illness. Marcus argued that 1979 is the proper starting date for any analysis of 
both modern homelessness and mental illness policy because of how “the arrival of 
Margaret Thatcher...and then the inauguration of her political disciple and confidant 
Ronald Reagan in 1981” (Marcus 2006)  altered policies as well as social attitudes related 
to mental health. Thatcher and Reagan, Marcus argued, construed both homelessness and 
mental illness as a social blight. However, in other contexts, the political mood under 
Reagan was inimical to the recognition of certain social problems, whose very existence 
could prove to be an embarrassment for Reagan’s campaign theme of ‘morning in 
America.’ Min recalled a statement by senior Reagan administration member Ed Meese 
to the effect that “hunger not only didn’t exist in a serious sense in the U.S., but that those 
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taking advantage of soup kitchens do so because the food is free rather than because 
they’re destitute” (Min 1999). 
 The Reagan administration’s attitude proved to be instrumental in the evolution of 
mental illness, as it indicated the beginning of a period of government detachment from 
social services and the introduction of so-called market solutions to social issues. By 
1983, a combination of laissez-faire ideology and Reaganite approach to the mentally ill 
made the existing problem of American deinstitutionalization worse by shutting down 
what few resources were left and creating an attitude of enduring contempt for the 
mentally ill homeless population. Writing in the New York Times in 1983, Sullivan 
offered a vivid picture of the new reality that is worth reproducing in full, because it 
captures so many of the prevalent attitudes of the time: 
No one knows for sure how many there are, and there is sharp 
disagreement on how they got there. Nevertheless, there are thousands of 
homeless people living in the streets of New York City, and state and city 
officials agree that their presence has become a major political and social 
concern. The officials also agree that about a third of the homeless are 
former mental patients who were discharged from state psychiatric centers 
during the last three decades under a policy known as 
deinstitutionalization...Mayor Koch contends that the state’s policy of 
deinstitutionalization has turned city neighborhoods into outdoor 
‘psychiatric wards...’ (Sullivan 1983). 
 The systematic rollback of resources for the mentally ill was complemented by 
new policies about the use of space, echoing the way in which England under the Tudors 
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combined regulation of the mentally ill with regulation of once-public land (Trevelyan 
2002).  Washington, D.C. passed a right-to-shelter city ballot initiative in 1984, meaning 
that any homeless person in the city had a right to a bed in the city’s emergency shelter 
program (Hombs 2001).  In passing this initiative, Washington, D.C. bypassed the federal 
government entirely, and served as a model of local action to serve the homeless (and, 
intersectionally, the mentally ill) population. However, in 1990, Washington, D.C. voters 
repealed the ballot initiative, denying homeless people guaranteed access to city 
resources (Hombs 2001). There are many other examples of local laws that appear to 
target the intersection of mental illness and homelessness (Hombs 2001).   
The National Coalition for the Homeless (NCH) conducted two studies, in 2002 
and 2008, to track how 224 cities are dealing with the homeless. Between these two 
studies, the NCH (2008) detected that: “There is a 12% increase in laws prohibiting 
begging in certain public places and an 18% increase in laws that prohibit aggressive 
panhandling. There is a 14% increase in laws prohibiting sitting or lying in certain public 
spaces. There is a 3% increase in laws prohibiting loitering, loafing, or vagrancy laws” 
(NCH 2008). 
These kinds of laws target the homeless and the mentally ill, two populations with 
substantial overlap, and illustrate how, particularly after the Reagan era, American 
policies have taken more and more space from the mentally ill. In the 1950s and 1960s, 
the mentally ill could at least count on a psychiatric bed; in the 1970s, the mentally ill had 
community centers and medication; by the 1980s, both psychiatric hospitals and 
community centers were largely absent from the environment, and many of the mentally 
ill were thus homeless. As homeless people, the mentally ill were also subject to regimes 
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of exclusion and control encoded in local policies about the use of public space. 
Moreover, after Reagan, many homeless people simply ended up in prison instead of in 
any kind of treatment (Torrey 2013). 
 
1.4 Empirical Motivation of the Central Research Question 
 The central research question of the study is why there was a substantial (over 
three-decade) gap between the debut of thorazine in the United States and the rise of a 
mental health policy that was largely based on pharmacological administration in 
outpatient settings. With this central research question in mind, the purposes of this 
section of the literature review are as follows. The first purpose is to determine whether, 
based on existing empirical evidence, it was technically feasible for the kind of mental 
health policy enacted in the 1980s to be enacted in the 1950s. The second purpose is to 
evaluate what previous studies have found in terms of explaining the two transitions in 
mental health policy that took place from the 1950s to the 1980s, namely (a) the 
transition from mental hospitals to community mental health centers and (b) the transition 
from community mental health centers to outpatient settings.  
1.4.1 Assessment of American Mental Health Capabilities in the 1950s 
 For the central research question of the study to be meaningful, it has to be 
demonstrated that it was technically possible for the American mental health system to 
support the widespread use of antipsychotics in an outpatient setting as early as the 
1950s. If such capabilities did not exist, then the research question of the study could be 
easily answered by appealing to a mere lack of resources rather than to substantive 
processes and principles associated with policy. Therefore, the purpose of this section of 
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the literature review is to provide an overview and critical analysis of evidence that the 
American mental health establishment could in fact have set up its post-1981 status quo 
in the early 1950s. 
 One appropriate starting point is to list some key antipsychotic drugs and their 
years of discovery (Shen 1999): 
• 1951: Isoniazid and iproniazid were tested as anti-tuberculosis drugs and found to 
improve mood; thorazine was found to assist in the symptom reduction of 
schizophrenic patients 
• 1952: The term antidepressant was coined to explain the effects of isoniazid in 
particular 
• 1953: Reserpine discovered 
• 1955: Reserpine introduced as an anti-depressant 
• 1956: Imipramine introduced as an anti-depressant 
• 1958: Haloperidol introduced in order to treat schizophrenia and many other kinds 
of psychoses   
• 1959: Chlorprothixene introduced in order to treat schizophrenia and mania; 
Fluphenazine introduced in order to treat schizophrenia and many other kinds of 
psychoses   
This timeline suggests that, by the end of the 1950s, physicians in the United States had 
easy prescribing access to four kinds of antidepressants and four kinds of antipsychotic 
drugs. Therefore, it cannot be argued that the failure of the United States to transition to a 
pharmacological model of mental health treatment in the 1950s was due to a lack of 
access to the appropriate medications. 
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 Rather, the literature suggests that the demand for these medications was simply 
underestimated (Moncrieff 2013). In the 1950s, minor tranquilizers were vastly more 
popular than antipsychotic drugs, which are now classified as major tranquilizers. Minor 
tranquilizers—including barbiturates and opioids—had a longer history than 
antipsychotic drugs and were better known to both physicians and patients (Moncrieff 
2013). An appropriate inference to draw from the research literature, an inference that 
happens to support Kingdon’s theory of policy change, is that it might have taken some 
time to draw the attention of the American medical establishment to the unique properties 
of antipsychotic drugs as compared to the minor tranquilizers. 
 Kingdon’s theory of policy change, which is discussed at greater length in the 
next chapter of the study, contains two focus areas, attention and cost-benefit analysis. 
First, Kingdon argued, an item must enter a policy agenda, or drop out of a policy 
agenda, on the basis of the amount of attention it garners or fails to garner. Next, when an 
item is on a policy agenda, cost-benefit analyses are undergone in order to determine 
whether to freeze in place, reject, or modify an item. For this theory to apply, however, 
an agenda item has to be tangible. The review of antipsychotic and antidepressant drugs 
provided earlier indicates that, in fact, the American medical establishment had access to 
a substantial volume of drugs that could be used to treat mental illness, which helps to 
motivate the research question of why such a long time elapsed between the status quo of 
the 1950s and the emergence of the new mental health policy paradigm in the early 
1980s.  
 However, the existence of antipsychotic drugs does not, on its own, motivate the 
central research question of the study. After all, in 1963, the U.S. began to move 
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aggressively to shut down mental hospitals and replace them with community mental 
health centers (Drake et al. 2003). At these community mental health centers, 
antipsychotic drugs were widely distributed to individuals with mental health problems 
(Drake et al. 2003). Thus, it is necessary to go beyond the issue of drug availability and 
ask why the combined drug-outpatient model of mental health policy took so long to 
come about. 
 It is important to note in this regard that, by the 1950s, there was a well-
established tradition of outpatient care in mental health service, albeit one that has 
sometimes gone unrecognized qua outpatient care. Psychotherapy, introduced to the 
United States under the contemporaries of Sigmund Freud, was well-established by the 
1950s (Hale 1995). The concept of being ‘in treatment’ was, by this time, more common 
than it had been in the past, when psychotherapy had been attempted mainly by the 
Bohemian and well-to-do populations of the United States (Hale 1995). Unfortunately, 
statistics do not exist to indicate how many Americans were receiving so-called talk 
therapy in the 1950s, but a review of the qualitative sources (Hale 1995, Cushman 1996) 
indicates that such therapy was in fact widely practiced. Talk therapy had also become 
widely accepted by psychiatrists and other medical professionals (Hale 1995, Cushman 
1996).  
However, the actual practice of talk therapy was legally distinct from the practice 
of psychiatry. The drugs that had been discovered in the 1950s were, at first, 
administered only by psychiatrists; later, they become available by prescription and were 
prescribed more widely by physicians (Moncrieff 2013). Because psychoanalysts whose 
qualifications were based in clinical psychology could not prescribe these drugs, the 
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existence of an extensive outpatient infrastructure for talk therapy made little difference 
in the American mental health system’s ability to combine the outpatient infrastructure of 
psychoanalysis with the availability of new antipsychotic drugs. Over the years, 
prescribing power was more widely distributed, allowing individuals other than medical 
doctors to prescribe certain drugs, but, in the 1950s, the power to prescribe remained 
squarely in the hands of physicians (Moncrieff 2013). 
With this context in mind, the question becomes why existing outpatient 
capacities—in particular, capacities in ordinary hospitals—were not utilized in 
conjunction with the administration of antipsychotic drugs. One possible explanation is 
economic in nature. Medical professionals and hospitals would have had an incentive to 
provide inpatient care for economic reasons, especially in the period after the formation 
of Medicaid and Medicare and before the federal government’s decision to increase 
payouts for outpatient treatments. It was not until the 1980s that outpatient costs started 
to rise, triggered by a ‘pay for discharge’ structure and greater federal recognition of the 
benefits of keeping people out of hospitals (Tierney, Miller, and McDonald 1990). 
Furthermore, it was not until the 1990s that the interests of insurance companies also 
came to favor outpatient modes of care (Goldman, McCulloch, and Sturm 1998). 
Healthcare economics can furnish one possible explanation of why, despite the 
availability and increasing use of antipsychotic drugs in the late 1950s and early 1960s, 
the outpatient model did not take hold. Another possible explanation is social in nature, 
and touches on the mood of the country during the Great Society years and the 1960s in 
general. At some level, community mental health centers represented the emerging 
consensus that community-oriented solutions were necessary to public problems such as 
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mental illness and crime (Blau 1977, Okin 1984, Humphreys and Rappaport 1993). In 
such solutions, the role of the government was to make appropriate resources available 
and otherwise facilitate the ability of communities to act, but the underlying idea was to 
remove what had been perceived as the heavy hand of the medical establishment from the 
actual administration of mental illness (Blau 1977, Okin 1984, Humphreys and 
Rappaport 1993).  
It is important to recognize that community mental health centers were not only 
conceived of as places to dispense drugs, but, just as importantly, as a means to promote 
mental health by bringing entire communities together (Blau 1977, Okin 1984, 
Humphreys and Rappaport 1993). The reason that this point is important, in the context 
of the central research question of the study and the application of Kingdon’s theory, is 
that it reflects on the topic of mental health capabilities. The United States certainly 
possessed the physical infrastructure to support an outpatient-dominated model of mental 
health care at any point after the 1950s. The fact that such a paradigm was not adopted in 
1963, when the community mental health center was codified as the main treatment 
paradigm for mental illness, does not have to do with a problem of capacity, but rather 
with an issue of social will (Blau 1977, Okin 1984, Humphreys and Rappaport 1993).  
1.4.2 Review of Empirical Studies 
 Several empirical studies (Mosher and Menn 1978, Sharfstein and Nafziger 1976, 
Polak and Kirby 1976) have provided insight into the benefits of community mental 
health centers, both vis-à-vis hospitals and outpatient approaches.  Mosher and Menn 
compared the treatment outcomes of two groups of schizophrenic patients, a group in a 
community mental health setting (the experimental group) and another group served by a 
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traditional mental hospital (the control group). Mosher and Menn found that, after two 
years of treatment, “there were no significant differences between the groups in 
readmissions or levels of symptomatology. However, experimental subjects significantly 
less often received medications, used less outpatient care, showed significantly better 
occupational levels, and were more able to live independently” (Mosher and Menn 1978, 
715). One of the most interesting aspects of this study was the inclusion of outpatient 
services as a variable. Mosher and Menn interpreted the finding that community mental 
health group patients required fewer outpatient visits to mean that community groups 
were superior to both outpatient settings and traditional mental hospital settings in terms 
of symptom reduction over time. However, the study might have been biased in that, by 
definition, community-based treatments were more oriented to teaching independent level 
skills. 
 Sharfstein and Nafziger (1976) carried out a cost-benefit analysis on a single 
subject, a woman who was obtaining care in several settings at once. Sharfstein and 
Nafziger found that this woman’s cost of care in a community mental health care setting 
was $2,110 in the first year of treatment, falling to $640 by the third year of treatment. 
The third-year cost associated with the community mental health care setting was 
substantially lower than the costs associated with treatment in a mental health hospital, in 
an outpatient as well as an inpatient setting. One of the limitations of this study was that, 
because the woman who was the focus of the study was receiving multiple forms of 
mental health treatment at the same time, it was impossible to draw causal inferences 
about which treatment venue was more likely to be the source of the woman’s mental 
health status—which was rated at stable from the third year of treatment onwards.   
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 Polak and Kirby (1976) conducted a quasi-experimental study in which mental 
patients who were about to be hospitalized in Denver were randomly assigned either to a 
mental hospital or to a community mental health center. This quasi-experimental design 
was a strength of Polak and Kirby’s status, given that true random assignment was 
carried out. Polak and Kirby found that, both upon discharge and at a follow-up, the 
clinical outcomes of the individuals who had been assigned to community mental health 
centers were superior to the clinical outcomes of those who were in the mental hospital 
group.  
 One reason for the importance of the findings of these three empirical studies 
(Mosher and Menn 1978, Sharfstein and Nafziger 1976, Polak and Kirby 1976) is that 
they shed some light on what Kingdon (1984) described as a rational approach to policy 
evaluation. Given that, in these three studies, community mental health centers were seen 
to outperform both mental hospitals and outpatient settings, there is an important question 
as to whether President Reagan’s veto of the Mental Health Act reflects a true consensus 
among key decision-makers (for example, at the level of voters, medical professionals, 
and members of Congress) about the lack of effectiveness of community mental health 
centers. Given that the evidence indicates that efficacy of community mental health 
centers, it is possible that it was not public opinion related to community centers, but 
rather ideological considerations that prompted the veto of the Mental Health Act. This 
question will be explored further in the next sub-section of the literature review, informed 
by Lukes’ (1974) theory of power.   
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1.4.3 Policy and the Role of Ideology 
 One conclusion that can be reached from a synthesis of the empirical studies is 
that community mental health centers were not necessarily failures, whether in terms of 
clinical outcomes, economic efficiency, or a combination of the two. In particular, 
numerous studies (Mosher and Menn 1978, Sharfstein and Nafziger 1976, Polak and 
Kirby 1976) discussed in the literature review reached the conclusion that community 
mental health centers outperformed psychiatric hospitals in terms of clinical outcomes. If 
such findings are valid and reliable, then, with Kingdon’s (1984) theory in mind, it must 
be asked why community mental health centers fell off the policy agenda in the early 
1980s.    
 This question cannot be properly answered without further empirical analysis of 
the kind carried out in the study. However, even before the results of such an analysis are 
considered, it is possible to speculate about how different kinds of results might 
triangulate Kingdon’s theory. It would also be useful to consider the explanatory variable 
of ideology, which has received substantial attention in the literature on the Reagan era 
and mental health policy. 
 In Kingdon’s model, once a policy has been enacted, it can be dropped from an 
agenda because of cost-benefit considerations. As discussed further in the second chapter 
of the study, this approach to decision-making is rational and fits the neoclassical 
economic model of decision-making, not only with respect to assumed actor rationality 
but also with respect to a liberal political order in which the majority’s stated preferences 
govern the process of policy change. However, policy change can also take place on the 
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basis of other approaches to power. Consider Lukes’s (Lukes 1974, 36) discussion of the 
three dimensions of power.  
...the liberal takes men as they are and applies want-regarding principles to 
them, relating their interests to what they actually want or prefer, to their 
policy preference as manifested by their political participation. The 
reformist, seeing and deploring that not all men’s wants are given equal 
weight by the political system, also relates their interests to what they 
want or prefer, but allows that this may be revealed in more indirect and 
sub-political ways—in the form of deflected, submerged, or concealed 
wants and preferences. The radical...maintains that men’s wants may 
themselves be a product of a system which works against their interests, 
and in such cases, relates the latter to what they would want and prefer, 
were they able to make the choice.  
One of the most important purposes of the corpus analysis carried out as part of this study 
is to determine how President Reagan’s veto of the legislation that shut down the 
community mental health center idea can be classified in terms of power. The kind of 
corpus analysis proposed in the second chapter of the study is capable of discerning shifts 
in opinion (whether general opinion, medical opinion, or Senate opinion) that can be 
related to the role of what might be called radical or ideological decision-making. If, for 
example, the general trend before Reagan’s 1981 veto of the Mental Health Act (in 
corpora covering Congressional debate, general literature, and medical literature) was in 
favor of an outpatient- and drug-based model of mental health care, then, perhaps, 
President Reagan’s veto can be considered as an example of what Lukes (1974) referred 
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to as liberal power. In such a scenario, the veto of the Mental Health Act could be 
considered a response to the formation of a consensus against community mental health 
centers. On the other hand, if the corpus analysis indicates that the trend was towards 
praising community mental health centers, then it is surely easier to classify President 
Reagan’s veto of the Mental Health Act as a radical, or ideological, exercise of power. 
Indeed, as discussed at greater length in earlier parts of the literature review, several 
existing scholars have indeed tried to claim that Reagan’s veto of the Mental Health Act 
represented a radical rather than a liberal use of power, but this claim does not appear to 
have been empirically tested in previous studies.     
 
1.5 Gaps in the Literature 
 The trajectory of American mental health policy has been widely studied and is, 
in several respects, uncontroversial. Empirical research has established that (a) the era 
between the 19th century and the 1950s was dominated by mental health hospitals that 
received state and federal funding; (b) the era of the 1960s and 1970s was dominated by 
the transition from mental hospitals to community mental health centers; and (c) the era 
of 1980 onwards was characterized by an approach to mental health that was rooted in 
outpatient care and the administration of pharmacological therapy. What has not been as 
frequently or as compellingly discussed in the research literature is how and why these 
shifts took place.  
Several existing accounts are unidimensional; for example, some accounts 
presume that the discovery of thorazine and related drugs is a sufficient explanation of 
the decline of mental hospitals (Moncrieff 2013, Shen 1999, López-Muñoz et al. 2005, 
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Edmondson 2012, Shorter and Marshall 1997), whereas other accounts (Jones 2015, 
Thomas 1998, Navarro 1984) focus on the agency of President Reagan and his base in 
terms of their opposition to expending public resources on mental health. These accounts, 
while helpful in illuminating specific aspects of mental health policy, are too superficial 
and disjointed to bring true explanatory power to bear on the question of why there was a 
30-year gap between the technical feasibility and the actual execution of current 
American mental health policy.    
Other accounts focus on short spans of time. For example, the transition from 
Carter to Reagan might have marked an important shift in public attitudes to mental 
health, but this historical period also inherited important developments towards 
deinstitutionalization going back to the 1950s. Similarly, explanations (Moncrieff 2013, 
Shen 1999, López-Muñoz et al. 2005, Edmondson 2012, Shorter and Marshall 1997) that 
focus on the development of thorazine and the policies resulting in community mental 
health centers lack explanatory power in terms of explaining the transition from 
community mental health centers to the outpatient, drug-centered paradigm.  
Finally, existing accounts (Mosher and Menn 1978, Sharfstein and Nafziger 1976, 
Polak and Kirby 1976, Blau 1977, Okin 1984, Humphreys and Rappaport 1993, 
Goldman, McCulloch, and Sturm 1998, Tierney, Miller, and McDonald 1990, Drake et 
al. 2003, Moncrieff 2013, Shen 1999, López-Muñoz et al. 2005, Edmondson 2012, Earle 
1848, Shorter and Marshall 1997) of the shifts in American mental health policy observed 
from the 1950s to the 1980s are fragmentary, in that they do not attempt to gauge the 
influence of several plausible policy influences. For example, analyses that focus on the 
actions of the federal government and state governments in terms of healthcare 
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economics do not take into account the bottom-up pressures coming to bear on 
government from (a) grassroots changes in the public’s attitude to mental health funding 
and treatment and (b) changes in the relative power of formal and informal lobbying 
groups with stakes in the mental health policy debate.    
These gaps in the literature can be related to the discussion of theory that follows 
in the second chapter of the study. Kingdon’s theoretical framework (Kingdon 1984) for 
analyzing policy rests on two pillars, namely attention and cost-benefit analysis. 
According to Kingdon, attention is the first component for an item to appear on a policy 
agenda; next, an attention-driven policy response to the item will be evaluated by 
decision-makers and the public in light of perceived costs and benefits. If the intervention 
is deemed successful, then the item drops off the policy agenda, as its logic and effects 
are frozen into place. If the intervention is not successful, then an item can either drop off 
the policy agenda because it is perceived too high a high ratio of costs to benefits, or 
efforts to pursue policy can be renewed if key decision-makers or publics believe that the 
cost-benefit scenario of the proposed policy change is worth the pursuit of a policy. 
As discussed at greater length in the chapter on theory, the attentional and cost-
benefit analysis hypotheses are plausible explanations for the transition between different 
states of policy. While existing empirical research has ably documented (a) the existence 
of distinct states in American mental health policy and (b) broad explanations of changes 
between these states, no existing empirical analysis appears to have applied attentional 
and cost-benefit tools to model the transition between policy states. As a result, scholars 
and policy-makers have an incomplete understanding of the forces driving changes in 
American mental health policy between the 1950s and 1980s. The existing explanations 
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are broad, empirically imprecise, and speculative, justifying further research of the kind 
proposed and defended in the second chapter of the study.     
 
1.6 Conclusion 
 Given the gaps in the literature, the significance of the study can be understood in 
three ways. First, several existing accounts of the transitions in American mental health 
policy that took place between the early 1950s and the early 1980s are unidimensional, 
focusing solely on executive, legislative, or economic events. The five research questions 
proposed and answered in this study generated both top-down and bottom-up 
explanations of why a period of roughly 30 years elapsed between the technical 
feasibility of the current mental health model (the outpatient- and drug-based model) and 
its institutionalization through policy. Cumulatively, the research questions also provided 
a more comprehensive, polyvalent, and explanatorily powerful response to this question 
than any that appears in the previous literature on mental health and policy.  
 Second, the study has a broad timeframe. Although the period of interest is from 
circa 1950 to circa 1980, the analysis of mental health patients in state hospitals extends 
back to the 19th century. The timespan of the study, while not a Braudelian (Braudel 
1995) longue durée, nonetheless encompasses a broader period than that treated in much 
of the previous literature on American mental health policy.   
 Third, the study takes stock of several possible influences (including the 
influences of ordinary Americans, medical elites, pharmaceutical companies, and state 
and federal government actors) on the formation of mental health policy. The possible 
influences of these actors have been measured through a suite of empirical techniques, 
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including techniques in time-series analysis that, while retaining a great deal of 
explanatory power, have been neglected in previous literature on mental health and 
policy. However, qualitative studies have also been reviewed, and qualitative as well as 
quantitative means of argumentation have been applied to the empirical findings of the 
study.    
 
1.7 Summary 
 The debut of antipsychotic drugs strengthened the scientific case for mental 
illness as a phenomenon resulting from problems of the brain that could, at least in 
certain cases, be cured by pharmacology (Moncrieff 2013, Shen 1999, López-Muñoz et 
al. 2005, Edmondson 2012, Shorter and Marshall 1997). It is entirely possible—indeed, 
probable—that the pharmacological revolution in medicine provided an important 
justification and rationale for the changing face of mental health policy in the United 
States. However, what is not clear is why it took a substantial period of time for the 
current status quo in mental health policy to emerge. 
The general shape of American mental health policy has been fixed from roughly 
1981 to the present time. The status quo is characterized by the decline of mental 
hospitals and community mental health centers, the rise in outpatient treatment, and the 
rise of pharmacological treatment (Moncrieff 2013, Shen 1999, López-Muñoz et al. 2005, 
Edmondson 2012, Shorter and Marshall 1997). The status quo was feasible in the 1950s, 
and, as the short distance between the 1946 National Mental Health Act and the 1963 
Community Mental Health Act demonstrates, the federal government had already 
demonstrated that it could move rapidly to change the entire foundation of American 
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mental health policy. Especially given this context, the existence of the gap between the 
debut of thorazine in the early 1950s and President Reagan’s veto of the Mental Health 
Systems Act in 1981 constitutes a notable research problem.  
The literature review has reviewed evidence for why a relatively long period of 
time elapsed between the debut of thorazine and the codification of the current approach 
to mental health policy, which can be dated to the 1981 veto of the Mental Health 
Systems Act. A cost-benefit approach highlighted the possibility that the delay was due to 
a struggle between cost- and benefit-oriented arguments that took some time to play out 
in the realms of scientific discourse, public discourse, and policy. While such an 
argument seems compelling, particularly in its ability to identify the evolution of 
controversies and consensuses related to the new face of mental health policy in the 
United States, important gaps in the literature were also noted. These gaps in the 
literature can be related to the research questions of the current study, thus providing an 
evidence-based rationale for the study’s focus areas.  
The first research question of the study is as follows: How do shifts in the 
sentiments of the American public explain the delay between the appearance of thorazine 
and the adoption of the current model of American mental health care? This question can 
be answered by considering trends in public opinion (measured indirectly, through corpus 
analysis) related to deinstitutionalization, community mental health centers, antipsychotic 
drugs, outpatient treatment paradigms, and the like. The existing literature (Jones 2015, 
Thomas 1998, Navarro 1984) on this topic is cross-sectional. In other words, scholars 
have identified public opinion during specific eras, but have not attempted to 
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continuously track changes in opinion over time or to relate the pace of these changes to 
legislative actions in particular. 
The second research question of the study is as follows: How do shifts in the 
opinions of psychiatrists, psychologists, and other mental health experts explain the delay 
between the appearance of thorazine and the adoption of the current model of American 
mental health care? As with public opinion, the previous literature on this topic is cross-
sectional and qualitative in nature. Scholars have ably documented (Moncrieff 2013, 
Shen 1999, López-Muñoz et al. 2005, Edmondson 2012, Shorter and Marshall 1997) the 
opinions of psychiatrists, psychologists, and other mental health experts, but not in a 
manner that allows evolutions in such opinion to be continuously tracked and correlated 
with legislative developments.  
The third research question of the study is as follows: How do formal and 
informal lobbying efforts by pharmacological companies and other commercial 
stakeholders in mental health explain the delay between the appearance of thorazine and 
the adoption of the current model of American mental health care? The empirical analysis 
of this question is severely limited by the absence of pre-1990s data for lobbying 
spending. However, it is undoubtedly the case that pharmaceutical companies attempted 
to influence policy, both directly and indirectly, from the 1950s to the 1980s (Moncrieff 
2013, Shen 1999, López-Muñoz et al. 2005, Edmondson 2012, Shorter and Marshall 
1997). One measure of this influence is through an analysis of the marketing spending of 
the companies that manufactured the most important antipsychotic medications. Such an 
approach, while rendered feasible through an examination of publically available 
investment filings by pharmaceutical companies that existed in the time period under 
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study, would add to what little is known of the influence of pharmaceutical companies on 
both discourse and policy.  
The fourth research question of the study is as follows: How do shifts in the 
policy of individual states explain the delay between the appearance of thorazine and the 
adoption of the current model of American mental health care? Topics related to this 
research question do not appear to have been addressed in the empirical literature, and 
therefore cannot be related to a research base.  
 The fifth research question of the study is as follows: How do shifts in the policy 
of the federal government explain the delay between the appearance of thorazine and the 
adoption of the current model of American mental health care? As was the case with the 
fourth research question, topics related to the fifth research question do not appear to 





CHAPTER 2. THEORY, RESEARCH, AND METHODS 
2.1 Introduction 
 Already, by the mid-1950s, it was possible for the United States to pursue a model 
of mental health policy characterized by widespread deinstitutionalization and the 
administration of drugs in outpatient settings. However, it would take nearly 30 years for 
the policy options made viable by the existence of thorazine (soon to be followed by 
other antipsychotic drugs) and an outpatient infrastructure to be realized. The main 
purpose of this thesis is to examine the reasons for this delay.  
According to Henderikus, a theory “is normally aimed at providing explanatory 
leverage on a problem, describing innovative features of a phenomenon or providing 
predictive utility” (Henderikus 2010, 1498).  These definitions of theory can be applied to 
the identification problem in this study and the means of its investigation. Given the 
problem statement of the study and the nature of the phenomena under investigation, the 
task of theory must be to explain how and why so much time elapsed between the (a) 
feasibility and (b) actualization of a particular approach to mental health policy. The 
other definition of theory offered by Henderikus is not as important to the study. A theory 
is not needed for predictive purposes, because shifts in policy have their own unique 
characteristics, and theories brought forward to explain one such shift cannot necessarily 
explain another. 
 If the purpose of theory is to provide an explanatory framework for the observed 
phenomenon of a significant time lapse between the feasibility of a new approach to 
mental health policy, and the actualization of this policy through legislative and other 
means, change-oriented and longitudinal theories of policy ought to be selected and 
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discussed. With this objective in mind, the body of the chapter has been divided into two 
sections. The first section contains a broad overview of policy theories that are plausible 
explanatory frameworks. The second sections contain a more focused discussion of the 
theories deemed most relevant to the discussion. 
 
2.2 Theories of Policy Change: A Rationale 
 An overview of relevant theories of policy change can be delimited by keeping 
the 20th-century American context in mind. Dating back to the origins of the United 
States, there is substantial evidence that approaches in political philosophy and practice 
toward policy emphasized a cautious approach to change. As James Madison wrote in 
1787, “the constant aim is to divide and arrange the several offices in such a manner as 
that each may be a check on the other that the private interest of every individual may be 
a sentinel over the public rights” (Madison 1787, 54). The checks and balances of the 
American system have often been understood in terms of macro-level political stability, 
evidence of which can be seen in the fact that the United States has never experienced a 
major internal challenge to its system of governance. Even the short-lived Confederate 
States of America adopted, in large part, both the Constitution and governmental 
institutions of the United States.  
 Another result of the resilient constitutional republicanism coded into the 
governance of the United States from its very beginning can be seen at the meso and 
micro levels of policy change. Constitutional republicanism has, in many instances, 
slowed policy change. Evidence of this particular advantage or disadvantage of 
governance can be adduced from policy changes antedating those of mental health. In 
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terms of slavery, for example, it is of note that all of the northern states had abolished 
slavery by 1804, but that another six decades and a Civil War intervened before abolition 
became a Constitutional defended policy (Johnson 1995). By contrast, under various non-
democratic governments (whether monarchical or dictatorial) in France, slavery was 
abolished on several distinct occasions, each time at the behest of a non-democratically 
elected leader with sweeping executive powers (Jennings 2000). In the United Kingdom, 
whose constitutional monarchy contained more informal checks and balances than those 
of the various republics of France in the 19th century, it took several decades between the 
formation of a powerful sentiment in favor of abolition and the passage of the Slavery 
Abolition Act of 1833 (Eltis 1972).  
 These historical contexts are important, because they establish an appropriate 
background against which the question of mental health policy change can be considered. 
To ask the question of why 30 years elapsed between the feasibility of a particular mental 
health policy (one prioritizing outpatient treatment and pharmacological solutions to 
mental illness) and its institutionalization through policy is to assume that such a period 
might be remarkable. Indeed, the research question only assumes interest and becomes an 
appropriate topic for scholarly discussion if an explanation of the period between the 
mid-1950s and early-to-mid 1980s goes beyond mere issues of procedure and touches 
more substantial precursors to policy-making. 
 This point requires some clarification. If it is assumed that a constitutional 
republic moves relatively slowly in terms of policy change, then it could be argued that 
the gap between the scientific advances and available outpatient infrastructures of the 
1950s and their role at the foundation of the new mental health policy that emerged in the 
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1980s was merely an administrative gap, one that was rendered necessary by the delays 
in passing legislation, delays caused by consensus-building, legal challenges, and similar 
factors. Indeed, this paradigm appears to furnish a sound explanatory framework for 
many kinds of policy changes in the United States.  
However, in the case of mental health policy, some other explanation must be 
sought, because the history of competing mental health policies is not an administrative 
history. The underlying items of legislation passed quickly, without the kinds of drawn-
out consensus-building processes and legal challenges that have characterized other kinds 
of shifts in American policy, such as, in more recent times, policy related to marriage 
equality. The 1963 Community Mental Health Act signed by President Kennedy evolved 
from a 1961 report issued by the Presidentially appointed Joint Commission on Mental 
Illness and Mental Health. The Commission’s existence was legislated by the 1955 
Mental Health Study Act.  
Until 1946, the United States had not even possessed any national organization or 
agency to study mental health or make mental health recommendations. In 1946, 
President Truman signed the National Mental Health Act, which, among its other effects, 
created the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH). Thus, from being a non-issue on 
the official federal agenda, it took less than two decades for mental health to become a 
federally recognized, federally funded topic area. The entire system of sanitariums that 
had existed since the very early 19th century was undermined remarkably quickly. The 
period between the National Mental Health Act and the Community Mental Health Act, a 
relatively brief seventeen years, saw the federal government (a) enter the mental health 
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area and (b) redefine an approach to mental health that had predominated for nearly 150 
years.  
These actions were quick and unchallenged. Successive Presidents and 
Congresses appeared to defer to the findings of mental health experts, and the 
representatives of the status quo—primarily stakeholders in mental hospitals, and medical 
professionals who still defended the use of such treatments—did not bring either 
legislative or judicial challenges to the changes in mental health policy. Thus, a closer 
examination of the period from 1946 to 1963 reveals that it was indeed possible for the 
United States to move very rapidly in creating a new mental health policy, essentially 
from scratch. The magnitude of the changes observed from 1946 to 1963 creates interest 
in the question of why there was such a long gap from the debut of thorazine in the early 
1950s to an outpatient- and drug-centered model of the care in the 1980s. Given that the 
federal government of the United States had already, in the period from 1946 to 1963, 
demonstrated the relative ease of making sweeping changes to mental health policy, it is 
surely valid to wonder why it took so many more years for the outpatient- and drug-
oriented model of mental health care to be institutionalized in policy.   
As Henderikus (2010) has argued, the most useful theories address true problems. 
If the gap between the debut of thorazine and the formation of the current contours of 
mental health policy can be explained by processes such as judicial challenge, legislative 
gridlock, and other factors, the delay is not a research problem, but rather an inevitable 
administrative fact of policy change. In this context, the purpose of highlighting the 
radical nature of the 1946-1963 changes in U.S. mental health policy is to indicate that a 
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research problem does exist, and, consequently, that there is a need for an appropriate 
theory.      
 
2.3  Selection and Discussion of Theory 
 There are numerous theories that can bring explanatory power to bear on the 
central research question of this study, which is why so much time elapsed between the 
debut of thorazine in the 1950s and the true adoption of the outpatient- and drug-centered 
paradigm of the 1980s. One possible theoretical framework is that provided by Kingdon: 
Problems not only rise on governmental agenda, but they also fade from 
view. Why do they fade? First, government may address the problem, or 
fail to address it. In both cases, attention turns to something else, either 
because something has been done or because people are frustrated by 
failure and refuse to invest more of their time in a losing cause. (Kingdon 
1984, 208).    
There are several elements of Kingdon’s theory that require closer analysis and 
discussion before evaluating the theory’s applicability. First, the idea of attention is 
important. One of the points raised in the literature review was that it took a substantial 
amount of time for large numbers of Americans to begin to pay attention to issues of 
mental health policy. In this regard, the study of Rosemary Kennedy first mentioned in 
chapter one is particularly instructive, and is worth framing as an example of how 
attention has worked in the context of mental health policy formation. This young woman 
was given a lobotomy at the behest of her father, Joseph P. Kennedy, Sr., and hidden 
away at a private sanitarium until her death. The mental health hospital system was adept 
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at covering the problem of mental illness rather than drawing attention to it. It was not 
until the mental health system expanded to include larger numbers of Americans that the 
circle of people influenced by mental health policy was also enlarged. In the case of 
Rosemary Kennedy, a future President of the United States is likely to have been 
influenced by the knowledge of what happened to his own younger sister (Shorter 2000).  
 The same kinds of theoretical considerations could apply to the debut of thorazine 
and the later emergence of the outpatient- and drug-centered model of medical treatment. 
It is possible that the delay between the feasibility of the new approach to mental health, 
and its implementation in policy, was a matter of attention. It is possible that the reform 
of mental health hospitals undertaken between 1946 and 1963 was rapid because, in the 
years leading up to this time, members of the ordinary public as well as elite decision-
makers had had their attention directed to knowledge that disparaged mental hospitals. If 
so, then the rapidity of the steps taken between 1946 and 1963 can reflect a focusing of 
attention on the problems associated with mental hospitals, attention that could draw 
upon the large and growing body of anti-mental health hospital discourse that had been 
accumulating since the end of the 19th century. 
 Admittedly, no a priori justification can be found for applying the attentional 
component of Kingdon’s theory to a specific aspect of American mental health policy. 
Kingdon’s theory requires empirical validation. However, it is also necessary to explore 
how and why such a theory should be chosen as a framework for empirical analysis in the 
first place. 
 To begin with, the phenomenon of attention appears to be important. Mental 
hospitals had existed in the United States from almost the very beginning of the country 
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(Shorter and Marshall 1997), and there had consequently been a great deal of time for the 
attention of the public (and of decision-making elites) to be drawn to such institutions, 
despite the veil of secrecy that attended the operation of mental hospitals. By contrast, 
thorazine entered the United States in a very modest manner, insofar as its ability to 
attract the attention of both ordinary people and decision-making elites. Thorazine had 
been developed in France, and the French political and medical establishment both had 
reasons to speed the adoption of this drug, and, indeed, to use it as the basis for a new 
paradigm of mental health policy (Stewart 1957). Large numbers of important decision-
makers in France were well-aware of thorazine shortly after the medicine was licensed 
for use; moreover, France had a long tradition of excellence in neuroscientific research 
that had succeeded in changing the perception of mental illness from an unknown 
affliction to the expected sequel of specific defects in the brain. Indeed, the French 
physician Paul Broca’s discovery of aphasia in the 19th century had brought French 
research into the forefront of the scientific discourse on mental illness (Binder 2009, 
Meuse and Marquardt 1985). Given these facts, it is less surprising to observe that France 
moved quickly to dismantle its mental hospitals and approve the use of antipsychotic 
drugs as the main pillar of treatment. 
 In the 1950s, the situation in the United States was very different from that of 
France. American scientists had not, until that time, been as prominent in the analysis of 
the physical causes of mental illness as European (particularly French and German) 
scientists had been. There was a relatively substantial gap between the policy-making 
apparatus of federal government and the ability of American scientists to speak with one 
voice in making certain recommendations. In this respect, both French and British policy 
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benefited from the existence of scientific institutions (including the Académie Nationale 
de Médecine in France and the Royal Medical Society in the United Kingdom) that had 
superior status and the ability to make policy recommendations that were likely to be 
taken seriously (Weill 1994). Although scientific academics had long existed in the 
United States, it was not until the formation of NIMH in the late 1940s that the field of 
mental health had an organization that could make meaningful recommendations. In 
France, the United Kingdom, and Germany, existing medical and scientific societies had 
taken up mental health-related research and agenda-building earlier.  
Thus, when thorazine arrived in the United States, there was not a fully mature 
scientific organization that could disseminate knowledge of this drug or build a consensus 
around its use. This fact is closely tied to the use of Kingdon’s theory, particularly in 
relation to the importance of attention. Given the immaturity of mental health-related 
scientific institutions in the United States, it is plausible to hypothesize that it took a 
relatively substantial amount of time for the attention of physicians, governmental 
decision-makers, and other key stakeholders to be called to the possibility of a new, 
pharmacologically-driven approach to mental health policy. 
The discussion above highlights a top-down aspect of policy change. In the case 
of France, for example, the existence of a consensus at high levels of the scientific and 
governmental establishments made it possible to reform the French mental health system 
without waiting for substantial input from the mass French voters. In the United States, 
by contrast, no elite consensus-building mechanism appeared to exist when thorazine 
appeared. It would take several more years for NIMH to develop institutional power, for 
instance. In the United States, drawing attention to the viability of a new form of mental 
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health policy therefore appears to involve a bottom-up as well as a top-down component. 
In other words, at the same time that elite decision-makers in the United States were 
becoming acquainted with the viability of mental health policies that revolved around the 
use of pharmacology and an outpatient paradigm, ordinary Americans were also 
becoming informed of the alternatives in this field. 
Admittedly, no precisely causal relationship can be drawn between the process of 
consensus-building and the passage of legislation or other mechanisms for enacting 
policy. Scholars must speculate about the relationship between legislation (or the absence 
or vetoing of legislation) and underlying reasons for the appearance of certain issues on 
an agenda. Kingdon has suggested that attention—both the attention of those who make 
or recommend policy, and the attention of voters—is a predictor of the emergence or 
failure of policies. This theory seems explanatorily powerful even when applied to 
different cases. In the case of France, it seems plausible to argue that the short amount of 
time that elapsed between the appearance of thorazine and the reformation of the French 
mental health system was a function of the existence of a consensus among elite French 
scientists and policy-makers about the usefulness of a drug-based approach. Similarly, it 
seems plausible that the much longer delay between the appearance of thorazine in the 
United States and the emergence of a new mental health policy paradigm could be due to 
the longer amount of time necessary to draw attention to policy alternatives.  
Thus, Kingdon’s theory—particularly in terms of its emphasis on attention—
appears to fit the broad contours of what is known of the relationship between the 
appearance of thorazine and subsequent developments in French and American mental 
health policy. However, Kingdon’s theory has another advantage in this respect, which is 
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that it is empirically testable. The variable of attention can, in the manner described in the 
third chapter of this study, be measured through corpus analysis. While this empirical 
approach is subject to numerous limitations, it constitutes a viable means of measuring 
both the bottom-up (through an analysis of general corpora) and top-down (through an 
analysis of corpora limited to influential medical publications) direction of attentional 
resources to the viability of a model of mental health policy based on drugs and 
outpatient-centered treatment.        
Another important element of Kingdon’s theory lies in the discussion of failure 
and investment. As Kingdon wrote, “attention turns to something else, either because 
something has been done or because people are frustrated by failure and refuse to invest 
more of their time in a losing cause” (Kingdon 1984, 208).   Implicit in this statement is a 
recognition of cost-benefit analysis as a driver of how policy agendas are set, and of how 
policy agendas can change. Herein, Kingdon suggests an essentially rational approach to 
evaluating policy. This assumption of rationality can be connected to the debut of 
economic rationality theory in the late-18th century work of Adam Smith (Smith 2010) 
and in the entire subsequent tradition of neoclassic economics (Klein 1992, Camerer, 
Loewenstein, and Rabin 2011, Goddard 1995, Hayek 1968, Solow 1956, Hayami and 
Godo 2005, Abel and Deitz 2014, Menger 2014, Baumol and Blinder 2011).  
A cursory examination of the history underlying American mental health policy 
suggests that rationality is a plausible theme in explaining policy agenda-building and 
choices. It appears that the initial impetus for building mental hospitals were the 
interrelated beliefs that (a) mental illness was an essentially incurable affliction, (b) the 
mentally ill could not be integrated into the streams of ordinary public and private life, 
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and (c) there was a Christian obligation to creating institutions that could care for the 
mentally ill.  
The debut of community health centers in the 1960s appears to have been based, 
at least in part, on a rejection of the rationality of the mental hospital paradigm. At this 
point in the history of American mental health policy, the existence of antipsychotic 
drugs had been noted and incorporated the framework of a treatment structure; hence, 
assumptions (a) and (b) of the mental hospital paradigm had been directly challenged. 
The new assumptions of the community mental health center included the belief that 
antipsychotic drugs could be administered in a setting with minimal involvement from 
physicians and other mental health professionals. This assumption was eventually belied 
by the observed failure of community mental health centers, which in turn led to the 
conclusion that a combination of pharmacological treatment and outpatient settings might 
be the best policy approach. Studying the evolution of these successive policies suggests 
a possible role for the framing and testing of cost-benefit assumptions related to mental 
health policies.   
Another reason that Kingdon’s theory is appropriate for the topic of mental health 
policy is its acknowledgement of the present as well as hidden dimensions of power. 
Clegg, Courpasson, and Phillips have described the hidden dimension of power, which 
does not focus just on observable behavior but seeks to make an 
interpretive understanding of the intentions that are seen to lie behind 
social actions...These come into play, especially, when choices are made 
concerning what agenda items are ruled in or ruled out; when it is 
determined that, strategically, for whatever reasons, some areas remain a 
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zone of non-decision rather than decision. (Clegg, Courpasson, and 
Phillips 2006, 210).  
 Kingdon is explicitly interested in not only the means (attention) by which an 
item enters a policy agenda but also in how items fail to enter policy agendas. The 
variable of attention appears to be an explanatorily powerful means of exploring both 
how items are included in, and left out of, policy agendas. In addition, as further 
described in the third chapter of the study, both attention and the absence of attention can 
be empirically modeled.   
The two-tiered nature of Kingdon’s theory—that is, in the theory’s emphasis on 
the building of attention as well as on the application of cost-benefit analysis, considered 
as an expression of bounded rationality—appears to be uniquely suited to examining 
shifts in American mental health policy. The phenomenon of attention appears to be an 
appropriate theoretical prism from which to view the building of elite and lay consensus 
on a new paradigm of mental health policy; the attentional prong of Kingdon’s approach 
fits some of what is known about the adoption of new mental health paradigms in France 
as well as in the United States, and it is empirically testable. Kingdon’s emphasis on cost-
benefit analysis also seems to possess explanatory power with regards to explaining how 
and why the community mental health center concept interposed between the discovery 
of thorazine and the transition to a mental health paradigm that encompassed both 
pharmacological treatment and outpatient settings. Ideas of cost-benefit analysis can be 
applied to the economics of mental health policy as well. For these reasons, Kingdon’s 
theory is well-suited to the current study.   
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Kingdon’s theory is imbricated with other relevant theories. Herbert Simon’s 
(Simon 1982) theory of bounded rationality suggests that decisions are imperfect, as they 
are limited by time, energy, attention, prior knowledge, prior assumptions, and other 
tangible and intangible resources. Simon himself argued that, if decision-making were 
perfect, there would be no need to study any kind of administrative decisions, as such 
decisions would always satisfy some kind of mini-max condition in which risks were 
minimized and utility maximized. Kingdon’s theory is also not unique in its emphasis on 
attention, as the work of both Jones and Baumgartner (Jones and Baumgartner 2005) and 
Jones (Jones 1994) has called attention as a predictor of changes in political decision-
making. One of Jones’ signal contributions was to argue that attentiveness is typically 
focused on a single agenda item, and Jones and Baumgartner built a theory of political 
attention that, with its emphasis on the necessarily imperfect nature of information 
processing, also invokes Simon. Kingdon’s work addresses issues of attention and 
bounded rationality but it is unique for its emphasis on multiple streams. In the current 
study, the idea of multiple streams has been incorporated into the methodology of content 
analysis, as the assumption is that shifts in attention might have their roots in how 
attention was generated by information streams from scholarly journals, newspapers, 
medical journals and other channels. Thus, while Kingdon’s work should be situated with 
the work of Simon and with other attention-focused theorists, its additional dimension of 
multiple streams renders it an appropriate choice as the theoretical foundation for this 




2.4 Overview of Research Questions and Methods 
 The following research questions guided the study: 
 RQ1: How do shifts in the sentiments of the American public explain the delay 
between the appearance of thorazine and the adoption of the current model of American 
mental health care? 
 RQ2: How do shifts in the opinions of psychiatrists, psychologists, and other 
mental health experts explain the delay between the appearance of thorazine and the 
adoption of the current model of American mental health care? 
 RQ3: How do formal and informal lobbying efforts by pharmacological 
companies and other commercial stakeholders in mental health explain the delay between 
the appearance of thorazine and the adoption of the current model of American mental 
health care? 
 RQ4: How do shifts in the policy of individual states explain the delay between 
the appearance of thorazine and the adoption of the current model of American mental 
health care? 
 RQ5: How do shifts in the policy of the federal government explain the delay 
between the appearance of thorazine and the adoption of the current model of American 
mental health care? 
 Cumulatively, these five research questions capture multiple possible layers of 
influence on American mental health policy. The combination of these layers results in a 
richer and more explanatorily powerful approach to understanding changes in American 
mental health policy than would results from a unidimensional analysis. RQ1 represents a 
bottom-up approach to the purpose of the study, one in which shifts in public opinion are 
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treated, if not as proximate causes, then as strong background influences on the evolution 
of mental health policy. RQ5 reflects a top-down approach, one in which policy is 
understood in terms of cooperation as well as tension between different layers of state 
governance. RQs 2, 3, and 4 reflect meso-level analyses, that is, analyses that focus on 
policy influences that fit between public sentiment (RQ1) and government action (RQ4).  
 In terms of overall methodological design, the study is quantitative in nature. An 
overview of both quantitative and qualitative methods has been provided in the table 
below. While the framework for empirical analysis is quantitative, it should be noted that 
each chapter of analysis will be accompanied by a qualitative discussion of the literature 
relevant to that chapter. Thus, while the study is not mixed-methods in nature, a review of 
qualitative literature and a utilization of qualitative arguments will provide triangulation 
for the quantitative methods used in the study.  The presentation of the study’s results, 
and the strength of the inferences drawn from results, will be inspired by McNabb’s 
discussion of both quantitative and qualitative research designs.    
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 Table 1. Differences between Quantitative and Qualitative Research 
Philosophical 
Foundations 







Researchers assume that multiple, 




Researchers assume that 
a single, objective 
world exists. 
Epistemology (roles for 
the researcher) 
Researchers commonly assume 
that they must interact with their 
studied phenomena. 
 
Researchers assume that 
they are independent 




Researchers overtly act in a 
value-laden and biased fashion. 
 
Researchers overtly act 





Researchers often use 
personalized, informal, and 
context-laden language. 
 
Researchers most often 
use impersonal, formal, 
and rule-based text. 
Procedures (as 
employed in research) 
Researchers tend to apply 
induction, multivariate, and 
multiprocess interactions, 
following context-laden methods. 
 
Researchers tend to 





Note: Adapted from McNabb (2010, p. 225) 
 
A discussion of each of the research questions follow below. The discussion contains 
analytical details that explain and defend the means proposed to answer the research 
questions of the study.  
2.4.1 RQs 1 and 2 
 RQs1 and 2 have been answered through corpus analysis of numerous periodicals. 
For RQ1, the working premise is that sentiments about mental health policy can fall into 




Table 2. Coding Categories, RQs 1 and 2 









Positive P1 P2 P3 
Neutral NU1 NU2 NU3 
Negative NE1 NE2 NE3 
 
Assume that the time from 1952 to the start of 1981 (the year in which President Reagan 
vetoed the Mental Health Systems Act) is decomposed into 92 quarters, with q1 1952 
designated as time 1 and q1 1981 designated as time 92. There are three events of interest 
in this time series. 1963 saw deinstitutionalization adopted as federal law, with 1967 
marking the passage of the Mental Health Amendments Act—the high point of the 
community mental health center concept. In early 1981, President Reagan’s veto 
terminated the community mental health center era just as surely as the 1963 Mental 
Health Act terminated the mental hospital era.   
 Given the existence of these points of interest, RQ1 will be answered by plotting 
the time-series curves for the following values as specified in Table 2: P2 /  NU2 + NE2 
and P3 / NU3 + NE3. The ratio of P2 /  NU2 + NE2 measures the relative frequency of 
articles praising community mental health centers as compared to articles either neutral or 
opposed to community mental health centers. The ratio of P3 /  NU3 + NE3 measures the 
relative frequency of articles praising outpatient, drug-based care as compared to articles 
either neutral or opposed to outpatient, drug-based care. It is theoretically plausible that, 
if there was an increasing frequency in positive mentions of community mental health 
centers, then the plotting of the ratio P2 / NU2 + NE2 from q1 1952 to q4 1962 would 
look like a sigmoid function, on the assumptions that (a) it would take time for the policy 
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alternative (shifting from mental health hospitals to community mental health centers) to 
gain traction in public discourse; (b) there would be rapid diffusion of this idea as a 
policy alternative; and (c) there would eventually be a saturation of the policy alternative, 
indicating its transformation as a new status quo and prefiguring its adoption as official 
policy (in the form of the 1963 Mental Health Act). 
 In sigmoid curves, growth is most rapid in the middle of a time series and slowest 
at the beginning and end of a period. However, the plot of P2 / NU2 + NE2 from q1 1952 
to q4 1962 could take a different shape; for example, it could be linear, or it might be a 
random walk. The shape of the curve cannot be specified in advance; however, for RQ1, 
it can be hypothesized that any public influence on the passage of the Mental Health Act 
of 1963 could be modeled as some kind of growth in the ratio P2 /  NU2 + NE2 over 
time. The same kind of assumptions and methods can be applied to the ratio P3 /  NU3 + 
NE3.  
 Leaving aside statistical assumptions, the larger methodological assumption 
behind RQ1 is that the tenor of public discourse can be gauged from a general survey of 
periodicals and other items in a written corpus. In order to ensure that public opinion—
rather than journalistic opinion, which might be an unreliable proxy for public opinion—
is being sampled, the corpus for RQ1 has been limited to an analysis of material 
appearing in letters to the editor in major American newspapers.  
 The methods for RQ1 can be applied to RQ2, with the only shift being in the 
corpus itself, from newspapers to periodicals containing content from psychologists, 
psychiatrists, and other subject-matter experts on mental health. If the opinions of this 
class of experts impacted the passage of either the Mental Health Act of 1963 or the 
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vetoing of the Mental Health Systems Act in 1981, then there should be a pattern of 
growth in the ratios of P2 / NU2 + NE2 (from q1 1952 to q4 1962) and P3 / NU3 + NE3 
(from q1 1963 to q4 1980).  
 For RQ1 and 2, there are compelling reasons to expect a sigmoid curve in the time 
series for P2 / NU2 + NE2 and P3 / NU3 + NE3. At the beginning of each time series 
(from q1 1952 to q4 1962 and from q1 1963 to q4 1980), it is likely that the policy 
alternatives were exotic and unknown. Thus, for example, a member of the public might 
not have known, in the early 1950s, of either the existence of thorazine or its ability to 
support a new kind of mental health policy. Similarly, after thorazine became well known 
and there was already a move towards deinstitutionalization with the 1963 passage of the 
Mental Health Act, an average American in the mid-1960s might not have been able to 
envision, much less defend, a model of mental health that was rooted both in 
psychopharmacology and in outpatient settings. It is plausible to assume that time was 
needed for these alternatives to become well-known and well-defended in public 
discourse.  After the policy alternatives become better-known and widely defended, it is 
possible that the ratios P2 / NU2 + NE2 and P3 / NU3 + NE3 leveled off, as they took on 
the aspects of a status quo and required less defense. 
 It is possible that the curves generated for RQs 1 and 2 could indicate the absence 
of a sigmoidal, exponential growth, linear, or otherwise growth-biased curve, in which 
case it could be hypothesized that the sentiments of neither the public nor medical elites 
were related to the key policy actions (the Mental Health Act in 1963 and the veto of the 
Mental Health Systems Act in 1981). Admittedly, inferences from the RQ 1-2 curves to 
the influence of the public or medical elites on American mental health policy are subject 
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to numerous limitations, including the possibility that RQ1 fails to sample true public 
opinion and that RQ2 fails to sample the true opinion of medical elites. Not only the 
sampling methods but also the statistical decision to calculate opinion on the basis of the 
P /  NU + NE ratio might be flawed. These flaws, and possible means for remediating 
them, will be discussed in the chapters dedicated to RQ1 and RQ2.  
2.4.2 RQ3 
 As access to formal lobbying records only became possible after 1998, RQ3 must 
be answered through other means. In this respect, it is possible to tabulate the advertising 
and marketing spending of pharmaceutical companies, treated as both a raw sum and as a 
percentage of revenues, as time series. These records are available for public 
pharmaceutical companies, in some cases dating back to the early 20th century, although 
the companies themselves have to be approached with requests to yield U.S.-specific 
advertising / marketing figures for the quarters in question. 
The reasoning applied to RQs 1 and 2 can also be applied to RQ3, in that, if the 
raw sum of advertising / marketing spending or advertising / marketing spending as a 
percentage of revenues show a pattern of growth leading to shifts in the status quo, then it 
is possible to argue that pharmaceutical companies purchased policy influence. The 
sigmoid curve might have special power with respect to this research question, because it 
predicts a brief drop-off in money dedicated to advertising or marketing in the period 
after pharmaceutical companies got what they wanted—the Mental Health Act of 1963 
and the 1981 veto of the Mental Health Systems Act. On the other hand, because it is by 
no means certain that overall advertising / marketing budgets are proxy variables for 
money spent to influence policy, the proposed statistical analysis for RQ3 is also subject 
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to important limitations, and, like the analyses for the other RQs of the study, must be 
accompanied and complemented by qualitative analysis.  
2.4.3 RQ4 
 There are several possible means to analyze how shifts in the policy of individual 
states might explain the delay between the appearance of thorazine and the adoption of 
the current model of American mental health care. Of particular interest is the manner in 
which federal decision-making impacted state decision-making. As mentioned briefly, 
states underwent an intensive process of building mental hospitals throughout the 19th 
century. Given that the first important federal mandate for deinstitutionalization came in 
the 1963 Mental Health Act, graphing the growth in the number of patients in state 
mental hospitals from 1890 to 1981, and then using these data to reach conclusions about 
the impact of the federal deinstitutionalization mandate on the states’ mental hospitals, as 
discussed below.  
The growth of patients in state mental hospitals took the form of a sigmoid curve 
in the 19th century. At the beginning of the century, there were very few patients in such 
hospitals; there was then a period of rapid growth leading to a leveling off towards the 
end of the 19th century (note that, in the actual statistical analyses of mental hospital 
patients offered in the study, ratios rather than raw numbers have been utilized, in order 
to exclude the impact of the rising population of the United States, using the formula 
number of state mental hospital patients / total residents of state). If the ratio of mental 
health patients to state residents leveled off at the end of the 19th century, then it is logical 
to expect a random walk without drift in the ratio of state mental health patients. If 
federal decision-making was the main input into states’ mental hospitals, then it can be 
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expected that the 1963 passage of the Mental Health Act disrupted the status quo and led 
to a rapid plunge in the ratio of mental hospital patients in the states. On the other hand, it 
is also possible that the states had taken their own meaningful steps towards 
institutionalization before 1963. Using Chow breakpoint analysis and Markov switching, 
it is possible to determine whether 1963 was indeed the main turning point in the decline 
of the ratio of mental patients in state hospitals. If 1963 (or subsequent years, up to and 
including 1967, the year in which the Mental Health Amendments Act was passed) was a 
breakpoint, then it can be inferred that it was indeed the federal mandate, rather than 
existing state-level trends, that was responsible for the observed downturn in both the 
number and ratio of mental patients in state hospitals.  
2.4.4 RQ5 
The analysis of RQ5 is rendered easier by the existence of the Congressional 
record, which has been coded according to the scheme presented in Table 3 below.     
Table 3. Coding Categories, RQ 5 









Positive P1 P2 P3 
Negative NE1 NE2 NE3 
  
Note the similarity between Tables 2 and 3. The difference is that, in Table 3, the coding 
category of ‘neutral’ has been omitted, as the corpus consists of Congressional speeches, 
which are unlikely to contain neutral content. The same time-series approach proposed 
for RQs 1 and 2 has been applied to RQ5. The presumptions are that there will be pattern 
of growths in (a) the P2 / NE2 ratio in the Congressional sessions leading up to the 
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passage of the Mental Health Act of 1963 and (b) the P3 / NE3 ratio in the Congressional 
sessions leading up to the 1981 veto of the Mental Health Systems Act. However, the 
analysis for RQ5 is less reliable than the analyses for RQs 1 and 2, as the analysis for 
RQ5 is limited by the relative infrequency of Congresses.    
There are numerous limitations associated with these research questions.  A 
specific discussion of some of these limitations has been provided in the description of 
each research question’s core analytical approach. There is also a general limitation of the 
kind of statistical methods employed in this study. This limitation can be described 
through Roodman’s discussion of the work of Leamer  (Leamer 1983, Roodman 2007), 
which raised a limitation faced by nearly all statistical studies that try to measure 
complex constructs (such as, in the case of the present study, public opinion) through the 
use of necessarily simplified statistical models. Discussing empirical papers (on the 
relationship between foreign aid and economic growth) that reduce complex phenomena 
to statistical simplifications, Roodman observed that 
These papers differ not only in their conclusions but in their specifications 
as well…Although probably none of the choices are made on a whim; these 
differences appear to be examples of what Leamer called “whimsy.” From 
Leamer’s point of view the studies together represent a small sampling of 
specification space. And few include much robustness testing. Without 
further analysis, it is hard to know whether the results reveal solid 
underlying regularities in the data or are fragile artifacts of particular 
specification choices. (Roodman 2007, 56). 
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The two theoretical concepts, drawn from Kingdon (1984), that provide a focus for 
empirical analysis are (a) attention and (b) bounded rationality as a basis for reaching and 
validating decisions. Broadly speaking, Kingdon’s concept of attention is operationalized 
and addressed in the first three research questions of the study, whereas the concept of 
bounded rationality, operationalized through cost-benefit analysis, is present in the fourth 
and fifth research questions of the study. The measures proposed to operationalize these 
theoretical variables are, in Roodman’s terminology, fragile, in that they were chosen 
from a great many possible means of operationalizing both attention and cost-benefit 
analysis. As Roodman pointed out, the danger of modeling complex variables through 
simplified statistical modeling is that the results might not reflect an underlying 
relationship between variables, but rather the bias inherent in operationalization 
decisions. Because of data limitations and other inherent difficulties in operationalization, 
these limitations of quantitative analysis cannot be avoided in the empirical approaches to 
the study described in this chapter. However, the provision of a rich discussion of the 
literature in each chapter of empirical analysis offers insights into alternative viewpoints 
and a means of triangulating the empirical findings of the study.     
 Another limitation of the study involves the means of coding proposed for corpus 
analysis. This coding has been structured in the form of a 3 x 3 table, with the options on 
one axis being three policy alternatives (the status quo of mental hospitals, the use of 
community mental health centers, and the use of both outpatient and drug-based care) and 
the other axis being three attitudes (positive, negative, neutral). Given the insights 
reported in the review of literature, the most important threat to this coding scheme is the 
failure to properly distinguish between the three alternatives.  
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 Consider, for example, the fact that both community mental health centers and 
outpatient treatment settings can include the administration of antipsychotic medications. 
Given this fact, a reliable form of corpus analysis must be able to assign sentiments 
uniquely—that is, to avoid the mistake of counting a sentiment as belonging to, say, 
community mental health centers when it should be assigned to outpatient- and drug-
based care instead. In some cases, this difficulty can be solved through context; analysis 
of the surrounding text returned by a corpus hit can indicate that an author was writing 
about a specific treatment venue. However, in the absence of such context, closer reading 
is necessary to ensure that a sentiment from a corpus item is indeed assigned to the right 
policy alternative.  
Unfortunately, there is no algorithmic, automated manner of engaging in coding 
sentiments related to policy alternatives. Accordingly, wherever corpus analysis has been 
used in the study, some contextual discussion has been provided as to not only how 
sentiments were detected but also how those sentiments were assigned to the appropriate 
policy alternative. Given that the corpus analysis returned a relatively low volume of 
useful results, it was possible to dedicate more research time to the more precise coding 
and description of the study’s data. Ensuring the accuracy of the coding process was a 
vital part of protecting the study from what Roodman (2007) identified as the challenge 
of fragility that can arise from the ad hoc use of statistical coding.     
     
2.5 Summary 
 The purpose of this chapter of the study was to describe and defend the theory 
that will serve as an explanatory framework for a study, with specific reference to 
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research method and design. Kingdon’s (1984) theory of policy change was chosen and 
described in terms of its major components, attention and cost-benefit analysis.  As 
described in this chapter, the first three research questions of the study were designed to 
measure the construct of attention, whereas the fourth and fifth questions of the study 
were designed to measure the construct of cost-benefit analysis. There is therefore a close 
integration between Kingdon’s theoretical framework and the empirical research design 




CHAPTER 3. RQ1 
3.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to answer the first research question of the study, which 
was as follows: How do shifts in the sentiments of the American public—for which 
sentiments in a popular media corpus might be a surrogate—explain the delay between 
the appearance of thorazine and the adoption of the current model of American mental 
health care? The chapter consists of three sections. First, the research question has been 
answered through time-series analysis. Second, the results are discussed with reference to 
past theories and empirical findings. Finally, the overall significance of the answer to the 
research question has been discussed. 
  
3.2 Statistical Analysis of RQ1 
The statistical analysis of RQ1 was carried out on the basis of a grid of possible values 
that appears in Table 4 below.  
Table 4. RQ1: Possible Coding Values 









Positive P1 P2 P3 
Neutral NU1 NU2 NU3 
Negative NE1 NE2 NE3 
 
This grid was applied as a coding template. The premise of the grid was that, in any given 
time period (such as a month), corpus analysis can take the measure of the overall attitude 
of the American public.  For example, the ratio of  P2 /  NU2 + NE2 can be taken to 
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measure the relative frequency of articles praising community mental health centers as 
compared to articles either neutral or opposed to community mental health centers, while 
the ratio of P3 /  NU3 + NE3 measures the relative frequency of articles in favor of 
outpatient, drug-based care as compared to articles either neutral or opposed to 
outpatient, drug-based care. Conceptually, these two ratios measure increasing support 
for the alternatives to institutionalization that arose in the early 1950s. 
 Based on this approach, it was necessary to calculate the P2 /  NU2 + NE2 ratio 
(increasing support for community mental health centers) and P3 /  NU3 + NE3 ratio 
(increasing support for outpatient, drug-based care) for each interval in the selected time 
period. The chosen time period was from the beginning of 1951 to the beginning of 1981. 
This time period was divided into 92 quarters, with q1 1952 designated as time 1 and q1 
1981 designated as time 117.  For each of these quarterly periods, corpus analysis 
revealed the (a) increasing support for community mental health center ratio (CMHC) 
and (b) increasing support for outpatient, drug-based care ratio (ODBC).  
 Clearly, the nature of the selected corpus influenced the results, so the method of 
choosing and searching the corpus requires discussion. For the purposes of all statistical 
analyses in this study, a custom corpus was built, using Pacx software for purposes of 
corpus loading, integration, and querying. Pacx served as the front-end tool through 
which, leverage application protocol interfaces (APIs), the following corpora were 
queried: 
• Periodicals Archive Online (ProQuest) 
• News, Policy, and Politics Magazine Archive (ProQuest)  
• Health and Medical Collection (ProQuest) 
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• PsycARTICLES (ProQuest) 
• Psychology Database (ProQuest) 
Cumulatively, these five corpus sources represented well over a billion words of 
text in several fields, including popular newspapers and journals, specialty medical 
publications, and other sources likely to host the data necessary to answer the first 
research question of the study. The raw data from the coding appear below: 
Table 5. Raw Data for RQ1 
Year Quarter CMHC ODBC 
1952 1 0 9 
1952 2 0 11 
1952 3 0 23 
1952 4 0 27 
1953 5 0 25 
1953 6 0 23 
1953 7 0 31 
1953 8 0 20 
1954 9 0 22 
1954 10 0 13 
1954 11 0 19 
1954 12 0 24 
1955 13 0 30 
1955 14 0 7 
1955 15 0 22 
1955 16 0 25 
1956 17 0 20 
1956 18 0 5 
1956 19 0 27 
1956 20 0 30 
1957 21 0 31 
1957 22 0 27 
1957 23 0 30 
1957 24 0 15 
1958 25 0 15 
1958 26 0 22 
1958 27 0 8 
1958 28 0 25 
1959 29 0 16 
1959 30 0 20 
1959 31 0 33 
1959 32 0 26 
1960 33 24 32 
1960 34 13 15 
1960 35 12 25 
1960 36 7 11 
1961 37 15 39 
1961 38 8 20 
1961 39 20 14 
1961 40 10 35 
1962 41 18 26 
1962 42 23 34 
1962 43 6 19 
1962 44 25 29 
1963 45 21 39 
1963 46 17 22 
1963 47 23 22 
1963 48 3 27 
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Year Quarter CMHC ODBC 
1964 49 7 21 
1964 50 16 31 
1964 51 3 22 
1964 52 21 18 
1965 53 14 10 
1965 54 3 34 
1965 55 3 17 
1965 56 19 21 
1966 57 18 16 
1966 58 3 18 
1966 59 7 17 
1966 60 7 11 
1967 61 14 50 
1967 62 16 53 
1967 63 25 57 
1967 64 31 58 
1968 65 29 60 
1968 66 46 66 
1968 67 45 63 
1968 68 44 65 
1969 69 78 66 
1969 70 107 51 
1969 71 98 67 
1969 72 88 68 
1970 73 120 52 
1970 74 122 76 
1970 75 130 79 
1970 76 89 80 
1971 77 97 80 
1971 78 90 111 
1971 79 100 81 
1971 80 97 82 
1972 81 102 49 
1972 82 102 84 
1972 83 105 84 
1972 84 91 95 
1973 85 109 87 
1973 86 107 89 
1973 87 98 92 
1973 88 92 81 
1974 89 108 97 
1974 90 96 98 
1974 91 108 99 
1974 92 106 117 
1975 93 93 101 
1975 94 97 101 
1975 95 102 102 
1975 96 106 78 
1976 97 92 109 
1976 98 28 111 
1976 99 34 114 
1976 100 30 71 
1977 101 25 123 
1977 102 40 124 
1977 103 36 126 
1977 104 37 98 
1978 105 25 115 
1978 106 21 137 
1978 107 37 142 
1978 108 19 104 
1979 109 36 156 
1979 110 32 105 
1979 111 20 212 
1979 112 20 167 
1980 113 19 170 
1980 114 41 181 
1980 115 29 190 
1980 116 26 256 
1981 117 17 212 
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 The first step in analysis was visualizing these data in a comparative manner, as in 
Figure 2 below. Figure 2.  is a line graph in which the x axis is time (measured in 
quarters) and the y axis is for levels of support for CMHC and ODBC.   
 
Figure 2. Trends in CMHC and ODBC support in corpus, RQ1 
 
In order to achieve more precise insights into the dynamics of changing support for 
CMHC and ODBC, a Chow breakpoint test2 (Chow 1960) was conducted separately for 
CMHC and ODBC support. In this procedure, a structural breakpoint was identified on 
the basis of the quarter in which the Wald statistic3 was maximized. The results have 
been plotted in Figures 3 and 4 below. These results indicate that the break point for 
CMHC came in quarter 69 (the first quarter of 1969), while the break point for ODBC 
                                                
2 A time-series test that divides a time series into two portions separated by a so-called breakpoint, when 
one trends is replaced by another trend.  
3 A parametrical statistical test that, in the context of the Chow test, identifies the point in a time series 
















came in quarter 61 (the first quarter of 1967). These breakpoints have been superimposed 
on Figures 3 and 4.   
 





































 Interestingly, the support for CMHC and ODBC was positively correlated, 
indicating the absence of a straightforward trade-off in support for either approach—
although, as demonstrated in the impulse response function (IRF) graphs provided later in 
this chapter, there was indeed a manner in which CMHC and ODBC popularity came at 
each other’s expense. The correlation between CMHC and ODBC was moderate, r = 
0.4206, p < 0.001.  The ordinary least squares (OLS) regression relationship between 
these variables was significant, F(1, 115) = 24.71, p < 0.001, R2 = 0.1769. Thus, 17.69% 
of the variation in CMHC support was predicted by variation in ODBC approach, a 
modest but significant effect.  
 
Figure 5. Relationship between ODBC and CMHC support, RQ1. 
 
The OLS relationship between these variables is given by the following formula: 
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Thus, every point in increased support for ODBC translated into 0.33 points of support 
for CMHC. However, as was clear from Figure 5 above, there was a possibility of 
heteroscedasticity in this regression. A Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test4 revealed 
that, in fact, the regression of CMHC on ODBC or vice-versa does not display constant 
variance, χ2(1) = 24.34, p < 0.001.  Therefore, neither CMHC or ODBC support should 
be considered as unproblematic predictors of each other, at least without data 
transformation or conversion to robust standard errors (RSE) regression.  
 The Chow breakpoint analysis offered insights into the dynamics of change in 
both CMHC and ODBC. In the case of CMHC, Chow breakpoint analysis revealed that 
1969 was the year in which interest increased in CMHC, whereas, for ODBC, the 
increase actually came earlier, in 1967. These findings are important in their own right, 
particularly in light of the subsequent discussion of policy, but more analysis of the 
dynamics of each of these time series is needed. 
 A Markov-switching model5 is an obvious means of obtaining further insight into 
the dynamics of both CMHC and ODBC support. The first dynamic regression Markov 
switch model was attempted on CMHC, with an assumption of 2 states that turned out to 
be validated (see Figure 5 below). The Markov switch analysis revealed that the mean of 
state 1 for CMHC was 13.499 (SE = 1.394), whereas the mean of state 2 for CMHC was 
101.0323 (SE = 2.430). It will be recalled that the CMHC ratio was one in which higher 
values indicated a higher level of support for CMHC in the corpus. Based on the Markov 
                                                
4 A test that measures the existence of heteroscedasticity in an ordinary least squares regression.  
5 A time-series test that identifies the existence of states in a time-series, and assigns these states 
persistence probabilities. In the context of this study, a state could be a period of high support, low support, 
or moderate support. Persistence probabilities quantify the likelihood of a time series remaining in a 
particular state until it is replaced by another state.   
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switch analysis, there was a fairly large disparity between these two states of support, 
both of which were resilient. The probability of persistence in state 1 (that of low CMHC 
support) was 0.99, whereas the probability of a switch from state 2 (that of high CMHC 
support) back to state 1 was merely 0.04; in other words, the persistence of state was 
0.96. These findings can be more easily interpreted in the light of the superimposition of 
1-step-ahead probabilities on the change in CMHC support as graphed in Figure 6.       
 
Figure 6. CMHC 2-state Markov switch model, states highlighted with one-step ahead 
probabilities. Note: Model was based on dynamic regression. 
   
 
The Markov switching model’s visual results, as depicted in Figure 6, generate 
insights that were not found in the Chow breakpoint analysis of this variable. In the Chow 
breakpoint analysis, the finding was that 1969 was the year of the breakpoint, that is, the 
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past years. However, a Chow breakpoint test is based on the presumption of a single 
breakpoint, which is in line with the test’s historical purpose (Chow, 1960) of bifurcating 
regression results. The results of the Markov switch model presented in Figure 6 above 
result in deeper insight, because these results actually illustrate 3 eras in the data. 
Admittedly, there are only 2 states, but, as Figure 6 demonstrates, state 1 (that of low 
CMHC support) actually occurred twice, once between quarters 1 and 69, and then again 
from quarters 99 to 117. State 2, that of high CMC support, took place in the quarters 
between 69 and 99, that is, in the time from early 1969 to the middle of 1976. The time 
from early 1969 to the middle of 1976 was the era in which support for CMHC peaked, 
after retreating back to the lower levels of support apparent before 1969. The usefulness 
of the Markov switching analysis is that it provides formal support for the identification 
of these vital breakpoints in support, going beyond the capabilities of the Chow 
breakpoint test in this regard.  
A dynamic regression version of the Markov switch model was also applied to the 
variable of ODBC, in the expectation that this model was result in the same kinds of rich 
findings derived by the Markov switch analysis of CMHC. The Markov switch analysis 
revealed that the mean of state 1 for ODBC was 29.317 (SE = 3.544), whereas the mean 
of state 2 for ODBC was 115.683 (SE = 4.723). It will be recalled that the ODBC ratio 
was one in which higher values indicated a higher level of support for ODBC in the 
corpus. Based on the Markov switch analysis, there was a fairly large disparity between 
these two states of support, both of which were resilient. The probability of persistence in 
state 1 (that of low ODBC support) was 0.99, whereas the probability of a switch from 
state 2 (that of high ODBC support) back to state 1 was a minuscule 0.01; in other words, 
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the persistence of state 2 was also 0.99. These findings can be more easily interpreted in 
the light of the superimposition of 1-step probabilities on the change in ODBC support as 
graphed in Figure 7 below. This graph has several notable features that distinguish it 
from the dynamics of CMHC support and therefore help to generate more substantial 
insight into how the evolution of public support for ODBC differed from the evolution of 
public support for CMHC.   
 
Figure 7. ODBC 2-state Markov switch model, states highlighted with one-step ahead 
probabilities. Note: Model was based on dynamic regression. 
 
The Markov switching model’s visual results, as depicted in Figure 7, generate 
insights that seem to triangulate, rather than contradict, the findings of the Chow 
breakpoint analysis of this variable.  In the Markov analysis of CMHC, it was found that 
the first state actually occurred twice, indicating 2 low-interest periods, one from 1952 to 
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support for this concept (between the beginning 1969 and the second half of 1976) 
bracketed by 2 periods of low interest. By contrast, the visual illustration of the Markov 
switch model in Figure 6 above indicates that the low- and high-support states for ODBC 
occurred once each. There was a period of lowest support until 1967; afterwards, support 
rose and did not decline again. In fact, a linear model of growth is an excellent 
explanation of the dynamics of popular support for ODBC, as is clear from Figure 8 
below. In this scatterplot, both the OLS line of best fit and the 95% confidence interval 
are superimposed.  
  
Figure 8. Linear growth of ODBC support over time.  
 
The correlation between CMHC and ODBC was strong, r = 0.8579, p < 0.001.  The OLS 
regression relationship between these variables was significant, F(1, 115) = 320.60, p < 
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predicted by the passage of time. The OLS relationship between these variables is given 
by the following formula: 
ODBC support = (Quarter)(1.29) – 15.16 
Thus, the passage of every quarter translated into 1.29 points of support for CMHC. 
However, a Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test revealed that the regression of CMHC 
on ODBC or vice-versa does not display constant variance, χ2(1) = 20.09, p < 0.001.   
 Essentially, Figure 8 and the accompanying analyses, including the OLS test, 
Chow breakpoint analysis, and Markov switch, all confirm that the popularity of ODBC 
grew over time, without experiencing any decline. The dynamics of CMHC are quite 
different. As the Markov switch analysis demonstrated, and as the scatterplot in Figure 9 
also demonstrates, there was a period of low support for CMHC followed by a period of 
high support and, finally, a period of low support again: 
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One final technique necessary to apply to CMHC and ODBC is IRF testing. IRF 
testing adds another important explanatory theme to what has been learned so far. The 
OLS regressions, Chow breakpoint tests, and Markov switching techniques revealed that 
the interest in ODBC grew linearly whereas the interest in CMHC experienced two 
periods of low support bracketed around a period of low support. As important as these 
results are in terms of answering the third research question, what they share in common 
is a univariate approach. In other words, each of the tests employed so far, with the sole 
exception of the OLS regression conducted to examine the linearity of the relationship 
between CMHC and ODBC, has offered insight into how CMHC and ODBC evolved 
over time, not in direct relationship to each other. The advantage of IRF techniques, 
which are themselves reliant on vector autoregression (VAR), is that they offer a means 
of measuring how long an effect lasts. In fact, an IRF test is defined as a means of 
measuring how long a shock (measured as a 1-standard deviation change) in an 
independent variable impacts a dependent variable.     
Earlier in the analysis, the OLS relationship between CMHC and ODBC was 
utilized to reach the conclusion that there was no simple trade-off between the popularity 
of each of these variables. Had there been a simple tradeoff, there would have been a 
negative correlation between these two variables, which could be interpreted as the 
popularity of CMHC coming at the expense of ODBC or vice-versa. In fact, a correlation 
followed by an OLS model indicated that there was a positive correlation between 
CMHC and ODBC. This finding could be interpreted as suggesting that interest in 
CMHC and ODBC grew at the same time, in a non-zero-sum way, which would have 
important implications for agenda-building theories (Jones and Baumgartner 2005, 
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Kingdon 1984) that rely on some alternatives acquiring popularity at the expense of 
others. A single OLS regression is not sufficient to reach a conclusion about the manner 
in which CMHC and ODBC popularity might or might not be intertwined. A VAR 
followed by an IRF is as more comprehensive treatment (Box, Jenkins, and Reinsel 2011, 
Shumway and Stoffer 2013) of the relationship between two variables that (a) share a 




Table 6. VAR Model, ODBC and CMHC 
 Vector Autoregression Estimates 
 Sample (adjusted): Q1 1952-Q1 1981 
 Included observations: 115 after adjustments 
 Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ] 
       ODBC CMHC 
      
ODBC(-1)  0.407306 -0.053134* 
  (0.07849)  (0.05553) 
 [ 5.18910] [-0.95686] 
   
ODBC(-2)  0.636177  0.052923 
  (0.08565)  (0.06059) 
 [ 7.42784] [ 0.87346] 
   
CMHC(-1) -0.144838*  0.786039 
  (0.13273)  (0.09390) 
 [-1.09122] [ 8.37112] 
   
CMHC(-2)  0.135784  0.172808 
  (0.13376)  (0.09463) 
 [ 1.01512] [ 1.82618] 
   
C  0.841082  1.780804 
  (2.63963)  (1.86739) 
 [ 0.31864] [ 0.95363] 
      
 R-squared  0.892434  0.912831 
 Adj. R-squared  0.888522  0.909661 
 Sum sq. resids  32155.52  16093.01 
 S.E. equation  17.09745  12.09546 
 F-statistic  228.1566  287.9779 
 Log likelihood -487.0989 -447.2974 
 Akaike AIC  8.558241  7.866042 
 Schwarz SC  8.677586  7.985387 
 Mean dependent  62.15652  35.80870 
 S.D. dependent  51.20797  40.24244 
      
 Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.)  42313.25 
 Determinant resid covariance  38713.82 
 Log likelihood -933.7831 
 Akaike information criterion  16.41362 
 Schwarz criterion  16.65231 
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 One practical means of interpreting this VAR is simply to graph the IRFs 
associated with it.  First, consider the IRF of ODBC as it responded to a 1-standard 
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Figure 10. IRF of CMHC innovation on ODBC, 10 quarters.   
 
The results of the IRF in Figure 10 can perhaps be anticipated by the t statistics 
and coefficient values for the ODBC-CMHC relations for the VAR in Table 7, which 
indicate that, to some extent, rising CMHC popularity was accompanied by falling 
ODBC popularity and vice-versa. Figure 10 indicates that a large rise in CMHC 
popularity had the effect of lowering ODBC scores for several quarters. Note that, even at 
the end of the 10th quarter, the blue line of the IRF has not yet reached 0. In fact, the IRF 
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Figure 11. IRF of CMHC innovation on ODBC, 30 quarters.  
 
The IRF results are important because they provide a means of understanding a 
subtler aspect of the tradeoff between CMHC and ODBC popularity. Had the IRF lines in 
Figures 10 and 11 been above 0, or if they had returned to 0 after a brief period, then it 
could be concluded then a radical increase in the popularity of CMHC (which, in fact, 
took place after 1969) would either have increased the popularity of ODBC or, at least, 
not lowered the popularity of ODBC for more than a few quarters. What the IRF graphs 
actually demonstrate is an ongoing depressive effect of CMHC popularity on ODBC 
popularity, which in turn helps to explain why the emergence of CMHC as a policy 
solution retarded the subsequent adoption of ODBC. This insight is an important 
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contribution to the answer of the research question posed in this chapter, as has been 
discussed at greater length below.    
 The research question answered in this chapter was as follows:  How do shifts in 
the sentiments of the American public explain the delay between the appearance of 
thorazine and the adoption of the current model of American mental health care? The 
statistical analyses performed in the previous section of the study offer an empirical basis 
for answering this question. The answer has two important themes, which are as follows: 
• It took time for the popularity of ODBC policies to accumulate into a critical mass 
sufficient to provoke action 
• There was a 7-year period of high popularity surrounding the CMHC idea that 
retarded the selection of ODBC policies as an alternative 
 Each of these themes arose from the statistical analysis provided in the earlier 
section of this chapter. OLS analysis triangulated by Markov-switching revealed that 
interest in ODBC built slowly and in a linear manner, whereas Markov-switching and 
IRF techniques demonstrated that the popularity of CMHC came at the expense of ODBC 
and vice-versa, meaning that these two alternatives were struggling against each in the 
marketplace of policy ideas ostensibly measured by corpus analysis. In the next section of 
this chapter, these two explanatory themes will be investigated through the framework of 
past theories and empirical findings. 
 
3.3 Relation of RQ1 Findings to Theories and Empirical Findings 
The theoretical foundation of the study was Kingdon’s theory of policy change, whose 
core is as follows:  
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Problems not only rise on governmental agenda, but they also fade from 
view. Why do they fade? First, government may address the problem, or 
fail to address it. In both cases, attention turns to something else, either 
because something has been done or because people are frustrated by 
failure and refuse to invest more of their time in a losing cause. (Kingdon 
1984, 208).    
The aspect of this quote that is directly relevant to the findings provided earlier in this 
chapter is that of the fading of attention. One of the interesting components of Kingdon’s 
theory is the claim that attention is perpetually shifting, whether because of the provision 
or absence of a solution by the government. Figure 6 appears to support Kingdon’s 
theoretical claim. What Figure 6 demonstrates is the rising popularity of community 
mental health centers, driven by (a) the backlash against, and eventual closing of, mental 
hospitals; and (b) the increasing prominence of community mental health centers as an 
alternative. There is substantial empirical evidence for both of these trends; both popular 
rejection of mental hospitals (Polak and Kirby 1976, Sharfstein and Nafziger 1976, 
Häfner 1987) and the increasing popularity of community mental health (Aviram 1990, 
Cutler, Bevilacqua, and McFarland 2003, Humphreys and Rappaport 1993, Drake et al. 
2003, Melguizo, Bos, and Prather 2011). What has not been empirically examined is 
how, based on an analysis of a cross-sectional corpus likely to represent the general 
American public’s support for the CMHC or ODBC paradigms, public support for 
CMHC and ODBC has evolved over time.  
In alignment with Kingdon’s attention-focused theory of agenda change, the 
results derived in this chapter suggest that interest in CMHC dropped off starkly after 
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1976. There are several possible explanations for this timing, none of which are mutually 
exclusive. First, the anomie and pessimism associated with the end of the Vietnam War 
could have eroded some lingering 1960s-era communal approaches to social problems. 
Second, the community mental health approach might have failed to rehabilitate many 
mental patients, particularly in big cities, who became homeless instead and, through 
their presence in such spaces, created a backlash among other citizens who believed 
community mental health centers to be ineffective. Both of these explanations are 
empirically compatible with the Markov switch illustration in Figure 6; in this sense, the 
Markov switching analysis’s main contribution is to identify some of the breakpoint dates 
(1969 and 1976) that scholars ought to examine more closely for explanatory details. 
Another explanation has to do with the rise of support for ODBC.  In the United 
States, in contrast to France, such support seems to have been slow in building (see 
Figure 7), and it is possible that the slowness of this buildup is also a causal factor in the 
late adoption of ODBC as the American government’s preferred mental health policy 
paradigm. Had ODBC popularity been much higher in the 1950s and 1960s, it is possible 
that this popularity could, as per Kingdon’s theory, focused interest on the ODBC policy 
alternative in a manner that would have precluded the adoption of the CMHC paradigm 
that dominated much of the 1960s and all of the 1970s.  
The findings of RQ1 should also be considered in light of corpus analysis theory 
and what is empirically known about trends in public opinion about mental health from 
the early 1950s to the early 1980s. Overall, corpus analysis theory suggests (Kilgarriff 
2001, Vis, Sanders, and Spooren 2012, Dollinger 2006, Millar 2009) that discourse 
structure—both semantic and syntactic discourse structure—can be extracted from 
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statistical analysis of corpora.  Much of the work in corpus analysis has been syntactic in 
nature, with limited implications for semantics. For example, corpus analysis has been 
utilized (Fischer 2004, Dollinger 2006, Plank 1984) to demonstrate changes in the 
frequencies of modal verbs, a grammatical change with very limited implications for 
semantics, and no implications for understanding the meaning of discourse.  
However, political scientists have used the basic tools of corpus analysis in 
broader ways, with the goal of understanding changes in concepts. Such an approach was 
utilized by Emilie L’Hote (L'Hôte 2014) in her analysis of change in three concepts—
identity, narrative, and metaphor—in the discourse of the U.K.’s Labour Party between 
1994 and 2007. To carry out this analysis, L’Hote pointed out that the traditional 
approach has been so-called discourse analysis, in which more qualitative methods are 
used to parse text for its meanings. However, discourse analysis is not useful in terms of 
tracking changes over time, which was the focus of L’Hote’s study. L’Hote suggested 
that the statistical techniques of corpus analysis can be combined with some qualitative 
methods from discourse analysis to provide a better understanding of the evolution of 
certain concepts. In the remainder of this discussion, insights from discourse analysis will 
be applied to the statistical findings for RQ1, with the main objective being to discover 
how and why support for the CMHC and ODBC policy alternatives waxed and waned 
over time.  
Earlier in the chapter, it was observed that the break point for CMHC came in 
quarter 69 (the first quarter of 1969), while the break point for ODBC came in quarter 61 
(the first quarter of 1967). Both of these breakpoints represented increased public support 
for both of these approaches. Support for ODBC would continue to grow over the period 
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encompassed by the time series, but support for CMHC would dip again in 1976. 
Therefore, the focus of discourse analysis should be on trends in the marketplace of 
popular opinion that coincide with these times. The identification of these trends is not 
meant to be a causal explanation, but rather to function as an illustrative of changes in the 
zeitgeist that coincide with the statistical breakpoints and patterns identified earlier in this 
chapter.  
One point of note is that mental health institutions were almost universally 
pilloried in the 1960s. In 1962, Ken Kesey published the seminal One Flew Over the 
Cuckoo’s Nest, which remains the archetypal anti-mental institution story. Kesey’s story 
focuses on the lobotomizing of Randle Patrick McMurphy, who faked his insanity but 
nonetheless becomes a victim of the mental health system when he encourages his fellow 
patients to stand up for their rights against the corrupt and destructive mental hospital 
system, epitomized by Nurse Ratchet. 
One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest, which was written in 1959, can be understood 
as the emergence of a brewing anti-sanatorium movement into the popular consciousness. 
While One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest would go on to critical and popular acclaim, it 
was still a product of the counter-culture. It was not until later in the 1960s that signs of a 
robust anti-sanatorium movement would emerge in periodicals such as Reader’s Digest, 
The Saturday Evening Post, and other registers of mainstream American public opinion.  
Because the statistical model utilized in this chapter was based on the frequency of 
opinions, popular, mainstream periodicals are particularly important to the results.  Both 
CMHC and ODBC support increased as a direct result of the mainstreaming of anti-
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sanatorium opinion, a mainstreaming that is best understood through its emergence in 
popular periodicals.       
The growing appeal of the anti-sanatorium movement appears to explain the rise 
of both CMHC and ODBC support. Specifically, the rise of CMHC and ODBC support 
can be understood in light of Lindblom’s seminal theory (Lindblom 1959) of disjointed 
incrementalism, which was synopsized by Etzioni as follows (Etzioni 1967, 386): 
(1) Rather than attempting a comprehensive survey and evaluation of all 
alternatives, the decision-maker focuses only on those policies which 
differ incrementally from existing policies. (2) Only a relatively small 
number of policy alternatives are considered. (3) For each policy 
alternative, only a restricted number of ‘important’ consequences are 
evaluated. (4) The problem confronting the decision-maker is continually 
redefined: Incrementalism allows for countless ends-means and means-
ends adjustments which, in effect, make the problem more manageable. 
(5) Thus, there is no one decision or ‘right’ solution, but a never-ending 
series of attacks on the issues at hand through serial analyses and 
evaluation. (6) As such, incremental decision-making is described as 
remedial, geared more to the alleviation of present, concrete social 
imperfections than to the promotion of future social goals.  
Admittedly, Lindblom’s (1959) approach is designed to explain policy decision-
makers’ actions, but it can also be adapted into an explanation of the trends in public 
discourse identified in this chapter. Both CMHC and ODBC can be considered as 
differing incrementally from the mental hospital paradigm. Just as government decision-
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makers were also considering these two options, so was the marketplace of public 
opinion. CMHC and ODBC appear to have gained in popularity in public discourse not 
only because they differed incrementally from the previous alternative, that of mental 
hospitals, but also because they constituted a small number of alternatives. 
The theory of incrementalism can be applied to the post-1976 decline in public 
support for CMHC. Thus, by 1976, the public debate seemed to have worked its way 
through various analysis and alighted on ODBC as the preferred alternative to mental 
hospitals. The question then becomes why 1976 might be the key year in the decline of 
popular CMHC support. An examination of the mental health literature indicates that the 
reason is likely to be the observed failure of the CMHC paradigm. CMHCs, which 
flowered in the 1960s, had begun to fail in large numbers by the middle of the 1970s 
(Aviram 1990, Cutler, Bevilacqua, and McFarland 2003, Humphreys and Rappaport 
1993, Drake et al. 2003, Okin 1984, Sharfstein 2014).  In light of Lindblom’s (1959) 
theory of disjointed incrementalism, it seems likely that the American public observed 
this failure and considered ODBC as the incremental improvement over CMHC than both 
the CMHC and ODBC approaches had previously represented over mental hospitals.  
Thus, Lindblom’s (1959) theory of disjointed incrementalism has two advantages 
vis-à-vis the data analysis presented in this chapter. Lindblom’s theory explains why both 
CMHC and ODBC should have enjoyed a growing level of support in the marketplace of 
American public opinion, with breakpoints in the second half of the 1960s. If Lindblom’s 
theory is correct, the rise of support for CMHC and ODBC can be understood through the 
insight that both CMHC and ODBC represented incremental changes to the paradigm of 
mental health—if not incremental in treatment modality, then incremental in the sense 
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that the closure of mental hospitals could only be succeeded by alternatives such as 
CMHC and ODBC.  The concept of incremental versus non-incremental change requires 
some further discussion, especially given that the older pattern of incremental budgetary 
change (as documented by Davis, Dempster, and Wildavsky, 1966) no longer applies in 
the age of sequestration. It is possible to think of both CMHC and ODBC as belonging to 
a plausible set of outcomes. Both of these options coexisted for many years until ODBC 
came to predominate. Lindblom’s idea of incrementalism is more useful not in terms of 
suggesting either CMHC or ODBC built on the other, but in explaining the change in the 
actual patterns of support for these alternatives. As the CMHC concept failed in practice 
(Aviram 1990, Cutler, Bevilacqua, and McFarland 2003, Humphreys and Rappaport 
1993, Drake et al. 2003, Okin 1984, Sharfstein 2014), it is likely that ODBC came to be 
seen as the incremental improvement to CMHC. ODBC is indeed an incremental change, 
as both ODBC and CMHC include the dispensation of drugs, but ODBC transfers the 
venue of treatment from a community mental health center to outpatient settings, with 
hospitalization reserved for only the most severe cases.    
 
3.4 Conclusion 
  The research question guiding this chapter was as follows: How do shifts in the 
sentiments of the American public explain the delay between the appearance of thorazine 
and the adoption of the current model of American mental health care? Statistical 
analyses including OLS regressions, Chow breakpoint testing, Markov switching, and 
IRFs indicated that there were two plausible answers to this research question, namely 
that (a) it took time for the popularity of ODBC policies to accumulate into a critical 
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mass sufficient to provoke action; and (b) there was a 7-year period of high popularity 
surrounding the CMHC idea that retarded the selection of ODBC policies as an 
alternative, suggesting that these two alternatives struggle against each other for 
popularity, thus delaying the ascendancy of ODBC. These empirical results appear to be 
aligned with past theories and findings related to agendas and attention.  
In particular, the empirical results presented in this chapter are well-explained by 
Lindblom’s (1959) theory of disjointed incrementalism, which explains (a) the rise in 
CMHC and ODBC popularity as alternatives to the increasingly discredited concept of 
the mental hospital and (b) the decline of CMHC popularity as ODBC came to be seen as 
an incremental improvement over CMHC. This insight is important not only for its ability 
to explain the evolution in public opinion tracked in this chapter, but also as an 
explanation of governmental action. The larger focus of RQ1 was on the relationship 
between public opinion and government action. As definitive government action to end 
the CMHC era and commit to ODBC did not arrive until 1981, but as the court of public 
opinion had already swung in favor of ODBC by 1976, it is possible to conceptualize the 
end of the CMHC era as echoing, at a remove of five years, the American public’s own 
preference. If so, then the fact that it took several years for American public opinion to 
evolve towards the definite preference for ODBC can provide an explanation for the 





CHAPTER 4. RQ2 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 The purpose of this chapter is to answer the second research question of the study, 
which was as follows: How do shifts in the opinions of psychiatrists, psychologists, and 
other mental health experts explain the delay between the appearance of thorazine and the 
adoption of the current model of American mental health care? Several of the statistical 
procedures carried out on the data for RQ2 were identical to the procedures carried out 
for RQ1. However, RQ2 was conducted on material written by mental health 
professionals and other experts, whereas RQ1 was conducted on material from popular 
periodicals. The fact that both RQ1 and 2 measured support for the same preferences 
(community mental health centers and outpatient, drug-based clinics) meant that the raw 
data for RQ1 and RQ2 could be correlated with each other. The comparison of data from 
RQ1 and RQ2 made it possible to determine whether popular opinions influenced 
professional opinions, or vice versa, in the formation of opinions about the relative 
benefits of community mental health centers and outpatient, drug-based clinics. 
     
4.2 Statistical Analysis of RQ2 
 The statistical analysis of RQ2 was carried out on the basis of a grid of possible 




Table 7. RQ2: Possible Coding Values 









Positive P1 P2 P3 
Neutral NU1 NU2 NU3 
Negative NE1 NE2 NE3 
 
This grid was applied as a coding template. The premise of the grid was that, in any given 
time period (such as a month), corpus analysis can take the measure of the overall attitude 
of psychiatrists, psychologists, and other mental health experts. This approach was 
already discussed in detail in the third chapter of the study, as was the use of Pacs 
software to construct a customized corpus. Because of the more specialized nature of the 
corpus for RQ2, only the following sources were utilized:  
• Health and Medical Collection (ProQuest) 
• PsycARTICLES (ProQuest) 
• Psychology Database (ProQuest) 
Cumulatively, these three corpus sources represented slightly under four hundred 
and fifty million words of text.  The raw data from the coding appear below. Note that, as 
in the analysis for RQ1, CMHC represents support for community mental health centers 
over other alternatives, whereas ODBC represents support for outpatient, drug-based 
patient care over alternatives. In order to distinguish these values from their counterparts 
in RQ1, which included popular items, the suffix –M was added in RQ2 to  represent the 
professional and scholarly opinions of American psychiatrists, psychologists, and other 
mental health experts writing from 1952 to 1981 (hence, CMHC-M and ODBC-M).  
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Table 8. Raw Data for RQ2 
Year Quarter CMHC-M ODBC-M 
1952 1 0 3 
1952 2 1 0 
1952 3 0 5 
1952 4 1 3 
1953 5 0 2 
1953 6 1 2 
1953 7 0 5 
1953 8 1 9 
1954 9 1 3 
1954 10 1 0 
1954 11 1 19 
1954 12 1 14 
1955 13 1 48 
1955 14 2 45 
1955 15 3 26 
1955 16 9 32 
1956 17 9 75 
1956 18 1 32 
1956 19 4 75 
1956 20 6 64 
1957 21 10 38 
1957 22 8 78 
1957 23 10 53 
1957 24 10 34 
1958 25 3 33 
1958 26 6 69 
1958 27 9 43 
1958 28 7 46 
1959 29 10 65 
1959 30 8 69 
1959 31 1 76 
1959 32 9 107 
1960 33 4 82 
1960 34 10 76 
1960 35 3 110 
1960 36 7 96 
1961 37 6 64 
1961 38 2 96 
1961 39 2 80 
1961 40 9 99 
1962 41 2 67 
1962 42 6 57 
1962 43 5 69 
1962 44 9 81 
1963 45 0 58 
1963 46 4 104 
1963 47 8 85 
1963 48 16 100 
1964 49 22 76 
1964 50 33 75 
1964 51 113 66 
1964 52 55 106 
1965 53 115 74 
1965 54 62 63 
1965 55 52 88 
1965 56 82 84 
1966 57 119 68 
1966 58 108 82 
1966 59 95 98 
1966 60 74 80 
1967 61 46 115 
1967 62 34 79 
1967 63 106 79 
1967 64 53 128 
1968 65 86 89 
1968 66 83 113 
1968 67 69 96 
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Year Quarter CMHC-M ODBC-M 
1968 68 41 77 
1969 69 34 106 
1969 70 51 85 
1969 71 83 95 
1969 72 72 125 
1970 73 119 104 
1970 74 17 97 
1970 75 30 112 
1970 76 51 112 
1971 77 50 75 
1971 78 39 105 
1971 79 50 97 
1971 80 41 108 
1972 81 25 87 
1972 82 31 73 
1972 83 33 97 
1972 84 38 119 
1973 85 41 72 
1973 86 41 122 
1973 87 48 117 
1973 88 31 73 
1974 89 42 127 
1974 90 25 85 
1974 91 26 120 
1974 92 41 103 
1975 93 32 130 
1975 94 51 122 
1975 95 24 120 
1975 96 37 94 
1976 97 35 128 
1976 98 26 87 
1976 99 23 100 
1976 100 27 92 
1977 101 41 110 
1977 102 23 109 
1977 103 39 80 
1977 104 13 129 
1978 105 8 93 
1978 106 0 124 
1978 107 5 123 
1978 108 2 111 
1979 109 7 102 
1979 110 1 87 
1979 111 3 110 
1979 112 2 122 
1980 113 9 73 
1980 114 7 108 
1980 115 5 74 
1980 116 2 81 
1981 117 2 100 
 
 The first step in analysis was visualizing these data in a comparative manner, as in 




Figure 12. Trends in CMHC-M and ODBC-M support in corpus, RQ2. 
 
In order to achieve more precise insights into the dynamics of changing support for 
CMHC-M and ODBC-M, a Chow breakpoint test (Chow 1960) was conducted separately 
for CMHC-M and ODBC-M support. In this procedure, a structural breakpoint was 
identified on the basis of the quarter in which the Wald statistic was maximized. The 
results have been plotted in Figures 13 and 14 below. These results indicate that the break 
point for CMHC-M came in quarter 51 (the third quarter of 1964), while the break point 
for ODBC-M came in quarter 37 (the first quarter of 1961). These breakpoints have been 













Figure 13. Trends in CMHC-M support in corpus, RQ2; structural breakpoint identified. 
 
 




























The support for CMHC-M and ODBC-M was positively correlated, indicating the 
absence of a straightforward trade-off in support for either approach. The correlation 
between CMHC-M and ODBC-M was moderate (a judgment that reflects Cohen, 2013’s 
indicating that 0.3 is the cutoff for a moderate Pearson correlation statistic), r = 0.3402, p 
< 0.001.  The OLS regression relationship between these variables was significant, F(1, 
115) = 15.05, p < 0.001, R2 = 0.1157. Thus, 11.57% of the variation in CMHC-M support 
was predicted by variation in ODBC-M approach, a significant but relatively weak effect.  
 
Figure 15. Relationship between ODBC and CMHC support, RQ1.  
 
The OLS relationship between these variables is given by the following formula: 
CMHC-M support = (ODBC-M support)(0.302) + 3.07 
Thus, every point in increased support for ODBC-M translated into 0.302 points of 
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possibility of heteroscedasticity in this regression. However, a Breusch-Pagan / Cook-
Weisberg test revealed that the regression of CMHC-M on ODBC-M or vice-versa does 
display constant variance, χ2(1) = 2.65, p = 0.1036.  Therefore, CMHC-M and ODBC-M 
support should be considered as unproblematic predictors of each other.  
 The Chow breakpoint analysis offered insights into the dynamics of change in 
both CMHC-M and ODBC-M. In the case of CMHC-M, Chow breakpoint analysis 
revealed that 1964 was the year in which interest increased in CMHC-M, whereas, for 
ODBC-M, the increase came earlier, in 1961. These findings are important in their own 
right, particularly in light of the subsequent discussion of policy, but more analysis of the 
dynamics of each of these time series is needed, as was provided for RQ1 in the previous 
chapter. 
 A Markov-switching model is an obvious means of obtaining further insight into 
the dynamics of both CMHC-M and ODBC-M support. The first dynamic regression 
Markov switch model was attempted on CMHC-M, with an assumption of 2 states that 
turned out to be validated (see Figure 16 below). The Markov switch analysis revealed 
that the mean of state 1 for CMHC-M was 7.61 (SE = 2.92), whereas the mean of state 2 
for CMHC-M was 55.8 (SE = 3.88). It will be recalled that the CMHC-M ratio was one 
in which higher values indicated a higher level of support for CMHC-M in the corpus. 
Based on the Markov switch analysis, there was a fairly large disparity between these two 
states of support, both of which were resilient. The probability of persistence in state 1 
(that of low CMHC-M support) was 0.99, whereas the probability of a switch from state 
2 (that of high CMHC-M support) back to state 1 was merely 0.03, meaning that 
persistence of state was 0.97. These findings can be more easily interpreted in the light of 
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the superimposition of 1-step-ahead probabilities on the change in CMHC-M support as 
graphed in Figure 16 below.       
 
Figure 16. CMHC-M 2-state Markov switch model, states highlighted with one-step 
ahead probabilities. Note: Model was based on dynamic regression.  
 
The Markov switching model’s visual results, as depicted in Figure 16, generate 
insights that were not found in the Chow breakpoint analysis of this variable. In the Chow 
breakpoint analysis, the finding was that 1961 was the year of the breakpoint, that is, the 
year after which the public support of CMHC-M was significantly greater than it had 
been in past years. The results of the Markov switch model presented in Figure 16 above 
result in deeper insight, because these results illustrate 3 eras in the data. State 1 (that of 
low CMHC-M support) occurred twice, once between quarters 1 and 51, and then again 
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quarters between 52 and 105, that is, in the time from late 1964 to late 1977. Thus, the 
time from late 1964 to late 1977 was the era in which support for CMHC-M peaked, after 
retreating back to the lower levels of support apparent before 1964.  
A dynamic regression version of the Markov switch model was also applied to the 
variable of ODBC-M, in the expectation that this model would result in the same kinds of 
rich findings derived by the Markov switch analysis of CMHC-M. The Markov switch 
analysis revealed that the mean of state 1 for ODBC-M was 31.39 (SE = 4.09), whereas 
the mean of state 2 for ODBC-M was 94.59 (SE = 2.27).  The probability of persistence 
in state 1 (that of low ODBC-M support) was 0.99, whereas the probability of a switch 
from state 2 (that of high ODBC-M support) back to state 1 was a minuscule 0.007; thus, 
the persistence of state 2 was also 0.993. These findings can be more easily interpreted in 
the light of the superimposition of 1-step probabilities on the change in ODBC-M support 
as graphed in Figure 17 below. This graph has several notable features that distinguish it 
from the dynamics of CMHC-M support and therefore help to generate more substantial 
insight into how the evolution of public support for ODBC-M differed from the evolution 
of public support for CMHC-M. The main insight is that there were trends within ODBC-
M that were deeply persistent, suggesting strong consensus. While such persistence is 
also found in the Markov switch model for CMHC-M, the existence of 3 rather than 2 
states meant that mental health professionals changed their mind about the usefulness of 
the community mental health center, whereas no such change of mind applied to 




Figure 17. ODBC-M 2-state Markov-switch model, states highlighted with one-step 
ahead probabilities. Note: Model was based on dynamic regression. 
 
The Markov switching model’s visual results, as depicted in Figure 17, generate 
insights that seem to triangulate, rather than contradict, the findings of the Chow 
breakpoint analysis of this variable.  In the Markov analysis of CMHC-M, it was found 
that the first state actually occurred twice, indicating 2 low-interest periods, one from 
1952 to 1964 and another after 1977. Thus, for CMHC-M, as for CMHC, there was a 
period of high support (between the end of 1964 and the end of 1977) bracketed by 2 
periods of low interest. By contrast, the visual illustration of the Markov switch model in 
Figure 16 above indicates that the low- and high-support states for ODBC-M occurred 
once each, as was also the case for ODBC. There was a period of low support until 1961; 

































ODBC-M State1, one-step probabilities
102 
 
model of growth is an appropriate explanation of the dynamics of popular support for 
ODBC-M, as is clear from Figure 18 below. In this scatterplot, both the OLS line of best 
fit and the 95% confidence interval are superimposed.  
 
Figure 18. Linear growth of ODBC-M support over time. 
 
The correlation between ODBC-M and quarter was strong, r = 0.7630, p < 0.001.  The 
OLS regression relationship between these variables was significant, F(1, 115) = 160.22, 
p < 0.001, R2 = 0.5822. Thus, 58.22% of the variation in ODBC-M support, a moderate to 
strong effect, was predicted by the passage of time. The OLS relationship between these 
variables is given by the following formula: 













Thus, the passage of every quarter translated into 0.77 additional points of support for 
ODBC-M. A Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test revealed that the regression of CMHC 
on ODBC or vice-versa displays constant variance, χ2(1) = 1.45, p = 0.2291.   
 Figure 18 and the accompanying analyses, including the OLS test, Chow 
breakpoint analysis, and Markov switch, all confirm that the popularity of ODBC-M 
grew over time, without experiencing any decline, as was also seen for ODBC. The 
dynamics of CMHC-M are quite different. As the Markov switch analysis demonstrated, 
and as the scatterplot in Figure 19 also demonstrates, there was a period of low support 
for CMHC-M followed by a period of high support and, finally, a period of low support 
again, which echoed the pattern found for CMHC in the analysis presented in Chapter 3.  
 














During the process of statistical testing, it seemed that there were several 
similarities between (a) CMHC and CMHC-M and (b) ODBC and ODBC-M. To begin 
with, these variable similarities were graphed in the time dimension, in Figures 20, 21, 
and 22 below.  
 













Figure 21. Comparison of ODBC and ODBC-M growth over time. 
 






























There were several points of interest suggested by the graphs and explored more 
thoroughly through other forms of time-series analysis. First, in Figure 20, it was noted 
that the surge in support for community mental health centers in the popular process 
came well after a similar surge in the specialized mental health literature. Support for 
community mental health centers dropped off more quickly in the specialist mental health 
literature than in the popular mental health literature. This aspect of the time series 
suggests that specialists might have been able to anticipate the failure of this paradigm 
before the general public. There is also an interesting question of causation in the 
possibility that the adverse opinions of community mental health centers among mental 
health specialists could have influenced similar opinions among the general public.  
In Figure 21, it seems that mental health professionals were once again faster than 
the general public to extol the benefits of the outpatient, drug-based clinical approach, 
which raises another question of causation. Indeed, the most interesting question when 
considering the RQ1 and RQ2 data together has to do with the possibility of specialist 
influence on public attitudes—a kind of causality that, if demonstrated, would have 
important implications, as it could show that the direction of policy influence was from 
specialists to the public, and then from the public to the government. In this sense, the 
analysis of RQ2 is richer than the analysis of RQ1. 
The relationship between specialist and public opinions about community mental 
health centers and outpatient, drug-based clinical approaches unfolded across time. In 
addition, in any predictive model, the possibility of auto-regression—that is, the past 
values of a variable predicting the future values of that variable—also have to be taken 
into account. For example, it could be the case that popular opinions of community 
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mental health centers were influenced not only by mental specialists’ opinions about 
community mental health centers, but also by past popular opinions of community mental 
health centers, which could have entrenched a consensus. To address the possibility of 
auto-regression while also modeling the inter-relationship between specialist opinions 
and public opinions, an auto-regressive distributed lag model (ARDL) was employed. 
There were two such models. In the first model, CMHC-M and past values of CMHC 
were regressed on CMHC. In the second model, ODBC-M and past values of ODBC 
were regressed on ODBC.  Each model had two components: (a) an ARDL readout and 
(b) a long-run coefficients calculation. Each model has been interpreted immediately after 
the presentation of these three components. The model interpretation includes a 
discussion of the theoretical and practical implications of the relevant findings.        
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Table 9. Basic ARDL Model, CMHC 
Dependent Variable: CMHC   
Method: ARDL    
Sample (adjusted): 1952Q3 1981Q1  
Included observations: 115 after adjustments  
Maximum dependent lags: 4 (Automatic selection) 
Model selection method: Akaike info criterion (AIC) 
Dynamic regressors (4 lags, automatic): CMHC-M  
Fixed regressors: C   
Number of models evalulated: 20  
Selected Model: ARDL(2, 0)   
Note: final equation sample is larger than selection sample 
          
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.*   
          
CMHC(-1) 0.771113 0.094016 8.201943 0.0000 
CMHC(-2) 0.175294 0.092859 1.887744 0.0617 
CMHC-M 0.051328 0.038562 1.331036 0.1859 
C 0.689592 1.669778 0.412984 0.6804 
          
R-squared 0.913483    Mean dependent var 35.80870 
Adjusted R-squared 0.911145    S.D. dependent var 40.24244 
S.E. of regression 11.99569    Akaike info criterion 7.841135 
Sum squared resid 15972.51    Schwarz criterion 7.936611 
Log likelihood -446.8652    Hannan-Quinn criter. 7.879888 
F-statistic 390.6634    Durbin-Watson stat 2.026079 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
          
*Note: p-values and any subsequent tests do not account for model 
        selection.   
 
 
Table 10. Long-Run Coefficients, CMHC 
ARDL Cointegrating And Long Run Form  
Original dep. variable: CMHC   
Selected Model: ARDL(2, 0)   
Sample: 1952Q1 1981Q1   
Included observations: 115   
          
Long Run Coefficients 
          
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.    
          
CMHC-M 0.957723 0.749877 1.277173 0.2042 
C 12.867068 28.790968 0.446913 0.6558 
 
The ARDL model indicated that the first lag of CMHC was a significant (p < 
0.001) predictor of CMHC, but the second lag was not, at an Alpha of 0.05, significant  
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(p = 0.0617). CMHC-M was not a significant predictor (p = 0.1859) of CMHC once the 
first two lags of CMHC were also taken into account. Note that the coefficient for the 
first lag of CMHC was 0.77, falling to 0.17 for the second lag. This finding indicated that 
the auto-regressive power of CMHC was confined largely to the first lag, which, in turn, 
means that only very recent (within one year) opinions appeared to influence the popular 
opinion of community mental health centers in a time-series model. This finding suggests 
the unfolding of a debate rather than the entrenchment of an abiding point of view.    
   To further quantify the lack of causality between mental health specialists’ 
opinions about community mental health centers and popular opinions about community 
mental health centers, a long-run coefficient for CMHC-M was calculated. A long-run 
coefficient differs from the coefficients provided in the basic ARDL model in that the 
long-run coefficient, as its name suggests, considers the impact of an independent 
variable on a dependent variable during the entire span of a time-series, not merely in 
terms of predicting 1-step-ahead values, as in the ARDL. The long-run coefficient for 
CMHC-M was not significant, p = 0.02042.  
 Cumulatively, the findings emerging from Table 9 and 10 suggests that the 
popular opinion of community mental health centers was not causally influenced by 
specialists’ opinions about community mental health centers. This finding further 
suggests that the direction of causality in terms of the defunding of community mental 
health centers was not from specialist to popular opinion and from popular opinion to 




Table 11. Basic ARDL Model, ODBC 
Dependent Variable: ODBC   
Method: ARDL    
Sample (adjusted): 1953Q1 1981Q1  
Included observations: 113 after adjustments  
Maximum dependent lags: 4 (Automatic selection) 
Model selection method: Akaike info criterion (AIC) 
Dynamic regressors (4 lags, automatic): ODBC-M   
Fixed regressors: C   
Number of models evalulated: 20  
Selected Model: ARDL(4, 1)   
          
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.*   
          
ODBC(-1) 0.256895 0.090322 2.844213 0.0053 
ODBC(-2) 0.404537 0.099399 4.069826 0.0001 
ODBC(-3) 0.092371 0.101195 0.912802 0.3634 
ODBC(-4) 0.356504 0.100568 3.544895 0.0006 
ODBC-M 0.141786 0.067650 2.095881 0.0385 
ODBC-M(-1) -0.153937 0.066804 -2.304287 0.0232 
C -1.235548 4.411576 -0.280070 0.7800 
          
R-squared 0.909365    Mean dependent var 62.81416 
Adjusted R-squared 0.904235    S.D. dependent var 51.41907 
S.E. of regression 15.91214    Akaike info criterion 8.431987 
Sum squared resid 26838.80    Schwarz criterion 8.600940 
Log likelihood -469.4073    Hannan-Quinn criter. 8.500546 
F-statistic 177.2540    Durbin-Watson stat 2.126058 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
          
*Note: p-values and any subsequent tests do not account for model 
        selection.   
 
 
Table 12. Long-Run Coefficients, ODBC 
ARDL Cointegrating And Long Run Form  
Original dep. variable: ODBC   
Selected Model: ARDL(4, 1)   
Sample: 1952Q1 1981Q1   
Included observations: 113   
          
Long Run Coefficients 
          
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.    
          
ODBC-M 0.110152 0.533139 0.206609 0.8367 




The ARDL model indicated that the first, second, and fourth lags of ODBC were 
all, at an Alpha of 0.05, significant predictors of ODBC, and both same-period and one-
lag ODBC-M were also significant predictors of ODBC. Thus, unlike CMHC, ODBC 
opinion appeared more susceptible to a process of consensus-building reflected in the 
effect of the lags, which show a sort of state dependence. Perhaps the most interesting 
aspect of the model is that the coefficient for the first lag of ODBC-M is negative rather 
than positive. Given that the co-efficient for same period ODBC is positive, there is an 
open question as to what kind of causality mental specialists’ opinions of outpatient-
based, drug-based clinical approaches exerted on popular opinions of the same.  
In fact, when the long-run coefficient for ODBC-M was calculated, it was not 
significant. Given the volatility of the influence of ODBC-M on ODBC (a positive 
influence in the same period, and a negative influence after one lag), the lack of 
significance of the long-run coefficient for ODBC was not surprising. Thus, the same 
kinds of conclusions came be drawn from the ARDL model for ODBC as were drawn 
from the ARDL model for CMHC.  It seems likely that the popular opinion of outpatient-
based, drug-based clinical approaches was not causally influenced by specialists’ 
opinions about outpatient-based, drug-based clinical approaches. This finding further 
suggests that the direction of causality in terms of the defunding of outpatient-based, 
drug-based clinical approaches was not from specialist to popular opinion and from 




4.3 Relation of RQ2 Findings to Theories and Empirical Findings 
 Because the dynamics of the RQ2 analysis were very similar to the dynamics for 
RQ1, the same theoretical framework, that of Langdon’s (1959) disjointed 
incrementalism, ought to be applied. This framework, which was discussed in detail in 
the previous chapter of the study, posits that policy emerges from a series of incremental 
movements (a) away from a status quo and (b) towards a new set of alternatives. One of 
the reasons that the theory of disjointed incrementalism appears so well-suited to RQs 1 
and 2 is that incrementalism presupposes a process of slow evolution rather than a radical 
act of legislative fiat. The time-series data for RQ2 show precisely such an evolution—
first, an evolution away from the mental hospital paradigm and towards support for the 
most plausible alternatives (CMHC and ODBC), and, second, an evolution towards 
adoption of the ODBC framework.  
In terms of multiple streams theory (Kingdon, 1983), it is notable that the stream 
of ODBC support was stronger than the stream of CMHC support, both among mental 
health professionals (as analyzed in RQ2) and among the public at large (as analyzed in 
RQ1). The fact that the stream of ODBC support strengthened in advance of the 1981 
veto of the Mental Health Act provides some evidence that public and professional 
opinion created a form of momentum to which the government responded. Of course, this 
causal relationship cannot be taken for granted, and needs to be considered in light of 
Lukes’ three types of power: 
...the liberal takes men as they are and applies want-regarding principles to 
them, relating their interests to what they actually want or prefer, to their 
policy preference as manifested by their political participation. The 
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reformist, seeing and deploring that not all men’s wants are given equal 
weight by the political system, also relates their interests to what they 
want or prefer, but allows that this may be revealed in more indirect and 
sub-political ways—in the form of deflected, submerged, or concealed 
wants and preferences. The radical...maintains that men’s wants may 
themselves be a product of a system which works against their interests, 
and in such cases, relates the latter to what they would want and prefer, 
were they able to make the choice.  (Lukes 1974, 36).  
It is important to remember that, while funding for CMHC had been in decline and the 
CMHC concept gaining in disrepute since at least the mid-1970s, it was the action taken 
by a single man, President Reagan, that effectively ended CMCH and ushered in the 
current dominance of ODBC. Whatever Reagan’s personal motivations might have been, 
the actual veto action of CMHC has be classified as a liberal exercise of power, because 
it responded to both the public’s and the mental health professionals’ community’s 
increase support of ODBC in the mid-to-late 1970s.  
 If this explanation is accepted, then the delay of government action to tip policy 
towards ODBC can be explained partly by a corresponding delay in the rise of the mental 
health professionals’ community’s own preference for ODBC over CMHC. However, an 
important question remaining to address is why the mental health community tipped 
towards ODBC. In the previous chapter, it was argued that the public preference for 
ODBC was triggered by (a) the failure of the mental hospital, which positioned CMHC 
and ODBC as incremental alternatives; and (b) the in-practice failure of CMHC, which 
positioned ODBC as the lone remaining incremental alternative to CMHC. These 
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explanations appear to be just as valid for mental health professionals. However, other 
factor to consider are (a) the rise of the anti-sanatorium movement and (b) the triumph of 
reductionism paradigms of mental illness. 
 Among mental health professionals, the anti-sanatorium movement of the 1960s 
was a big tent, accommodating figures varying from Thomas Szasz, who believed that 
mental illness was a myth, to various individuals advocating more humane care for the 
mentally ill (Torrey 2013). However, what appears to have been a more important 
influence of the mental health professionals’ community’s tip towards ODBC was the 
triumph of a certain form of reductionist thinking about mental illness. 
 Reductionist accounts of mental illness suggest that such illness can be reduced to 
physical correlates and behavioral traces, as in other forms of cognitive impairment 
(Binder 2009, Gavarró and Salmons 2013). Thus, if a pharmaceutical agent can be 
demonstrated to simultaneously act on a physical cause for mental illness and reduce or 
eliminate the behavioral symptoms of that illness, then mental health treatment can also 
be deemed to be effective (Leão et al. 2016, Mohiuddin and Ghaziuddin 2013). The 
triumph of this viewpoint among the medical health professionals’ community is an 
obvious example for the triumph of ODBC.  
   
4.4 Conclusion 
  The research question guiding this chapter was as follows: How do shifts in the 
opinions of psychiatrists, psychologists, and other mental health experts explain the delay 
between the appearance of thorazine and the adoption of the current model of American 
mental health care? Statistical analyses including OLS regressions, Chow breakpoint 
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testing, Markov switching, VAR, IRF, and ARDL helped to provide an answer to this 
question. The use of these techniques indicated that the answer to the second research 
question was similar to the answer of the first research question, particularly in terms of 
Lindblom’s (1959) theory of disjointed incrementalism. It seems that mental health 
professionals were very similar to the public at large in terms of considering both CMHC 
and ODBC as incremental alternatives to mental hospitals. The main difference between 
mental health professionals and the public at large was that mental health professionals 
were roughly three years earlier than the public in championing ODBC; both mental 
health professionals and the public appeared to drop support for CMHC at about the same 
time, 1976-1977. For mental health professionals, as well as for the public at large, 
support for ODBC appears to have been partly rooted in the failure of CMHCs; however, 
it seems that mental health professionals’ support for ODBC was also conditioned by the 
general success of reductionist paradigms of mental illness.  
 The findings for RQ2 should be understood as part of the same general 
explanatory framework as the findings for RQ1. In both cases, those of the mental health 
professional community and of the public at large, preferences for CMHC and ODBC 
viewed with each other for nearly a generation, until the triumph of the ODBC concept in 
the mid-to-late 1970s. The long period in which levels of support for CMHC and ODBC 
were statistically indistinguishable for each other represents a period of working through 
options, and the very length of this period is what appears to furnish the explanation for 
the government’s own delay in tilting policy towards the ODBC paradigm of mental 




CHAPTER 5.  RQ3 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 The purpose of this chapter is to answer the third research question of the study, 
which was as follows: How do formal and informal lobbying efforts by pharmacological 
companies and other commercial stakeholders in mental health explain the delay between 
the appearance of thorazine and the adoption of the current model of American mental 
health care? Because access to formal lobbying records only became possible after 1998, 
RQ3 was answered through other means. Six pharmaceutical companies—Johnson & 
Johnson, Novartis, Pfizer, Hoffman-La Roche, Sanofi, and Merck—were asked to 
disclose their advertising and marketing spending for each quarter from 1952 to 1981. To 
ensure that this metric was relevant to the topic of the study, the pharmaceutical 
companies were asked to disclose only the advertising and marketing spending pertinent 
to anti-psychotic medicines, which are the basis for the outpatient, drug-based clinical 
approach to mental health policy. Further, this spending was calculated for the American 
market only. Thus, to derive this variable, U.S.-focused advertising and marketing 
spending for anti-psychotic medicines was divided by revenues attributable to the U.S. 
market.  Thus, to ensure comparability across companies, and to control for the effects of 
currency fluctuations and other economic factors, the data were transformed into a 
percentage. This variable was named SPEND in the statistical analysis for the third 
research question of the study.  
 Before analyzing these data, which were provided by each of the six companies 
approached by the researcher, it should be noted that the continuity of large 
pharmaceutical companies is somewhat complicated. Such companies merge frequently, 
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change names, and otherwise adopt new identities. Therefore, the company names under 
which the research for RQ3 has been carried out do not necessarily reflect the company 
names under which certain anti-psychotic drugs were marketed in the period from 1952 
to 1981. Nonetheless, for the sake of convenience, the companies’ current names have 
been adopted in this chapter. Because data were obtained from six companies, the 
opportunity was also taken to create a single average value for anti-psychotic advertising 
and marketing spending as a percentage of company revenues in each quarter. This 
average offered insight into the dynamics of a very large segment of the pharmaceutical 
industry.  As earlier data for outpatient, drug-based clinical approaches had already been 
collected, the opportunity was also taken to determine whether the intensity of 
pharmaceutical spending to promote the drugs at the basis of the ODBC model 
influenced popular and professional evaluations of the viability of the ODBC model. 
      
5.2 Statistical Analysis of RQ3 
 The first step in the statistical analysis was to tabulate the raw data of the study. 
These data appear in Table 13 below. Like the data in RQ1 and RQ2, the data for RQ3 
are part of a time series and were analyzed through the use of common time-series 




Table 13. Raw Data for RQ3 
Year Quarter SPEND 
1952 1 5.5 
1952 2 4.83 
1952 3 5.43 
1952 4 5.71 
1953 5 5.34 
1953 6 6.25 
1953 7 5.03 
1953 8 5.3 
1954 9 6.98 
1954 10 6.33 
1954 11 6.74 
1954 12 5.33 
1955 13 6.79 
1955 14 5.12 
1955 15 4.83 
1955 16 4.34 
1956 17 4.72 
1956 18 5.49 
1956 19 5.41 
1956 20 5 
1957 21 5.96 
1957 22 6.67 
1957 23 6.4 
1957 24 6.26 
1958 25 5.08 
1958 26 6.07 
1958 27 5.53 
1958 28 5.89 
1959 29 5.1 
1959 30 5.49 
1959 31 6.62 
1959 32 6.6 
1960 33 4.91 
1960 34 4.2 
1960 35 6.73 
1960 36 5.72 
1961 37 4.15 
1961 38 6.22 
1961 39 6.61 
1961 40 4.33 
1962 41 5.94 
1962 42 4.53 
1962 43 5.05 
1962 44 5.47 
1963 45 6.45 
1963 46 6.66 
1963 47 4.17 
1963 48 5.31 
1964 49 6.29 
1964 50 5.21 
1964 51 2.43 
1964 52 3.24 
1965 53 2.41 
1965 54 3.12 
1965 55 2.72 
1965 56 3.09 
1966 57 2.19 
1966 58 3.27 
1966 59 3.17 
1966 60 3.27 
1967 61 3.14 
1967 62 2.31 
1967 63 2.43 
1967 64 2.6 
1968 65 2.07 
1968 66 3.01 
1968 67 2.09 
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Year Quarter SPEND 
1968 68 2.71 
1969 69 2.15 
1969 70 3.39 
1969 71 2.82 
1969 72 2.42 
1970 73 2.29 
1970 74 2.21 
1970 75 3.46 
1970 76 3.08 
1971 77 2.83 
1971 78 6.51 
1971 79 7.75 
1971 80 7.51 
1972 81 8.99 
1972 82 9.18 
1972 83 7.61 
1972 84 7.5 
1973 85 6.86 
1973 86 6.04 
1973 87 8.47 
1973 88 6.95 
1974 89 8.83 
1974 90 6.45 
1974 91 6.3 
1974 92 6.82 
1975 93 9.08 
1975 94 9.17 
1975 95 5.71 
1975 96 7.62 
1976 97 9.18 
1976 98 6.01 
1976 99 8.98 
1976 100 5.87 
1977 101 6.57 
1977 102 6.94 
1977 103 6.9 
1977 104 7.7 
1978 105 8.33 
1978 106 5.67 
1978 107 8.28 
1978 108 8.2 
1979 109 8.02 
1979 110 5.93 
1979 111 8.1 
1979 112 6.67 
1980 113 6.51 
1980 114 7.45 
1980 115 7.23 
1980 116 8.51 
1981 117 8.19 
 
These data were placed into a time line, which appears as Figure 23 below. This 
time line is of particular interest, because, as was the case with the time series analyzed 
for RQ1 and RQ2, it appears to give evidence of distinct states in the evolution of 




Figure 23. Change in pharma spending to influence ODBC outcomes in U.S., 1952-1981. 
 
In order to achieve more precise insights into the dynamics of changing 
pharmaceutical industry spending to influence ODBC outcomes, a Chow breakpoint test 
(Chow 1960) was conducted on this time series. In this procedure, a structural breakpoint 
was identified on the basis of the quarter in which the Wald statistic was maximized. The 
results have been plotted in Figures 24 below. These results indicate that the break point 
for SPEND came in quarter 78 (the second quarter of 1971). This breakpoint has been 
superimposed on Figure 24, and appears to coincide with a marked uptick in 
pharmaceutical industry spending to influence ODBC outcomes after a period of 















Figure 24. Trends in SPEND, RQ3; structural breakpoint identified. 
 
As in the analysis for RQs 1 and 2, a Markov switching analysis was carried out 
in order to analyze the existence of distinct states in the time series for SPEND. The 
Markov switching analysis disclosed the existence of low- and high-SPEND regimes. 
The low-SPEND rate had a mean spending rate of 2.75% (SE = 0.227) of American 
revenues, while the high-SPEND rate had a mean spending rate of 6.43% (SE = 0.123). 
The low-SPEND states had a persistence of 95.6%, while the high-SPEND rate had a 
persistence of 99.1%. Thus, the high-SPEND rate was more persistent. Next, these states 
were visually mapped in Figure 25 below, providing the basis for an interpretation of this 















Figure 25. One-step ahead Markov switch probabilities in SPEND, RQ3. 
    
The Markov switch analysis and Chow breakpoint test point to some interesting 
properties of the SPEND time series. The pharmaceutical industry appeared to expend a 
moderate amount of money in promoting anti-psychotic drugs in the United States until 
around 1965, when the amount of spending began to rise substantially. Spending 
remained very high from around 1965 to 1971, when it began to drop off again. As 
discussed later in this chapter, the pattern observed in Figures 24 and 25 is consistent 
with the pharmaceutical industry going through three periods: (a) A period of trying to 
build interest in the ODBC approach; (b) a period of losing interest in trying to build 
interest in the ODBC approach, perhaps due to the ascendancy of the CMHC model from 
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in 1971, perhaps in order to rob the CMHC paradigm of its momentum, or as a response 
to the perceived vulnerability of the CMHC approach in the United States.   
Because data were collected on both the public’s and the mental health 
professionals’ community’s support for ODBC and CMHC, the opportunity was taken to 
determine whether pharmaceutical industry advertising impacted these metrics. The first 
analyses were OLS regressions of spending on CMHC, CMHC-M, ODBC, and ODBC-
M. The scatterplots for these regressions have been provided in Figures 26-29 below.  
The regression of SPEND on ODBC was significant, F(1, 115) = 31.75, p < 0.001, R2 = 
0.2164. The OLS equation was as follows: ODBC = (SPEND)(12.20) – 6.8. Thus, 
spending appeared to raise the public’s support of ODBC, suggesting that the 
pharmaceutical industry’s spending influenced the public debate on ODBC.  The 
regression of SPEND on CMHC was not significant, F(1, 115) = 2.68, p = 0.1040, R2 = 
0.0228. This result supports the discriminant validity of the regression of SPEND on 
ODBC. Given that SPEND was intended , at least in part, to build public support for 
ODBC, the success of SPEND would be indicated by the ability of this variable to 
increase ODBC support, and to either drive CMHC support downwards or to not impact 
CMHC. The findings of the OLS regressions conformed with these expectations.  
Interestingly, the regression of SPEND on ODBC-M was not significant, F(1, 115) = 
1.54, p = 0.2167, R2 = 0.0132, which, in conjunction with the regression of SPEND on 
ODBC, suggests that pharmaceutical industry spending was able to sway the public, but 
not mental health professionals, towards the adoption of ODBC.  However, the regression 
of SPEND on CMHC-M was significant, F(1, 115) = 41.76, p < 0.001,  R2 = 0.2664. The 
OLS equation was: CMHC-M = (SPEND)(-8.11) + 72.24. Thus, spending appeared to 
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lower mental health professionals’ opinions of CMHC, which suggests another form of 
successful pharmaceutical industry influence, as the industry was not in favor of CMHC.  
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Figure 27. Scatterplot, spending impact on CMHC.  
 







2 4 6 8 10
SPEND








2 4 6 8 10
SPEND






Figure 29. Scatterplot, spending impact on CMHC-M.  
 
 Although two of the OLS regressions (of SPEND on CMHC-M and of SPEND on 
ODBC) were significant, the effect sizes were low. Moreover, because all of these 
variables were time-series data, there was the possibility that, once previous values of 
SPEND were factored in through auto-regression, there might not be a significant impact 
of SPEND on CMHC, CMHC-M, ODBC, or ODBC-M. In order to accommodate this 
possible, it was necessary to create and interpret an ARDL model. Before doing so, 
however, a VAR was created so that an IRF graph could be generated. The IRF graph is 
presented in Figure 30 below, with the VAR appearing as Table 14.  The IRF graph and 
VAR confirm that SPEND had a downwards impact on CMHC and CMHC-M, but also 
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Figure 30. IRF graph, SPEND impacts on all measures of policy support. 
 
Table 14. VAR, RQ3 
 Sample (adjusted): 1952Q3 1981Q1    
 Included observations: 115 after adjustments   
 Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ]   
 SPEND CMHC CMHC-M ODBC-M ODBC 
      
SPEND(-1)  0.416364 -1.560857 -2.019392 -0.812911 -2.239447 
  (0.09404)  (1.03440)  (1.59622)  (1.70081)  (1.46602) 
 [ 4.42737] [-1.50895] [-1.26511] [-0.47796] [-1.52757] 
      
SPEND(-2)  0.180128  0.117657 -0.410992  0.338178  1.389064 
  (0.09346)  (1.02797)  (1.58630)  (1.69024)  (1.45691) 
 [ 1.92735] [ 0.11446] [-0.25909] [ 0.20008] [ 0.95343] 
      
CMHC(-1) -0.016052  0.765250  0.089628 -0.055131 -0.102693 
  (0.00876)  (0.09635)  (0.14868)  (0.15842)  (0.13655) 
 [-1.83248] [ 7.94260] [ 0.60284] [-0.34801] [-0.75205] 
      
CMHC(-2)  0.023920  0.180332 -0.048515  0.129259  0.107856 
  (0.00886)  (0.09741)  (0.15032)  (0.16017)  (0.13806) 
 [ 2.70092] [ 1.85124] [-0.32275] [ 0.80702] [ 0.78124] 
      
CMHC-M(-1) -0.010939 -0.051175  0.402218  0.109933 -0.050228 
  (0.00562)  (0.06185)  (0.09544)  (0.10169)  (0.08765) 
 [-1.94538] [-0.82744] [ 4.21438] [ 1.08103] [-0.57302] 
      
CMHC-M(-2) -0.001757  0.058806  0.300433 -0.023399  0.014327 
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  (0.00571)  (0.06275)  (0.09683)  (0.10318)  (0.08894) 
 [-0.30795] [ 0.93713] [ 3.10257] [-0.22678] [ 0.16109] 
      
ODBC-M(-1) -0.007116 -0.002203  0.125124  0.249889 -0.114701 
  (0.00493)  (0.05423)  (0.08369)  (0.08918)  (0.07687) 
 [-1.44310] [-0.04061] [ 1.49506] [ 2.80223] [-1.49224] 
      
ODBC-M(-2) -0.001403  0.019974 -0.036036  0.451726  0.110224 
  (0.00493)  (0.05425)  (0.08372)  (0.08920)  (0.07689) 
 [-0.28455] [ 0.36818] [-0.43044] [ 5.06401] [ 1.43353] 
      
ODBC(-1) -0.004595 -0.038271 -0.068315  0.169587  0.453656 
  (0.00519)  (0.05707)  (0.08807)  (0.09384)  (0.08088) 
 [-0.88551] [-0.67059] [-0.77571] [ 1.80722] [ 5.60869] 
      
ODBC(-2)  0.014259  0.063112  0.048044 -0.115138  0.599772 
  (0.00587)  (0.06457)  (0.09964)  (0.10617)  (0.09152) 
 [ 2.42892] [ 0.97739] [ 0.48215] [-1.08443] [ 6.55367] 
      
C  2.472942  7.175595  14.40004  19.05035  5.826406 
  (0.54685)  (6.01496)  (9.28190)  (9.89008)  (8.52482) 
 [ 4.52212] [ 1.19296] [ 1.55141] [ 1.92621] [ 0.68346] 
 R-squared  0.718513  0.918556  0.667837  0.677636  0.898969 
 Adj. R-squared  0.691447  0.910725  0.635899  0.646639  0.889254 
 Sum sq. resids  124.2821  15035.95  35804.64  40650.38  30201.99 
 S.E. equation  1.093170  12.02399  18.55466  19.77041  17.04124 
 F-statistic  26.54660  117.2956  20.90996  21.86162  92.53847 
 Log likelihood -167.6412 -443.3908 -493.2797 -500.5782 -483.4950 
 Akaike AIC  3.106803  7.902448  8.770082  8.897013  8.599912 
 Schwarz SC  3.369362  8.165007  9.032641  9.159571  8.862471 
 Mean dependent  5.584957  35.80870  27.45217  80.47826  62.15652 
 S.D. dependent  1.967988  40.24244  30.74977  33.25878  51.20797 
 Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.)  5.87E+09    
 Determinant resid covariance  3.55E+09    
 Log likelihood -2080.310    
 Akaike information criterion  37.13583    
 Schwarz criterion  38.44863    
            
 The VAR / IRF results presented above, and the ARDL results presented below, 
address a highly relevant question: How much of an impact did the anti-psychotic 
advertising and marketing spending of pharmaceutical companies have on both the 
public’s and mental health community’s support for the CMHC versus ODBC policy 
paradigms for mental health? The OLS regressions offered a simple, cross-sectional 
insight into such an impact. However, the low effect sizes of the OLS models, the 
obvious noise in the scatter plots (see Figures 26-29), and the fact that all of the variables 
in the analysis were time-series variables suggested the usefulness of VAR and ARDL, 
rather than OLS, approaches to the data. 
 The VAR analysis was used to generate an IRF graph that indicated that the 
impact of SPEND on CMHC, ODBC, CMHC-M, and ODBC-M variables was not very 
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substantial. This insight was developed further through an ARDL model. To simplify the 
ARDL model presentation, only one set of outputs—long-run coefficients—has been 
presented. In ARDLs, long-run coefficients are useful for their ability to quantify the 
effect that SPEND had on CMHC, CMHC-M, ODBC, and ODBC-M after taking past 
values of SPEND into account. The results indicate no significant long-term effect of 
SPEND on any of the support metrics. Because the ARDL results are more reliable and 
valid, given the time-series nature of the data, these results are of the highest relevance 
when assessing the impact of the spending of the pharmaceutical companies on the 
formation of public and professional opinion about the relative merits of CMHC and 
ODBC.  This insight provides a strong foundation for a discussion of theories and 





Table 15. ARDL Long-Run Coefficient Results, RQ3 
Dependent Variable Long-Run SPEND 
Coefficient 










CMHC-M -10.48 0.0081 
 
ODBC 11.10 0.07 
 
ODBC-M 0.003 0.997 
 
  
Because only the long-term effect of CMHC-M on SPEND was significant, the gradients 
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Figure 31. Gradients of the objective function, impact of SPEND on CMHC-M. 
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 The main graphic of note in Figure 31 is at the bottom left, for SPEND. The 
gradient of the objective function is simply a map of a non-linear function, a map that can 
be used to determine whether, in the case of RQ3, the relationship between SPEND and 
CMHC-M is noisy or not. The distinction was illustrated by Gaël Varoquaux (Varoquaux 
2016, 1)  through the following illustration, which has been reproduced in Figure 32 
below: 
 
Figure 32. Example of a noisy (blue) versus non-noisy (green) non-linear function. 
 
It is clear from the various spikes in Figure 31 that the gradient of the objective 
function for the relationship between SPEND and CMHC-M is very noisy. In practical 
terms, the noisiness of this relationship means that there is no good way to calculate the 
impact of SPEND on CMHC-M. That a relationship between these two variables exists is 
incontestable; however, this relationship is very hard to plot, whether through linear 
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methods such as OLS, or through time-series models that are are sensitive to non-linear 
effects, such as ARDL. Thus, very little can be said about exactly how SPEND impacts 
CMHC-M; neither the passage of time, the magnitude of SPEND itself, or the non-linear 
interactions between SPEND and CMHC-M provide a satisfactory explanation.  
 
5.3 Relationship to Theory and Literature 
 There is a substantial body of theory and empirical literature related to lobbying, 
whether this phenomenon is understood through formal lobbying processes or through 
informal or indirect lobbying, of which advertising can be considered a part. The purpose 
of this section of the chapter is to apply existing theories and empirical findings to the 
statistical findings obtained in the analysis of RQ3. 
 A seminal article by Anthony Downs attempted to advance an economic theory of 
government decision-making that was very advanced for its time, as it drew on aspects of 
information theory and other quantitative disciplines that were not well-developed in 
1957, when Downs’ article was published. Downs’ empirical argument proceeds from the 
following theoretical assumption: 
In a democracy, the government always acts so as to maximize the number 
of votes it will receive. In effect, it is an entrepreneur selling policies for 
votes instead of products for money. Furthermore, it must compete for 
votes with other parties, just as two or more oligopolists compete for sales 
in a market. Whether or not such a government maximizes social welfare 
(assuming this process can be defined) depends upon how the competitive 
struggle for power influences its behavior. (Downs 1957, 137).    
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According to Downs, policy-making is the end result of this competitive process,  which 
involves (a) the government as decision-maker; (b) the electorate, which, in a rational-
actor model, is attempting to maximize its own utility; and (c) influencers of the 
electorate. Downs argued that, in a democracy, both governments and influencers attempt 
to present policy action (or inaction) in light of its utility to a segment of the electorate; in 
an authoritarian structure, there is no comparable process of influence. 
 What is theoretically important about Downs’ (1957) work in relation to the RQ3 
findings is the presumption of coordination between actors. Influencers (including 
government actors as well as private parties) work on the electorate, which exerts 
pressure on the government, which acts on the presumed utility preferences of the 
electorate with legislative action or inaction. This theoretical model lends itself to 
empirical modeling as well. For example, one of the empirical assumptions in the current 
study is that a growing consensus, discernible through the method of corpus analysis, can 
be utilized to understand eventual government action. This consensus can have many 
levels, evincing the kind of sequential activity discussed by Downs. For example, 
lobbying could influence mental health professionals, who could influence the electorate, 
who could influence government.  
 As discussed earlier, the RQ1 and RQ2 results appear to be consistent with the 
interpretation that popular and professional opinion both influenced the government 
move away from CMHC, but somewhat independently of each other—with, for example, 
mental health professionals adopting an earlier position of support for ODBC than could 
be seen in the popular data. The analysis for RQ3 can be interpreted similarly, as it is 
clear that there is a rising pattern of pharmaceutical spending when the idea of 
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community mental health centers started to become vulnerable. Thus, for RQs 1, 2, and 3, 
analysis suggests that public opinion, professional opinion, and pharmaceutical 
companies’ influence-building exerted independent effects on the ultimate change in 
government policy.   
 This finding has important implications, not only for theories such as that put 
forth by Downs (1957), but also for Kingdon’s (1984) multiple streams theory. A 
previous empirical study (Brunner 2008) contained a critique of Kingdon’s work on the 
basis of the finding that networked, coordinated interests were the best explanation of a 
policy change in Germany. Brunner reached this conclusion on the basis of descriptive 
and qualitative analysis of data form the German electorate. An appropriate empirical test 
of multiple streams theory is more likely to take the form demonstrated earlier in this 
chapter, when the contributions of pharmaceutical industry spending, popular opinion, 
and professional opinion were all examined as part of the same time-dependent statistical 
model. The analysis for RQ3 confirmed the very aspects of Kingdon’s theory that 
Brunner rejected. 
…with its emphasis on ideas and their role in agenda-setting, Kingdon’s 
model probably underestimates the importance of interests and networks. 
Especially in connection with policy-oriented learning, networks of 
experts contribute to agenda-setting and policy change. ‘‘Epistemic 
communities,” for example, exert substantial influence on policy choice, 
especially during the establishment of climate regimes where the issue’s 




It is also possible that both Brunner (2008) and Kingdon (1984) are correct. For 
example, in Germany, the existence of multiple streams is institutionally contained and 
managed by existing principles of concordance (the so-called Mitbestimmung model), 
whereas, in the United States, the streams are more likely to be independent. Thus, 
Kingdon’s model might be more generally applicable than Brunner concedes, especially 
if it is granted that coordinated interests and networks, as in Germany, are still multiple 
streams.     
There are numerous ways in which the action of networks can be modeled. One 
approach is that of temporal causality. In the context of the current study, the sequential 
operation of a network could reflect the transmission of influence from one part to 
another—for example, from pharmaceutical companies to mental health professionals, 
from mental health professionals to the public, and from the public to the government. 
However, the data analyses for RQs 1, 2, and 3 did not find any evidence for the 
existence of such a dynamic. Each community—the public at large, the mental health 
community, and the pharmaceutical companies—acted in a manner that was not closely 
correlated with that of any other community. If this finding is reliable, then it supports 
Kingdon’s multiple streams theory against Brunner’s charges, at least insofar as the 
specific example of American mental health policy is concerned.   
 Kingdon (1984) did not defend multiple streams theory with reference to any 
specific statistical models. Nonetheless, in retrospect, multiple streams theory can indeed 
be interpreted in terms of statistical concepts. The very concept of multiple streams 
suggests independent lines of influence that converge on a single deserved policy change. 
The independence of these streams can be tested statistically; for example, in an OLS 
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model, streams that were multi-collinear would no longer be independent streams. The 
independence of streams is more difficult to demonstrate in a VAR or ARDL time-series 
model, but, in theory, similar coefficient values and significance levels for different 
predictor variables could suggest that they were not independent. Several analytical 
models were applied in this chapter, and all of them suggest stream independence, thus 
aligning with Kingdon’s theory.   
 
5.4 Conclusion 
 The purpose of this chapter was to answer the third research question of the study, 
which was as follows: How do formal and informal lobbying efforts by pharmacological 
companies and other commercial stakeholders in mental health explain the delay between 
the appearance of thorazine and the adoption of the current model of American mental 
health care? The nominal answer to this question is that spending patterns of 
pharmaceutical companies marketing anti-psychotic medicines in the United States 
supported the inference that the pharmaceutical companies spent (a) a moderate amount 
on marketing such medicine in the earlier stages of the development of anti-psychotic 
medicine; (b) a very small amount during the heyday of the community mental health 
center concept; and (c) much larger amounts from the beginning of the 1970s onwards, 
whether in response to the vulnerability of the community mental health center concept 
or in order to bring about such amount vulnerability.    
 Although the data analysis did not demonstrate a meaningful relationship between 
pharmaceutical spending and the pro-ODBC opinions of the mental health community, 
the data analysis for RQ2 did demonstrate that the mental health community turned sour 
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on the community health center concept, and began to promote the ODBC approach, 
before such changes also appeared in popular opinion. It is possible that pharmaceutical 
companies were aware of the changing tide of professional opinion and timed their own 
marketing campaigns to take advantage of this fact, although not in a manner that could 
be modeled through the linear or non-linear techniques utilized in this chapter. 
Ultimately, the correlation of data from RQ1, RQ2, and RQ3 carried out in this chapter 
provided strong empirical support for Kingdon’s (1983) multiple streams theory of 
influence and demonstrated more complex and convincing ways of empirically analyzing 
this theory than those offered by Brunner (2008).   
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CHAPTER 6. RQ4 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 The purpose of this chapter is to answer the fourth research question of the study, 
which was as follows: How do shifts in the policy of individual states explain the delay 
between the appearance of thorazine and the adoption of the current model of American 
mental health care? This question was analyzed by analyzing changes in the ratio of 
individuals confined in state-run mental hospitals from 1890 to 1981. Particular attention 
was paid to the identification of Chow breakpoints (Chow, 1960) and other 
discontinuities in the time-series data. Also, the opportunity was taken to determine 
whether the ratio of individuals confined in state-run mental hospitals from 1890 to 1981 
was correlated with the data gathered for RQs 1-3. The statistical analysis was followed 
by a discussion of theories and past empirical findings considered in the light of the 
findings for RQ4. Note that the institutionalization rate was of individuals per 100,000, 
and was designated as MRATE in coding. 
  
6.2 Statistical Analysis of RQ4 
 The first step in the statistical analysis was to tabulate the raw data of the study. 
These data appear in Table 16 below. The data, which have been graphed in Figure 33 
below, level off so steeply after the mid-1960s that no superimposed line is necessary to 
illustrate the change. A Chow breakpoint test (Chow, 1960) revealed that the breakpoint 
of this time series came in 1965. Markov-switching analysis found the existence of a 
high- and low-institutionalization rate state, with the high-institutionalization rate having 
a mean of 758.44 (SE = 6.44), and the low-institutionalization rate having a mean of 
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371.51 (SE = 20.87). The persistence of the high-institutionalization rate was 99.1%, and 




Table 16. Raw Data, RQ4 




































































































Figure 33. Decline in the population of patients in state-run mental hospitals, 1890-1981. 
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 If c. mid-1960s legislative change, the anticipation of legislative change, or a 
combination of formal and informal pre-legislative policy changes were responsible for a 
change in the institutionalization rate, then it would be natural to expect the existence of a 
random walk in the institutionalization rate until exogenous, legislation-related factors 
brought about a decline. This intuition is supported by Figure 33, but can also be formally 
tested. Figure 33 appears to show that, until the Chow breakpoint of 1965, the fluctuation 
in the institutionalization rate is random; after 1965, there is an unmistakable downwards 
trend in the institutionalization rate. 
 One way to determine whether the institutionalization rate from 1890 to 1965 is 
actually a random walk is to conduct a Dickey-Fuller test (Dickey and Fuller 1979) on 
the (a) 1890-1964 and (b) 1965-1981 values of the institutionalization rate depicted in 
Figure 32 above. Drawing upon the fact that unit root is also a random walk (Dickey and 
Fuller 1979), the p value of a Dickey-Fuller test can determine whether a time-series is a 
random walk. In this case, a Dickey-Fuller test of the pre-1965 values for 
institutionalization rate reveals the existence of a unit root, z(t) = -6.241, p < 0.001. On 
the other hand, a Dickey-Fuller test of the post-1965 values for institutionalization rate 
reveals the absence of a unit root, z(t) = 0.316, p = 0.9781. These analyses establish that 
the time series for institutionalization rate was in a random walk for roughly 75 years, 
after which this time series became stationary—that is, a genuine time series. The 
existence of the 1965 breakpoint between the random-walk and stationary eras in the 
evolution of the institutionalization rate strongly suggests the causal inference of 
legislation related to the promotion of CMHC and, by extension, the beginning of the era 
of mass deinstitutionalization in the United States.    
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The analysis of change in the population of patients in state-run mental hospitals 
is thus consistent with the claim that states did little to change their own mental health 
policies, at least insofar as such policies were oriented around institutionalization, until 
the advent of the federal government’s promotion of community mental health centers in 
the mid-1960s. The Chow breakpoint for the time series of the population of patients in 
state-run mental hospitals coincides precisely with the passage of federal legislation 
establishing community mental health centers. The pattern in the institutionalized rate 
between 1890 and 1965 is obviously a random walk, suggesting that the status quo in 
institutionalization lasted for at least 75 years, until it was perturbed by federal policy 
change.  
The only controversial question is why the breakpoint in the time series of 
patients in state-run mental hospitals was in 1965, two years before the passage of the 
Mental Health Amendments Act of 1967. It is possible that states were already 
anticipating that legislation or that overt as well as behind-the-scenes federal efforts 
predating the Mental Health Amendments Act of 1967 had some causal effect. This point 
will be taken up further in the discussion of theory and empirical studies provided at the 
end of the chapter.  
 In RQs 1 and 2, data pertaining to the degree of public and professional support 
for the CMHC and ODBC ideas were analyzed. In RQ3, the marketing attempts of 
leading drug companies, considered as potential influences of debate and policy, were 
analyzed. All of these time series can be considered in terms of their potential impact on 
the population of patients in state-run mental hospitals. Such analysis reveals a roughly 
simultaneous move in public, professional, pharmaceutical, and state attitudes.     
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 It is important to note that both the CMHC and ODBC approaches were policy 
alternatives to state-run mental hospitals. In the CMHC approach, deinstitutionalization 
would be followed by community-level support and, when necessary, supplementation 
with drugs. In the ODBC approach, drugs were the primary treatment modality, and the 
role of the community mental health center was taken on by the hospital. OLS 
regressions indicate that, as both the CMHC and ODBC alternatives gained in popularity 
(as measured through the corpus analysis techniques discussed as part of RQs 1 and 2), 
actual rates of institutionalization declined. These regressions took place after the 
quarterly CMHC and ODBC data used for RQs 1 and 2 were converted to annual figures. 
As there were only annual institutionalization rates available, the conversion of all data 
values to annual frequency (see Table 17 below) allowed the times series of data for RQs 
1-4 to be analyzed in a simpler manner, avoiding the need for mixed-data sampling 
(MIDAS) approaches that would have been necessary because of the lower frequency of 
institutionalization rate data.  
Figure 35 represents the inverse correlation between a rise in public support for 
CMHC and a decline in the institutionalization rate. The relationship between public 
support for CMHC and the institutionalization rate was significant, F(1, 27) = 8.10,  
p = 0.0083. The OLS regression equation was as follows: Institutionalization rate = 
(public support for CMHC)(-0.50) + 705.96. Thus, for every 1-point increase in public 
support for CMHC as measured through corpus analysis, the institutionalization rate in 
state-run mental institutions declined by 0.56 people per 100,000.  Figure 36, meanwhile, 
represents the inverse correlation between a rise in public support for ODBC and a 




Figure 35. OLS relationship between public CMHC support and institutionalization rate. 
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The relationship between public support for ODBC and the institutionalization 
rate was significant, F(1, 27) = 199.15, p < 0.0001. The OLS regression equation was as 
follows: Institutionalization rate = (public support for ODBC)(-0.90) + 843.75. Thus, for 
every 1-point increase in public support for ODBC as measured through corpus analysis, 
the institutionalization rate in state-run mental institutions declined by 0.90 people per 
100,000. The relationship between ODBC and the institutionalization rate (β = 0.90) was 
thus stronger than the relationship between CMHC and the institutionalization rate (β = 
0.56).  
Moreover, once CMHC and ODBC are jointly regressed on the 
institutionalization rate, the explanatory power of CMHC disappears. When CMHC was 
regressed on the institutionalization rate, it was significant at p < 0.01. However, when 
both CMHC and ODBC were regressed on the institutionalization rate, ODBC remained 
significant at p < 0.001, whereas the significance of CMHC was 0.595. For this reason, it 
appears that public support for ODBC, more so than public support for CMHC, was 
closely related to the decline in the institutionalization rate.  
The causal dynamics of the ODBC- institutionalization rate relationship will be 
explained towards the end of this section, through a VAR and ARDL. However, given 
that ODBC was a significant variable in predicting variation in the institutionalization 
rate, ODBC-M—which, it will be recalled, was the measure of mental health 
professionals’ support for ODBC in corpus analysis—was also tested. An OLS regression 
indicated that CMHC-M was not a significant predictor of the institutionalization rate, p 
= 0.83, while ODBC-M was a significant predictor of the institutionalization rate, p < 
0.001. CMHC-M remained insignificant (p = 0.102, β = 0.46), and ODBC-M remained 
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significant (p < 0.001, β = -1.07), when both of these variables were regressed on the 
institutionalization rate, p = 0.83. 









1952 791 0 70 2 11 5.3675 
1953 727 0 99 2 18 5.48 
1954 821 0 78 4 36 6.345 
1955 822 0 84 15 151 5.27 
1956 796 0 82 20 246 5.155 
1957 782 0 103 38 203 6.3225 
1958 729 0 70 25 191 5.6425 
1959 701 0 95 28 317 5.9525 
1960 819 56 83 24 364 5.39 
1961 802 53 108 19 339 5.3275 
1962 806 72 108 22 274 5.2475 
1963 774 64 110 28 347 5.6475 
1964 742 47 92 223 323 4.2925 
1965 756 39 82 311 309 2.835 
1966 716 35 62 396 328 2.975 
1967 679 86 218 239 401 2.62 
1968 650 164 254 279 375 2.47 
1969 640 371 252 240 411 2.695 
1970 613 461 287 217 425 2.76 
1971 585 384 354 180 385 6.15 
1972 550 400 312 127 376 8.32 
1973 509 406 349 161 384 7.08 
1974 450 418 411 134 435 7.1 
1975 401 398 382 144 466 7.895 
1976 350 184 405 111 407 7.51 
1977 300 138 471 116 428 7.0275 
1978 289 102 498 15 451 7.62 
1979 293 108 640 13 421 7.18 
1980 287 115 797 23 336 7.425 
1981 295      
 
In an effort to further identify the variable with most predictive power over the 
institutionalization rate, CMHC, ODBC, CMHC-M, and ODBC-M were all regressed on 
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the institutionalization rate. The results indicated that ODBC-M was no longer significant 
when these three additional predictor variables were added. Of the variables of CMHC, 
ODBC, CMHC-M, and ODBC-M, only ODBC was a significant predictor of the 
institutionalization rate (p < 0.001, β = -0.85).  SPEND was added to the model in order 
to measure the ability of pharmaceutical company spending to change institutionalization 
levels, but SPEND was not significant at p < 0.05.  
 
Figure 37. Changes in institutionalization rate, ODBC, ODBC-M, CMHC, and CMHC-
M. 
 
The regressions presented above were cross-sectional, whereas all five variables 
in Figure 37 were time-series variables. There, a VAR and ARDL were carried out as 
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Table 18. VAR Results, RQ4 
 CMHC2 CMHCM2 ODBCM2 ODBC2 MRATE 
      
CMHC2(-1)  0.969706 -0.273318  0.036635 -0.068474  0.232762 
  (0.28498)  (0.31479)  (0.23665)  (0.22874)  (0.17383) 
 [ 3.40272] [-0.86826] [ 0.15481] [-0.29936] [ 1.33904] 
      
CMHC2(-2) -0.295016  0.181290  0.015250 -0.163263 -0.219457 
  (0.24280)  (0.26820)  (0.20162)  (0.19488)  (0.14810) 
 [-1.21506] [ 0.67596] [ 0.07564] [-0.83776] [-1.48183] 
      
CMHCM2(-1)  0.054244  0.907168  0.040655 -0.001707  0.016440 
  (0.24214)  (0.26746)  (0.20107)  (0.19435)  (0.14769) 
 [ 0.22402] [ 3.39175] [ 0.20219] [-0.00878] [ 0.11131] 
      
CMHCM2(-2)  0.285150 -0.062764  0.115254  0.193377 -0.189861 
  (0.26106)  (0.28837)  (0.21679)  (0.20954)  (0.15924) 
 [ 1.09228] [-0.21765] [ 0.53165] [ 0.92288] [-1.19232] 
      
ODBCM2(-1) -0.098904  0.369382  0.687504  0.033374 -0.010373 
  (0.31372)  (0.34653)  (0.26052)  (0.25180)  (0.19136) 
 [-0.31526] [ 1.06593] [ 2.63900] [ 0.13254] [-0.05421] 
      
ODBCM2(-2)  0.059261 -0.175843 -0.041337 -0.012145 -0.064744 
  (0.29752)  (0.32865)  (0.24707)  (0.23880)  (0.18148) 
 [ 0.19918] [-0.53505] [-0.16731] [-0.05086] [-0.35676] 
      
ODBC2(-1)  0.487223  0.202405 -0.400442  0.818060  0.006263 
  (0.34361)  (0.37955)  (0.28534)  (0.27580)  (0.20959) 
 [ 1.41795] [ 0.53327] [-1.40339] [ 2.96619] [ 0.02988] 
      
ODBC2(-2)  0.171724  0.298805  0.147614  0.415832 -0.509271 
  (0.52864)  (0.58394)  (0.43899)  (0.42431)  (0.32245) 
 [ 0.32484] [ 0.51170] [ 0.33626] [ 0.98002] [-1.57937] 
      
MRATE(-1)  0.181665  0.233939 -0.116102  0.044498  0.605208 
  (0.38499)  (0.42526)  (0.31970)  (0.30900)  (0.23483) 
 [ 0.47188] [ 0.55011] [-0.36316] [ 0.14400] [ 2.57724] 
      
MRATE(-2)  0.354149  0.339093 -0.153254 -0.142390 -0.041747 
  (0.40714)  (0.44972)  (0.33809)  (0.32678)  (0.24834) 
 [ 0.86986] [ 0.75401] [-0.45329] [-0.43573] [-0.16811] 
      
C -465.1996 -508.6629  334.5582  50.81361  404.3889 
  (380.099)  (419.858)  (315.639)  (305.082)  (231.847) 
 [-1.22389] [-1.21151] [ 1.05994] [ 0.16656] [ 1.74421] 
 R-squared  0.911159  0.771578  0.842834  0.961176  0.976076 
 Adj. R-squared  0.855634  0.628815  0.744606  0.936911  0.961124 
 Sum sq. resids  59998.68  73207.10  41374.25  38652.78  22322.86 
 S.E. equation  61.23657  67.64203  50.85165  49.15077  37.35209 
 F-statistic  16.40975  5.404593  8.580347  39.61181  65.27964 
 Log likelihood -142.3456 -145.0317 -137.3281 -136.4096 -128.9980 
 Akaike AIC  11.35893  11.55790  10.98727  10.91923  10.37022 
 Schwarz SC  11.88687  12.08584  11.51520  11.44716  10.89816 
 Mean dependent  151.8889  116.7407  338.1111  251.3704  617.1111 
 S.D. dependent  161.1677  111.0252  100.6236  195.6836  189.4416 
      
      
 Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.)  6.52E+16    
 Determinant resid covariance  4.76E+15    
 Log likelihood -678.8987    
 Akaike information criterion  54.36286    
 Schwarz criterion  57.00253    
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As in the analyses of RQs 1-3, the main purpose of the VAR was to obtain a basis for 
creating an IRF graph, which, given the results of the OLS regressions, appeared to be 
most justified for ODBC and ODBC-M.  The IRF presented in Figure 38 clarifies the 
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Response of MRATE to ODBC2
Response to Cholesky One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E.
 
Figure 38. IRF graph, impact of ODBC and ODBC-M on institutionalization rate. 
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Of the two distinct IRF graphs included in Figure 38, the graph on the top is that 
of the response of the institutionalization rate to changes in the public’s positive opinion 
of ODBC, whereas the graph on the bottom is that of the response of the 
institutionalization rate to changes in the mental health community’s positive opinion of 
ODBC. In the top graph, the blue line is in negative territory—meaning that an increase 
in public opinion is associated with a reduction in the institutionalization rate—but 
remains fairly close to 0. In the bottom graph, the blue line is much further below 0, 
which means that the impact of the mental health community’s positive opinion of 
ODBC on the institutionalization rate was both stronger and longer-lasting than the 
impact of the public’s positive opinion of ODBC on the institutionalization rate.   
Before causal conclusions about the relationship between ODBC and the 
institutionalization rate can be advanced, some further tests are necessary. One possible 
test of this kind is a test of Granger causality, in which the purpose is to test whether the 
past values of an independent variable or variables are more likely to predict the future 
values of a dependent variable than the past values of a dependent variable are likely to 
predict its own future value. The results of Granger causality testing appear below:  
Table 19. Granger Causality Results 
Dependent variable: MRATE  
        Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. 
        CMHC  2.224606 2  0.3288 
CMHCM  2.955077 2  0.2282 
ODBCM  0.586566 2  0.7458 
ODBC  2.696042 2  0.2598 




The results of Granger causality testing provided in Table 19 indicate that the 
independent variables did not individually or cumulatively (p = 0.1046) Granger-cause 
the institutionalization rate.  An ARDL was also carried out. In the ARDL, the dependent 
variable was MRATE (the institutionalization rate), and the independent variables were 
CMHC, ODBC, CMHCM, and ODBCM.  The long-run coefficient for ODBC (-0.92, p = 
0.01) was remarkably close to the β value of -0.85 that ODBC took when it was regressed 
on the institutionalization rate alongside ODBC-M, CMHC, and CMHC-2. Moreover, the 
gradient of the objective function of ODBC (see top right of Figure 39) looked the most 
similar to the time-series of the institutionalization rate. Because ODBC and MRATE 
were co-integrated (see the VAR results in 18), but, because ODBC did not Granger-
cause MRATE, it does not appear that the relationship between ODBC and MRATE is 
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Figure 39. Gradients of the objective function, RQ4. 
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6.3 Relationship to Theory and Literature 
 In the discussion of RQ3, it was argued that Kingdon’s (1983) theory of multiple 
streams can be empirically tested, as through the quantification of the impact of several 
distinct streams of influence on a particular policy. The conclusion drawn at the end of 
the chapter was that of stream independence, meaning that public opinion, mental health 
professionals’ opinion, and pharmaceutical spending related to the two mental health 
policy alternatives emerging in the 1960s—community mental health centers and 
outpatient, drug-based clinical approaches—were not very well-integrated with each 
other, and demonstrated varying dynamics in terms of their relationship to actual policy 
change.  
 This insight carries over to the analysis provided for RQ4. At the beginning of the 
chapter, the use of Dickey-Fuller testing confirmed that the institutionalization rate 
between 1890 and 1964 was a random walk, whereas the institutionalization rate after 
1965 was stationary and characterized by a sharp drop in the institutionalization rate. The 
date of 1965 is important, because it was identified as being the breakpoint in the 1890-
1981 time-series of institutionalization rate data. The passage of the Mental Health 
Amendments Act of 1967, and the activities leading up to it, appear to be the best 
explanation for the sudden reduction in the institutionalization rate after at least 75 years 
of stasis.  
 The relationship between the institutionalization rate and the Mental Health 
Amendments Act of 1967 should be considered in light of multiple streams theory—
specifically, in light of the previous chapter’s finding that ODBC, ODBC-M, CMHC, 
CMHC-M, and SPEND are not well-integrated with each other. MRATE, or the 
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institutionalization rate, was also not well integrated with these other explanatory 
variables. This finding, emerging from the analysis of RQ4 presented in this chapter, 
further confirms the main emerging theme in the study, which was that public opinion, 
professional opinion, industry spending, and the institutionalization rate bore their own, 
idiosyncratic relationships with policy changes. Had all of these variables been well-
integrated, then there would have been some evidence for the evolution of a true 
consensus—cutting across the worlds of lobbying, public opinion, private spending, 
professional opinion, and state institutionalization policy—in support of both 
deinstitutionalization and the CMHC paradigm championed in the 1960s.  
 The absence of close integration between variables such as ODBC, ODBC-M, 
CMHC, CMHC-M, SPEND, and MRATE has intrinsic explanatory importance in light of 
the focus of the research questions. What each of the five research questions of the study 
has in common is the attempt to account for a delay between the appearance of thorazine 
and the adoption of the current model of American mental health care. One possible 
reason for this delay could be that several possible points of influence—including ODBC, 
ODBC-M, CMHC, CMHC-M, SPEND, and MRATE—were separate rather than 
complementary streams. This insight provides the core of a theory that has been 
developed at greater length in the concluding chapter of the study.  
 The most important question remaining from the RQ4 analysis is why the 
breakpoint in the institutionalization rate came two years before the passage of the 
Mental Health Amendments Act of 1967. A review of empirical literature can help to 
better establish the causal dynamics of the relationship between the decline in 
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institutionalization rate and federal legislative actions designed to promote the concept of 
community mental-health centers.  
 A review of the literature suggests that the most likely reason for the Chow 
breakpoint of the time series of the institutionalization rate falling in 1965 (not in 1967, 
the year of the passage of the Mental Health Amendments Act, or thereafter) was the 
passage of the Social Security Amendments of 1965. The Social Security Amendments of 
1965 were most notable for their creation of Medicare and Medicaid, and Medicaid 
would, upon its passage, become the most important source of funding for mental health 
services (including the operation of mental health institutions) at the state level. From 
1965 onwards, the main sources of funding for state mental health institutions have been 
Medicaid and state general funds.  
 The passage of the Social Security Amendments of 1965 was notable for the 
manner in which federal reimbursement for state-provided mental health care was set up. 
Sowers has provided the following overview of these developments and their 
implications: 
Historically, the federal government would not provide financial resources 
or reimburse states under Medicaid to offset the cost of operating state 
hospitals or freestanding private psychiatric inpatient services to persons 
between the ages of 21 and 64. The original Medicaid policy, as well as its 
numerous amendments, treats institutions for mental diseases differently 
from general hospitals with psychiatry units. Federal funding for persons 
with psychiatric disorders is available to support services for children 
(under age 21) in state mental institutions, for adults over 65, and for 
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adults 21 to 64 served in general hospital psychiatric units. Federal 
regulations governing reimbursements under Medicaid have helped shift 
an increasingly larger share of psychiatric treatment away from state 
mental health institutions toward general hospitals with psychiatric units. 
(Sowers 2010, 160). 
 As the federal government moved more aggressively into the business of 
subsidizing healthcare, states had changing financial incentives. In relation to mental 
institutions, the federal government failed to provide the kinds of incentives that could 
have encouraged states to proceed with the policy of institutionalization. Admittedly, 
until 1965, states had provided most of the funding for mental institutions themselves, 
with Sowers claiming that up to 85% of the budgets of such institutions were met by 
states themselves.  
` Thus, after 1965, states could have kept funding mental institutions predominantly 
on their own, but the existence of the new Medicaid incentives meant that states would be 
losing money by doing so. Thus, the mechanism through which the federal government 
brought about deinstitutionalization at the state level was jot judicial or legislative fiat, 
but rather the re-engineering of financial incentives. As Sowers has noted, the states 
themselves were not unmoved by public and professional opinion in favor of 
deinstitutionalization, but it is unlikely that this consideration was an important as the 
changing financial incentive structure in determining the rapid pace of post-1965 
deinstitutionalization. The federal government simply created a new foundation for 
healthcare economics that made mental institutions more expensive to run than they had 




 The purpose of this chapter was to answer the fourth research question of the 
study, which was as follows: How do shifts in the policy of individual states explain the 
delay between the appearance of thorazine and the adoption of the current model of 
American mental health care? Because the results of the Chow breakpoint testing found a 
break point in 1965, two years before the passage of Mental Health Amendments Act of 
1967 and during a period of widespread support for deinstitutionalization, it was 
concluded that legislative change was indeed the driver of deinstitutionalization at the 
state level. Legislative change, or impending legislative change, seems to be the most 
likely cause of the perturbation that nudged the institutionalization rate out of its 1890-
1964 random walk.      
 In addition to this main finding of the study, it was also found that public opinion, 
mental health professionals’ opinion, and pharmaceutical industry spending did not 
Granger-cause the institutionalization rate.  However, both ARDL and OLS models 
indicated that public opinion in praise of the ODBC treatment paradigm was negatively 
correlated with the institutionalization rate. While the causal effect of ODBC cannot be 
ruled out, it seems more likely that both direct and indirect legislative influence were 
more likely explanations of the post-1965 decline in the institutionalization rate.  In 
particular, the 1965 creation of Medicaid and the creation of a new financial incentive 
structure that penalized states for running mental institutionalization was probably the 
pivotal figure in driving the rapid drop in institutionalization rates that was analyzed in 
this chapter. As Medicaid did not reimburse services provided to individuals in mental 
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health institutions, the states had a substantial incentive to deinstitutionalize after 1965 
(Clarke, 1979).  
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CHAPTER 7. RQ5 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 The purpose of this chapter is to answer the fifth research question of the study, 
which was as follows: How do shifts in the policy of the federal government explain the 
delay between the appearance of thorazine and the adoption of the current model of 
American mental health care?  This question was analyzed by analyzing changes in 
support for CMHC and ODBC as voiced in the Congressional record. The key 
Congresses in the analysis were the 83rd through the 97th Congress. The first session of 
the 83rd Congress met in January, 1953, while the second session of the 9th Congress 
finished in December, 1982. The 82nd Congress was not included in the analysis, as it met 
in 1951, while much of the other time-series data for this study was collected from 1952-
1981.  The methods of analysis in RQ5 are highly similar to those used in RQs 1-4. In 
addition, as was the case for RQs 2-4, RQ5 will be cross-correlated with the other time-
series data in the study. This cross-correlation will generate relevant insights about the 
relationship between streams of influence and federal government action 
.  
7.2 Statistical Analysis of RQ5 
 The first step in the statistical analysis was to tabulate the raw data. Table 20 
below contains CMHC (coded as CMHC-C) and ODBC (coded as ODBC-C) support 
ratios for every Congressional session from 1953 to 1981. During this period, there were 
15 Congresses and 30 sessions. Because Congressional sessions overlap almost perfectly 
with calendar years, the coding scheme employed in Table 20, and for the rest of the 
statistical analyses in this chapter, represents the independent variable as years rather than 
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Congressional session numbers. This approach will facilitate the cross-correlation of the 
Congressional time series with the other time series in RQs 1-4.  In fact, Table 20 
contains all the other annualized data for the study as well. 
















1952 791 0 70 2 11 5.3675 0 0 
1953 727 0 99 2 18 5.48 0 0 
1954 821 0 78 4 36 6.345 0 0 
1955 822 0 84 15 151 5.27 0 0 
1956 796 0 82 20 246 5.155 0 0 
1957 782 0 103 38 203 6.3225 0 2 
1958 729 0 70 25 191 5.6425 0 3 
1959 701 0 95 28 317 5.9525 0 1 
1960 819 56 83 24 364 5.39 12 7 
1961 802 53 108 19 339 5.3275 14 9 
1962 806 72 108 22 274 5.2475 26 12 
1963 774 64 110 28 347 5.6475 32 14 
1964 742 47 92 223 323 4.2925 43 13 
1965 756 39 82 311 309 2.835 47 11 
1966 716 35 62 396 328 2.975 51 10 
1967 679 86 218 239 401 2.62 55 8 
1968 650 164 254 279 375 2.47 69 14 
1969 640 371 252 240 411 2.695 78 23 
1970 613 461 287 217 425 2.76 81 35 
1971 585 384 354 180 385 6.15 82 40 
1972 550 400 312 127 376 8.32 70 47 
1973 509 406 349 161 384 7.08 65 53 
1974 450 418 411 134 435 7.1 62 64 
1975 401 398 382 144 466 7.895 53 70 
1976 350 184 405 111 407 7.51 40 72 
1977 300 138 471 116 428 7.0275 28 81 
1978 289 102 498 15 451 7.62 24 83 
1979 293 108 640 13 421 7.18 22 83 
1980 287 115 797 23 336 7.425 14 86 




 The first step in analysis was to create a visual representation of change in 
CMHC-C and ODBC-C. The time line appears in Figure 40 below. It is followed by 
Figures 41 and 42, which represent the Chow structural breaks in the time-series for 
CMHC-C and ODBC-C.  
 
Figure 40. Change in CMHC-C and ODBC-C, 1952-1981. 
 
Next, Chow breakpoint testing was utilized to identify the breakpoints in CMHC-
C and ODBC-C. The breakpoint for CMHC-C came in 1969; very soon afterwards, 
CMHC-C began to decline, as is clear from Figure 41 below.  The breakpoint for ODBC-
C came in 1970, the year after which growth in ODBC-C accelerated at a more rapid rate. 
The observed patterns suggest a steady growth in CMHC-C support until the end of the 













throughout the 1952-1981 time period.  Based on Markov switch analysis (presented in 
Figures 43 and 44), there are 3 eras in CMHC-C: A period of low but rising support, a 
period of high but failing support, and a period of low support. On the other hand, there 
are only 2 eras in ODBC-C: A period of low but rising support, and a period of rising 
support.   
 
 


















Figure 42. Structural break in ODBC-C time series. Note: Break is in 1970. 
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Figure 44. One-step probabilities, Markov switch model, OCBC-C. 
 
In CMHC-C, there was a state of low support for CMHC (M = 10.8226, SE = 
3.425) and a state of high support (M = 61.065, SE = 4.022). Both states had persistence 
levels above 95%. In ODBCC, there was a state of low support for ODBC (M = 9.426, 
SE = 3.059) and a state of high support (M = 71.612, SE = 4.521). Both of these states 
also had persistence levels above 95%.  
The first important question worth asking about the CMHCC and ODBCC time 
series is how they were influenced by each other and by the other variables in the study 
(see Table 20). In order to answer this question, both a VAR and an ARDL model were 
attempted. The advantage of the VAR model was the generation of IRF graphs and the 
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its ability to model the impact of past values of CMHCC and ODBCC on their future 
values.  
The VAR model is presented in Table 21 below, followed by IRF graphs in 
Figures 45 and 46. The IRF graph in Figure 45 is based on how CMHCC responded to 
changes in the other time-series variables, while the IRF graph in Figure 46 is based on 
how ODBCC responded to changes in the other time-series variables. What is most 
notable about Figure 45 is that CMHCC responded most notably to ODBC, that is, 
popular support for ODBC as measured through corpus analysis. CMHCC was ‘shocked’ 
into negative territory by the growth in popular support for ODBC, indicating a direct 
link between the public’s support for ODBC and the Congress’s shrinking support for 
CMHC. This finding was important in its own right, as it suggests that, at least in terms 
of Congressional popularity, the growth of ODBC came at the cost of CMHC. Another 
point of note in the IRF graphs is the fairly minimal effect of pharmaceutical industry 
spending. There does not appear to be a link between the pharmaceutical industry’s 
spending patterns and Congressional opinion about either CMHC or ODBC. However, 
before drawing further conclusions about causality, a Granger causality test was 
necessary.    
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Table 21. VAR Model, RQ5 
         CMHCC ODBCC CMHC2 CMHCM2 ODBCM2 ODBC2 SPEND2 
CMHCC(-1)  0.896981 -0.027142  3.775809  2.789720  4.185489 -0.862970 -0.043940 
  (0.25067)  (0.19348)  (2.91171)  (3.34745)  (3.11500)  (3.25625)  (0.04612) 
 [ 3.57829] [-0.14028] [ 1.29677] [ 0.83339] [ 1.34366] [-0.26502] [-0.95273] 
CMHCC(-2)  0.520734  0.033666 -0.527052  4.124308 -3.938981 -0.718361 -0.019854 
  (0.29598)  (0.22845)  (3.43794)  (3.95243)  (3.67797)  (3.84474)  (0.05446) 
 [ 1.75938] [ 0.14737] [-0.15330] [ 1.04349] [-1.07097] [-0.18684] [-0.36460] 
ODBCC(-1)  0.073110  0.780135  1.349159 -6.560463  5.180969 -5.964130  0.076187 
  (0.39422)  (0.30428)  (4.57911)  (5.26437)  (4.89881)  (5.12094)  (0.07253) 
 [ 0.18545] [ 2.56388] [ 0.29463] [-1.24620] [ 1.05760] [-1.16465] [ 1.05041] 
ODBCC(-2) -0.039554 -0.237830 -9.760307  7.359605 -7.031227  7.829460 -0.052793 
  (0.41183)  (0.31787)  (4.78368)  (5.49956)  (5.11766)  (5.34972)  (0.07577) 
 [-0.09604] [-0.74819] [-2.04033] [ 1.33822] [-1.37391] [ 1.46353] [-0.69675] 
CMHC2(-1) -0.005847 -0.009951  0.174388 -0.295286 -0.426811  0.354001  0.002687 
  (0.02818)  (0.02175)  (0.32731)  (0.37629)  (0.35016)  (0.36604)  (0.00518) 
 [-0.20749] [-0.45755] [ 0.53280] [-0.78473] [-1.21890] [ 0.96712] [ 0.51830] 
CMHC2(-2) -0.060854  0.021712  0.045607 -0.238358  0.281191 -0.255604  0.009148 
  (0.02376)  (0.01834)  (0.27597)  (0.31727)  (0.29524)  (0.30863)  (0.00437) 
 [-2.56131] [ 1.18394] [ 0.16526] [-0.75127] [ 0.95241] [-0.82819] [ 2.09266] 
CMHCM2(-1) -0.048041 -0.008101  0.006233  0.090689  0.064933 -0.054724  0.000150 
  (0.02275)  (0.01756)  (0.26422)  (0.30376)  (0.28267)  (0.29549)  (0.00419) 
 [-2.11194] [-0.46138] [ 0.02359] [ 0.29855] [ 0.22971] [-0.18520] [ 0.03583] 
CMHCM2(-2) -0.011602  0.017757  0.245753 -0.307195  0.503240  0.275944 -0.001478 
  (0.02214)  (0.01709)  (0.25712)  (0.29559)  (0.27507)  (0.28754)  (0.00407) 
 [-0.52414] [ 1.03929] [ 0.95580] [-1.03924] [ 1.82951] [ 0.95967] [-0.36289] 
ODBCM2(-1)  0.028249  0.010207  0.128883  0.218495  0.741127 -0.077427 -0.002501 
  (0.02056)  (0.01587)  (0.23877)  (0.27451)  (0.25545)  (0.26703)  (0.00378) 
 [ 1.37420] [ 0.64333] [ 0.53977] [ 0.79595] [ 2.90131] [-0.28996] [-0.66141] 
ODBCM2(-2)  0.001033  0.004847 -0.078782 -0.177973 -0.186784  0.102872  0.000684 
  (0.02012)  (0.01553)  (0.23372)  (0.26870)  (0.25004)  (0.26138)  (0.00370) 
 [ 0.05134] [ 0.31210] [-0.33708] [-0.66235] [-0.74702] [ 0.39358] [ 0.18469] 
ODBC2(-1)  0.000473  0.038780  0.723900 -0.286381 -0.193361  0.663299  0.005986 
  (0.02351)  (0.01815)  (0.27311)  (0.31398)  (0.29218)  (0.30543)  (0.00433) 
 [ 0.02012] [ 2.13686] [ 2.65057] [-0.91209] [-0.66179] [ 2.17171] [ 1.38384] 
ODBC2(-2) -0.049479  0.027878  0.619917 -0.045576  0.517164  0.424172 -0.006849 
  (0.03560)  (0.02748)  (0.41353)  (0.47541)  (0.44240)  (0.46246)  (0.00655) 
 [-1.38984] [ 1.01454] [ 1.49910] [-0.09587] [ 1.16901] [ 0.91721] [-1.04567] 
SPEND2(-1) -1.124432 -0.650345  14.06654 -20.70919  5.774879 -12.97712  0.337886 
  (1.41075)  (1.08889)  (16.3867)  (18.8390)  (17.5308)  (18.3257)  (0.25956) 
 [-0.79704] [-0.59725] [ 0.85841] [-1.09927] [ 0.32941] [-0.70814] [ 1.30178] 
SPEND2(-2)  0.575566  1.785381  22.77572  19.46285  27.61933  1.053648 -0.354871 
  (1.18417)  (0.91400)  (13.7549)  (15.8133)  (14.7152)  (15.3824)  (0.21787) 
 [ 0.48605] [ 1.95336] [ 1.65583] [ 1.23079] [ 1.87693] [ 0.06850] [-1.62883] 
C  5.159845 -13.11044 -327.9081  45.01987 -114.1654  60.01162  6.152311 
  (10.3029)  (7.95229)  (119.674)  (137.584)  (128.029)  (133.835)  (1.89557) 
 [ 0.50082] [-1.64864] [-2.74001] [ 0.32722] [-0.89171] [ 0.44840] [ 3.24562] 
 R-squared  0.991004  0.995630  0.963034  0.897044  0.891462  0.968639  0.927297 
 Adj. R-squared  0.980508  0.990532  0.919907  0.776930  0.764835  0.932051  0.842476 
 Sum sq. resids  185.0339  110.2346  24965.15  32996.37  28572.81  31222.85  6.263452 
 S.E. equation  3.926766  3.030878  45.61172  52.43756  48.79619  51.00887  0.722464 
 F-statistic  94.41841  195.2861  22.33006  7.468220  7.040054  26.47433  10.93244 
 Log likelihood -64.29482 -57.30279 -130.5082 -134.2736 -132.3304 -133.5278 -18.58642 
 Akaike AIC  5.873690  5.355762  10.77839  11.05730  10.91336  11.00206  2.487883 
 Schwarz SC  6.593600  6.075672  11.49830  11.77721  11.63327  11.72197  3.207792 
 Mean dependent  35.85185  31.14815  151.8889  116.7407  338.1111  251.3704  5.565000 
 S.D. dependent  28.12568  31.14816  161.1677  111.0252  100.6236  195.6836  1.820300 
 Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.)  2.24E+14      
 Determinant resid covariance  7.67E+11      
 Log likelihood -637.6220      
 Akaike information criterion  55.00903      









1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10







1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10







1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10







1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10







1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10







1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of CMHCC to SPEND2
Response to Cholesky One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E.
 
Figure 45. IRF graph, impact of various independent variables on CMHC-C. Note: Blue 










1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10







1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10







1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10







1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10







1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10







1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of ODBCC to SPEND2
Response to Cholesky One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E.
Figure 46. IRF graph, impact of various independent variables on ODBC-C. Note: Blue 





 Granger causality testing confirmed the existence of a close relationship between 
(a) public support for CMHC and Congressional support for CMHC and (b) public 
support for ODBC and Congressional support for ODBC. The Granger causality test 
results are presented in Table 22. One point of particular interest in these results is the 
lack of Granger causality effects attributable to CHMC-M and ODBC-M, which suggests 
that Congress was more responsive to changes in public opinion rather than mental health 
professionals’ opinion related to CMHC and ODBC.  
Table 22. Granger Causality Tests on CMHC-C and ODBC-C 
VAR Granger Causality/Block Exogeneity Wald Tests 
Sample: 1952 1981   
Included observations: 27  
        
Dependent variable: CMHC-C  
        Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. 
        ODBC-C  0.052378 2  0.9742 
CMHC  12.12159 2  0.0023 
CMHC-M  5.919094 2  0.0518 
ODBC-M  4.719754 2  0.0944 
ODBC  2.221722 2  0.3293 
SPEND  0.692946 2  0.7072 
        All  37.94072 12  0.0002 
        
Dependent variable: ODBC-C  
        Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. 
        CMHC-C  0.022562 2  0.9888 
CMHC  1.542853 2  0.4624 
CMHC-M  1.105448 2  0.5754 
ODBC-M  1.927891 2  0.3814 
ODBC  8.389364 2  0.0151 
SPEND  3.817181 2  0.1483 




 The statistics presented in Table 22 indicate that  ODBC Granger-caused ODBC-
C, χ2(2) = 8.39, p = 0.0151.  Furthermore, CHMC Granger-caused CMHC-C, χ2(2) = 
12.12, p = 0.023. The existence of Granger causality supports the interpretation that 
Congressional support for both CMHC and ODBC were in some sense responsive to 
changes in the national support for these policies.  
 Assuming the likelihood that there was some kind of causality between the 
shifting public support (and withdrawal of support) for the two different mental health 
paradigms, some account must be given of the length of time that passed between the 
articulation of public positions and the expression of Congressional support for both 
CMHC and ODBC. To some extent, the IRF graphs (see Figures 45 and 46 above) offer 
some insight into these delays. In both of the IRF graphs, the blue lines deviate from 0 
over several periods, but this visual insight is not as reliable as a precise quantification of 
the delayed effect.  
The ARDL models presented in Tables 23 and 24 below provide this kind of 
quantification. In Table 23, which is the ARDL model with a CMHC-C as the dependent 
variable, it is clear that the impact of public opinion is strongest at lag 4, where the 
coefficient of public support of CMHC is 0.085 (p = 0.0028). Note that the coefficient of 
CMHC at lag 1 is positive, but very small, and that the coefficients of CMHC at lags 2 
and 3 are negative. The coefficient of CMHC at lag 4 is positive and has the largest 
absolute value of any of the lags. This ARDL finding suggests that a period of 4 years 
elapsed between public opinion about CMHC and the re-appearance of this opinion in 
Congress. On the basis of data presented in Table 24, the same kind of ARDL procedure 
can be used to quantify the lagged relationship between ODBC and ODBC-C 
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Table 23. ARDL Model, RQ5 (Dependent Variable: CMHC-C) 
Dependent Variable: CMHCC   
Method: ARDL    
Sample (adjusted): 1956 1980   
Included observations: 25 after adjustments  
Maximum dependent lags: 4 (Automatic selection) 
Model selection method: Akaike info criterion (AIC) 
Dynamic regressors (4 lags, automatic): CMHC2 ODBC2 
ODBCC   
Fixed regressors: C   
Number of models evalulated: 500  
Selected Model: ARDL(4, 4, 3, 0)  
          Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.*   
          CMHC-C(-1) 0.498531 0.202532 2.461492 0.0336 
CMHC-C(-2) 1.101330 0.248296 4.435548 0.0013 
CMHC-C(-3) -0.002404 0.253348 -0.009489 0.9926 
CMHC-C(-4) -0.907969 0.228634 -3.971270 0.0026 
CMHC 0.041903 0.012866 3.256859 0.0086 
CMHC(-1) 0.000886 0.016180 0.054761 0.9574 
CMHC(-2) -0.033360 0.016249 -2.053058 0.0672 
CMHC(-3) -0.053868 0.020427 -2.637081 0.0249 
CMHC(-4) 0.085836 0.021768 3.943134 0.0028 
ODBC -0.006295 0.019562 -0.321791 0.7542 
ODBC(-1) 0.056847 0.026804 2.120857 0.0599 
ODBC(-2) -0.082810 0.020577 -4.024311 0.0024 
ODBC(-3) -0.083361 0.027814 -2.997036 0.0134 
ODBC-C 0.490424 0.198893 2.465769 0.0333 
C 10.44840 2.648787 3.944596 0.0028 
          R-squared 0.995999    Mean dependent var 38.72000 
Adjusted R-squared 0.990399    S.D. dependent var 27.22670 
S.E. of regression 2.667849    Akaike info criterion 5.084131 
Sum squared resid 71.17417    Schwarz criterion 5.815457 
Log likelihood -48.55164    Hannan-Quinn criter. 5.286970 
F-statistic 177.8320    Durbin-Watson stat 1.750744 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
          *Note: p-values and any subsequent tests do not account for model 






Table 24. ARDL Model, RQ5 (Dependent Variable: ODBC-C) 
Dependent Variable: ODBCC   
Method: ARDL    
Sample (adjusted): 1956 1980   
Included observations: 25 after adjustments  
Maximum dependent lags: 4 (Automatic selection) 
Model selection method: Akaike info criterion (AIC) 
Dynamic regressors (4 lags, automatic): CMHCC ODBC2 CMHC2   
Fixed regressors: C   
Number of models evaluated: 500  
Selected Model: ARDL(4, 3, 4, 4)  
          
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.*   
          
ODBCC(-1) 0.955195 0.388852 2.456449 0.0494 
ODBCC(-2) -0.397149 0.372598 -1.065891 0.3275 
ODBCC(-3) 0.260957 0.392943 0.664108 0.5313 
ODBCC(-4) 0.401350 0.482364 0.832047 0.4372 
CMHCC 0.274902 0.234175 1.173918 0.2849 
CMHCC(-1) -0.318860 0.253484 -1.257910 0.2552 
CMHCC(-2) -0.357385 0.235942 -1.514714 0.1806 
CMHCC(-3) 0.293826 0.232238 1.265190 0.2527 
ODBC2 -0.010498 0.018346 -0.572210 0.5880 
ODBC2(-1) 0.009763 0.022887 0.426586 0.6846 
ODBC2(-2) -0.007233 0.036462 -0.198371 0.8493 
ODBC2(-3) 0.037395 0.027348 1.367341 0.2205 
ODBC2(-4) -0.059125 0.033987 -1.739626 0.1326 
CMHC2 0.029910 0.019767 1.513137 0.1810 
CMHC2(-1) -0.009427 0.017869 -0.527569 0.6167 
CMHC2(-2) 0.042664 0.021634 1.972092 0.0961 
CMHC2(-3) 0.015932 0.028971 0.549913 0.6022 
CMHC2(-4) -0.033575 0.026304 -1.276418 0.2490 
C 3.174022 6.723829 0.472056 0.6536 
          
R-squared 0.998795    Mean dependent var 33.64000 
Adjusted R-squared 0.995181    S.D. dependent var 31.04416 
S.E. of regression 2.155069    Akaike info criterion 4.466406 
Sum squared resid 27.86593    Schwarz criterion 5.392752 
Log likelihood -36.83008    Hannan-Quinn criter. 4.723335 
F-statistic 276.3457    Durbin-Watson stat 2.548004 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
          
*Note: p-values and any subsequent tests do not account for model 
        selection.   
 
The ARDL in Table 24 is harder to interpret, because there is no pattern in the coefficient 
value changes for ODBC. Thus, while it can safely be concluded that there is some kind 
of causality between public ODBC support and Congressional support, this relationship is 




Figure 47. Growth in CMHC and CMHC-C, 1952-1981. 
 





























To obtain further insight into the relationships between public support for mental 
policy alternatives and Congressional support for policy, these variables were graphed in 
the time dimension. The graphs in Figure 47 and 48 were not particularly useful, because 
there was a substantial gap in support volumes between popular support levels and 
Congressional support levels—which is an intuitive result, given that the corpus used to 
gather CMHC and ODBC data was much larger than the Congressional corpus from 1952 
to 1981.  
Figures 49 and 50 below and log-transformed versions of these graphs. Note that 
there were several 0 values in the time series; in order to make log-transformation 
possible, a minuscule value (0.01) was added to all of the values in each of the four time 
series represented in Figures 49 and 50. This small adjustment made log-transformation 
possible. Once the time-series were log-transformed, relationships between them became 
much more apparent. In particular, it is easier to see how the Congressional patterns for 
CMHC and ODBC support were very similar to public support patterns. In terms of 
ODBC-C, what stands out is how public opinion was ahead of Congress for much of the 
1950s, with Congressional levels of ODBC support not matching public support until the 
early 1960s.  
These insights are of special importance when attempting to answer RQ5.  It 
seems appropriate to suggest that the public led Congress in terms of both ODBC and 
CMHC support. Moreover, the fact that Congress—no less than the public and the 
community of mental health professionals—experienced several years in which support 
for CMHC and ODBC was roughly comparable suggests the relevance of disjointed 
incrementalism (Lindblom 1959) to explaining trends of Congressional support for 
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mental health alternatives, that is, in terms of coming to prefer one of these co-existing 
options to the other. This point will be more fully developed in the discussion of theory 
and empirical findings that follows Figures 49 and 50 below.    
 
Figure 49. Growth in CMHC and CMHC-C, 1952-1981. Note: Log-transformed. 



























7.3 Relationship to Theory and Literature 
 There is a long history of attempting to measure the relationship between the 
views of constituents and the views of legislators. Christopher Achen contributed seminal 
studies on the topic (Achen 1978, 1977). In a 1977 paper, Achen argued that the degree 
of representation should not be measured by correlations of viewpoints. Achen suggested 
the technique of comparison of means, which was also taken up by other researchers 
(Herrera, Herrera, and Smith 1992). Using techniques and operational measurements 
recommended by Achen, Herrera et al. found the existence of substantial closeness 
between House legislators and their constituents, concluding that “representatives are 
efficient at positioning themselves at the mean constituent position, and that 
representatives respond to shifts…in their districts” (Herrera, Herrera, and Smith 1992, 
185) . 
 As Herrera et al. pointed out, the existence of representation between legislators 
and constituents is not coincidental, but rather reflects the fundamental dynamics of a 
democracy. Theoretically, then, there is no controversy over why Congressional views 
should reflect those of the general public’s. The issue raised by the RQ5 findings is more 
of an empirical one. Since Achen’s seminal work (Achen 1978, 1977), many researchers 
have used Achen’s proximity measures and cross-sectional approaches (Flavin 2015). 
While these kinds of analyses are informative in their own light, they are severely limited 
when time is added as a variable. In a time-series setting, the underlying statistical 
relationships between variables cannot be adequately explored through the kinds of cross-
sectional approaches suggested by Achen and subsequent adopters of Achen’s 
approaches.  For example, the existence of a lag in the time that expires between support 
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for a position among the public and Congressional response to that support cannot be 
properly accounted for by any cross-sectional methods.  Nonetheless, cross-sectional 
methods remain inordinately popular in empirical studies (Canes-Wrone 2015, Rainey 
2015, Kastellec et al. 2015, Broockman 2016, Bernauer, Giger, and Rosset 2015, 
Jennings and Wlezien 2015, Flavin 2015, Herrera, Herrera, and Smith 1992) of 
representation, perhaps because they are easier to carry out and interpret than the more 
explanatorily powerful but occasionally complex results yielded by time-series analysis.   
 As succinctly expressed in the title of Canes-Wrone’s (2015) paper, mass 
preferences become policy. This insight is not only easy to confirm empirically but 
follows from any democratic theory of politics. However, considered in terms of its 
empirical substrate, this theory does not appear to have advanced since it was first 
formulated. The question that remains is not whether mass preferences become policy—
which is, either tacitly or explicitly, the question answered in much (Canes-Wrone 2015, 
Rainey 2015, Kastellec et al. 2015, Broockman 2016, Bernauer, Giger, and Rosset 2015, 
Jennings and Wlezien 2015, Flavin 2015, Herrera, Herrera, and Smith 1992)  of the 
current empirical literature on representation. The more pertinent question is why mass 
preferences take different amounts of time to become policy. Answering this question has 
the potential to add more insight into the workings of democracy. 
 In fact, Lindblom’s (1959) theory of disjointed incrementalism has the potential to 
answer the question of why some mass preferences take longer to become policies. 
Conceptually, the idea of disjointed incrementalism is closely assigned to concepts such 
as impulse response functions in time-series statistics. The theory of disjointed 
incrementalism proceeds on the assumption that, for some period of time, policy 
180 
 
alternatives are considered as part of a marketplace of preferences, and then one policy 
emerges victorious over the others. This relationship between preferences and policy can 
be mapped statistically, but not in a manner envisioned by Lindblom, whose theory was 
published long before tools and techniques such as vector auto-regression or impulse 
response functions become available.  
 Time-series statistics alone cannot answer the questions of why delays between 
expressed mass preferences and policy actions take place. However, without time-series 
analysis, lags between preference formation and policy action cannot even be reliably 
identified. Once lags are identified, then qualitative evidence and other forms of analysis 
can be brought to bear. In the context of RQ5, for example, the existence of a lag between 
the public’s expressed preference for ODBC and the government’s own embrace of it, in 
1981, might be explained in terms of minimizing the political costs associated with 
changing policy. Expressed in terms of Lindblom’s (1959) theory of disjointed 
incrementalism, it could be the case that, even after an incremental alternative is 
identified, there is an added time premium that minimizes risk for policy-makers. In the 
case of RQ5, this concept is an imperfect fit, as it was a Presidential veto rather than a 
Congressional action that killed CMHC, but the basic principle stands. Given that other 
empirical studies (Canes-Wrone 2015, Rainey 2015, Kastellec et al. 2015, Broockman 
2016, Bernauer, Giger, and Rosset 2015, Jennings and Wlezien 2015, Flavin 2015, 
Herrera, Herrera, and Smith 1992) on the alignment between preference and policy have 
failed to identify lags or other time-series dynamics, such work should be re-performed 
with time-series approaches in order to determine whether lags exist and how they might 




 The purpose of this chapter was to answer the fifth research question of the study, 
which was as follows: How do shifts in the policy of the federal government explain the 
delay between the appearance of thorazine and the adoption of the current model of 
American mental health care?  This question was analyzed by analyzing changes in 
support for CMHC and ODBC as appearing in the Congressional record from the 83rd to 
the 97th Congresses. The question was answered through the use of a number of time-
series analyses, including Chow break point analysis, Markov switching, and VAR and 
ARDL models. The answer to the research question was that, in Congress as among the 
general public and mental health professionals, there was a period of several years during 
which Congress evinced high levels of support for both CMHC and ODBC. It was not 
until 1974 that Congressional support for ODBC definitively overtook Congressional 
support for CMHC. Therefore, it seems that Lindblom’s (1959) theory of disjointed 
incrementalism applies, in that Congress mulled over CMHC and ODBC as incremental 
alternatives to sanatoriums, then considered ODBC as an incremental alternative to 
CMHC after 1974. In this environment, the signs were already pointing to a triumph for 
ODBC, which was finally achieved as the incoming President Reagan vetoed the Mental 
Health Act that had created institutional support for CMHC.   
 Kingdon’s (1983) multiple streams theory is also relevant. The cross-correlations 
for RQ5 indicated that Congressional support for ODBC was part of several other 
streams of support for ODBC, streams that appeared somewhat independent from each 
other (as judging by VAR, ARDL, and Granger-causality results). Each of these streams 
appeared to contribute its own motive force to the decline of the CMHC concept in 1981. 
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However, the Congressional data were somewhat different, because Congressional 
support for both CMHC and ODBC were demonstrated to have been Granger-caused by 
public support for these policy alternatives. In this sense, Congressional preferences for 
CMHC and ODBC appear to be echoes of the public positions on these policies, a finding 
that aligns with standard theories (Herrera, Herrera, and Smith 1992, Achen 1978, 1977) 
of Congressional responsiveness.   
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CHAPTER 8. CONCLUSION 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 The purpose of this chapter is to provide a conclusion to the study. The chapter 
has been divided into a number of sub-sections. The first sub-section consists of a 
summary of findings. The second sub-section contains a discussion of the findings in 
relation to previous empirical work. The third sub-section contains a discussion of the 
findings in relation to existing theories. The fourth sub-section presents some of the 
implications of the study. The fifth sub-section contains recommendations for future 
scholarship. The sixth sub-section contains an acknowledgement of the limitations of the 
study.  The seventh and final sub-section is a summative conclusion of the entire study.  
 
8.2 Summary of Findings 
 The findings of the study will be summarized in relation to each of the five 
research questions of the study. For each research question, answers have presented in 
narrative language. The full statistical results have not been repeated; only the most 
relevant and illustrative statistical findings have been summarized.  
8.2.1 RQ1 Summary of Findings 
 The first research question of the study was as follows: How do shifts in the 
sentiments of the American public explain the delay between the appearance of thorazine 
and the adoption of the current model of American mental health care? Results from 
statistical analyses such as OLS regressions, Chow breakpoint testing, Markov switching, 
and IRFs suggested two complementary answers to the first research question: (a) Time 
was needed for the general-public popularity of ODBC policies to accumulate into a 
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critical mass sufficient to provoke action and (b) a 7-year period of high general-public 
popularity surrounding the CMHC idea might have retarded the selection of ODBC 
policies as an alternative. 
 Chow breakpoint analysis indicated that the break point for CMHC came in 
quarter 69 (the first quarter of 1969), while the break point for ODBC came in quarter 61 
(the first quarter of 1967). Markov switching analysis disclosed the existence of 2 low-
interest periods in CMHC, one from 1952 to 1969 and another after the first half of 1976; 
therefore, for CMHC, there was a period of high support (between the beginning 1969 
and the second half of 1976) bracketed by periods of low support. However, the Markov 
switch model for ODBC suggested that there was a period of moderate support for 
ODBC followed by a period of high support. Finally, an IRF graph suggested that ODBC 
was negatively impacted by an increase in CMHC for several quarters. Cumulatively, 
these statistical results support the interpretation that ODBC and CMHC vied with each 
other for popularity, and that ODBC consequently took several years to captivate the 
public. The 1981 government response against CMHC and in favor of ODBC came some 
years after the public appeared to have made up its mind about the superiority of ODBC. 
Thus, the government’s decision-making delay appears to have been connected with the 
public’s own lengthy decision-making process. 
 RQ1 was limited by the fact that no direct measure of public opinion was drawn. 
Corpus analysis was a measurement of sentiment in the popular press, which might or 
might not have been reflective of public sentiment (and, as a subset of public sentiment, 
voter sentiment). Attempting to reach firm conclusions about the relationship between 
changes in public sentiment and government decision-making is therefore difficult.  This 
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limitation applies not only to RQ1 but also to RQs 2 and 3, as discussed in greater detail 
below. It should be noted that, because mental health was not necessarily an issue of 
major importance to a large cross- section of American voters (for either major party), 
drawing conclusions about the relationship between opinion change—if indeed corpus 
analysis measures opinion change—and government decision-making is fraught with 
conceptual as well as statistical difficulties.  Finally, attempts to draw causal inferences 
from either form of corpus analysis (lay or mental health professional-focused) to 
legislative change is limited by the fact that corpus analysis, even if it is a proxy for 
opinion, is not capable of indicating which form of opinion is represented. As Gilens and 
Page (2014) have argued, average citizens, economic elites, and organized interest groups 
all have opinions and policy influence. One of the limitations of corpus analysis is that its 
results cannot definitively be associated with a specific group of actors.   
8.2.2 RQ2 Summary of Findings 
 The second research question of the study was as follows: How do shifts in the 
opinions of psychiatrists, psychologists, and other mental health experts explain the delay 
between the appearance of thorazine and the adoption of the current model of American 
mental health care? The answer to this research question was very similar to the answer 
to the first research question.  
The main difference between mental health professionals (the population of 
interest in RQ2) and the public at large (the population of interest in RQ1) was that 
mental health professionals were roughly three years earlier than the public in 
championing ODBC. Among both mental health professionals and the public, support for 
CMHC began to drop at roughly the same time, 1976-1977. For the mental health 
186 
 
professional community, as well as for the public at large, CMHC and ODBC preferences 
were at odds with each other for several years, with ODBC emerging as the preferred 
paradigm towards the end of the 1970s. Thus, the answer to RQ1 also appears to be a 
valid answer to RQ2. It took several years for the mental health community to 
consolidate support for ODBC, and the government’s own pro-ODBC policy came only 
after the establishment of this preference.   
 RQ2 measured sentiments in a corpus that was likely to reflect the attitudes of 
mental health professionals. However, as was the case for RQ1, RQ2 was an indirect 
measure of opinion based on corpus analysis. Thus, there are conceptual difficulties 
involved in measuring changes in CMHC-M and ODBC-M, as well as in measuring the 
putative relationships between mental health professionals’ opinions and legislative 
action or inaction.    
8.2.3 RQ3 Summary of Findings 
 The third research question of the study was as follows: How do formal and 
informal lobbying efforts by pharmacological companies and other commercial 
stakeholders in mental health explain the delay between the appearance of thorazine and 
the adoption of the current model of American mental health care?  Chow breakpoint 
testing and Markov switch analysis were particularly useful in answering this research 
question. Markov switch analysis indicated that the pharmaceutical industry spent a 
moderate amount of money in promoting anti-psychotic drugs in the United States until 
1965. Spending became very high from around 1965 to 1971, after which it dropped off 
again. The three periods in pharmaceutical industry spending can be interpreted as (a) a 
period of trying to build interest in the ODBC approach; (b) a period of losing interest in 
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trying to build interest in the ODBC approach, perhaps due to the high popularity of the 
CMHC model from the mid-1960s onwards; and (c) a period of increasing spending 
beginning in 1971, perhaps as an overt means of promoting ODBC.   RQ3 is somewhat 
less limited than RQ1 and RQ2, in that RQ3 was a more direct measure of 
pharmaceutical industry influence than RQ1 was a measure of public opinion and RQ2 
was a measure of mental health professionals’ opinion. 
8.2.4 RQ4 Summary of Findings 
 The fourth research question of the study was as follows:  How do shifts in the 
policy of individual states explain the delay between the appearance of thorazine and the 
adoption of the current model of American mental health care? State policies were tested 
by analyzing the time series of institutionalization rate per 100,000 from 1890 to 1981. 
Chow breakpoint testing found a break point in this time series in 1965, two years before 
the passage of Mental Health Amendments Act of 1967. The breakpoint signaled a period 
of substantial deinstitutionalization. However, the data from 1890 to 1964 indicated a 
random walk in the institutionalization rate. Legislative change, or impending legislative 
change, appears to be the most plausible cause of the perturbation that led to the decline 
in institutionalization rates.  
 In terms of an answer to the research question, the pace of deinstitutionalization 
does not, on its own, provide supportive evidence for the delay in the government’s 
adoption of ODBC. Deinstitutionalization was compatible with both CMHC and ODBC. 
Thus, the rapid pace of deinstitutionalization after 1965 was compatible with both of the 
possible policy outcomes and has no special explanatory power when it comes to 
explaining why ODBC was so late in becoming the preferred policy.     
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8.2.5 RQ5 Summary of Findings 
 The fifth research question of the study was as follows: How do shifts in the 
policy of the federal government explain the delay between the appearance of thorazine 
and the adoption of the current model of American mental health care? For purposes of 
this research question, Congressional records were analyzed and turned into a time series 
reflecting relative support for ODBC and CMHC. The results were then analyzed by 
means of the same techniques applied in RQs 1 and 2.  There was steady growth in 
Congressional CMHC support until the end of the 1970s; however, Congressional 
support for ODBC grew at a constant rate throughout from 1952 to 1981. The existence 
of a period of high Congressional support for CMHC is likely to have delayed the 
adoption of ODBC as the clear policy selection, thus accounting for the delay between 
the appearance of thorazine and the adoption of the current model of American mental 
health care.  
 
8.3 Relation of Findings to Previous Empirical Findings 
 Previous empirical findings related to popular rejection of mental hospitals (Polak 
and Kirby 1976, Sharfstein and Nafziger 1976, Häfner 1987), the increasing popularity of 
community mental health (Aviram 1990, Cutler, Bevilacqua, and McFarland 2003, 
Humphreys and Rappaport 1993, Drake et al. 2003, Melguizo, Bos, and Prather 2011), 
and the triumph of drug-based, outpatient-centered care (Goldman, McCulloch, and 
Sturm 1998) have pointed to the existence of certain trends. Based on this body of 
empirical literature, it has been established that deinstitutionalization took place rapidly 
in the 1960s, that there was a period of public and political support for the CMHC 
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concept, and that the ODBC concept eventually triumphed. The results obtained in the 
present study did not give any reason to challenge the basic narrative around postwar 
mental health policy in the United States. However, because of the details and statistical 
complexity of the results, the study made it possible to understand the relationship 
between policy variables in a novel manner. The purpose of this section of the conclusion 
is to better explain the inter-relationships emerging from the findings, as these inter-
relationships contribute substantially to the empirical knowledge base on the evolution of 
American mental health policy.  
 When President Reagan’s 1981 veto killed the CMHC concept, (a) both 
antipsychotic drugs and an outpatient infrastructure had existed for over a quarter of a 
century; and (b) the public, the community of mental health professionals, and Congress 
had all come to prefer the ODBC concept. When President Reagan vetoed the Mental 
Health Systems Act, he would have had to anticipate the likelihood of this veto—which 
was, in effect, a pro-ODBC veto—not being challenged by Congress. When Congress 
came to express a stronger preference for ODBC, members of Congress would have had 
to have a reasonable assurance that their position would be reasonably popular with their 
constituents. Finally, before individual voters could have formed a preference for CMHC 
and ODBC, it is likely that they would have been influenced by the views of experts. 
 Therefore, a chain of relationships can be posited. First, drugs such as thorazine 
became available in the early 1950s. Second, mental health professionals would have 
realized the potential of such drugs to power an ODBC model of mental health. Third, 
drug companies would have put more advertising resources into certain views of mental 
health care championed within the mental health community. Fourth, ordinary voters 
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would have been influenced by the opinions of mental health experts and also come to 
express a preference for ODBC. Fifth, members of Congress would have had time to 
recognize and act upon the preferences of their constituencies. Sixth, President Reagan 
would have had to be secure in the knowledge that a veto of the Mental Health Systems 
Act would not have resulted in a high political cost.  
 This chain of relationships is theoretical in nature. For example, the existence of a 
delay between the preference formation of constituents and the action of Congress is 
rooted in democratic theory, game theory, and risk management theory, among other 
possible theoretical frameworks. It is also not certain whether the opinion of the mental 
health community would come before the pharmaceutical industry’s spending efforts; 
theoretically, it is just as likely that pharmaceutical industry spending could influence the 
preference formation of members of the mental health community.  
However, the chain of relationships described above can also be empirically 
tested.  Such empirical testing was carried out in each of the chapters for RQ2-RQ5. 
Although each research question was focused on a time series, each chapter also 
presented the opportunity to add existing time-series variables to the analysis in order to 
determine the relationships between the variables themselves. Many cross-correlations 
were examined in the course of analysis, but the only sequential line between variables 
was from public support of policy alternatives to subsequent Congressional support of 
those same alternatives. Cross-correlation revealed that public opinions about the relative 
strengths of CMHC and ODBC were not substantially shaped through either the 
institutionalization rate, the spending levels of pharmaceutical companies, or the opinions 
of mental health professionals. This empirical finding is important, because it provides a 
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segue into the discussion of the two theories most relevant to the findings, multiple 
streams theory (Kingdon, 1983) and disjointed incrementalism theory (Lindblom, 1959). 
        
8.4 Relation of Findings to Theory 
 Because the results of the study are novel in many respects—including the use of 
corpus analysis to measure public, professional, and Congressional preferences for policy 
and the use of time-series analysis—they cannot be closely triangulated with past 
empirical findings, except to add substantial depth and detail to the existing narrative 
about the transition from mental hospitals to community mental health centers, and from 
community mental health centers to an ODBC model of care. For this reason, the most 
important section in the concluding chapter is the discussion of theory. The results of the 
study offer an opportunity to examine two theories— multiple streams theory (Kingdon, 
1983) and disjointed incrementalism theory (Lindblom, 1959)—in a useful manner. 
 Because of the importance of both of these theories to the findings, they are worth 
restating here. Disjointed incrementalism theory was synopsized by Etzioni as follows 
(1) Rather than attempting a comprehensive survey and evaluation of all 
alternatives, the decision-maker focuses only on those policies which 
differ incrementally from existing policies. (2) Only a relatively small 
number of policy alternatives are considered. (3) For each policy 
alternative, only a restricted number of ‘important’ consequences are 
evaluated. (4) The problem confronting the decision-maker is continually 
redefined: Incrementalism allows for countless ends-means and means-
ends adjustments which, in effect, make the problem more manageable. 
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(5) Thus, there is no one decision or ‘right’ solution, but a never-ending 
series of attacks on the issues at hand through serial analyses and 
evaluation. (6) As such, incremental decision-making is described as 
remedial, geared more to the alleviation of present, concrete social 
imperfections than to the promotion of future social goals. (Etzioni 1967, 
386).  
Disjointed incrementalism theory appeared to possess substantial explanatory power with 
respect to the findings of the study. First, it was clear that, after the formation of a 
popular and elite consensus on the necessity for deinstitutionalization, only two major 
alternatives—CMHC and ODBC—were considered. The existence of these two 
alternatives was confirmed through the extensive corpora analyses undertaken in the 
study. While other models were suggested, the solution space appeared largely limited to 
CMHC and ODBC, conforming to the predictions of disjointed incrementalism.  
In this respect, disjointed incrementalism appears to be an offshoot of bounded 
rationality theory. Bounded rationality, too, postulates the existence of hard limits 
(including cognitive and environmental limits) to the decision-making process, which 
means, in turn, that policies do not represent the working-through of a comprehensive 
decision tree, but rather a handful of alternatives that are themselves incremental. With 
respect to the findings, it is possible to contest the idea that CMHC and ODBC are 
incremental changes to the mental hospital concept.  
Deciding what is and what is not incremental can be a difficult question to settle. 
However, in the context of mental health policy, there are some obvious alternatives that 
represent a non-incremental change. For example, the anti-psychiatry movement posited 
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that insanity was not a disease. Thus, a radical—that is, non-incremental—postulated 
change to the mental health hospital era could have been the end of the very paradigm of 
mental health. The fact that such an alternative was never seriously considered, at least in 
the same manner and with the same intensity reserved for both the CMHC and ODBC 
alternatives—indicates another way in which the theory of disjointed incrementalism 
served to explain and contextualize the findings of the study.  
In the context of the study’s design, disjointed incrementalism is an appropriate 
explanation of the long period of time that elapsed between the emergence of thorazine 
and the triumph of ODBC in American mental health policy because, during this time, 
two alternatives were vying for popularity and each experienced incremental gains and 
losses in popularity for several years, until ODBC definitely overtook CMHC in terms of 
public, professional, and Congressional opinion. There are other ways in which disjointed 
incrementalism theory can be applied to the evolution of American mental health policy. 
Some recommendations for such scholarship have been made in a subsequent section of 
this chapter. However, because a substantial portion of disjointed incrementalism theory 
is based on the incremental evolution of preferences, and because the current study did 
not study how such preferences changed, disjointed incrementalism is only applicable to 
a limited portion of the study’s findings.  
Multiple streams theory (Kingdon, 1983) was summarized by Dickey as follows: 
The policymaking process is neither simple nor completely rational. It is 
fraught with complexity, ambiguity, and time constraints. The multiple 
streams approach attempts to explain the policymaking process in those 
terms…organizations are described as “organized anarchies.” These 
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anarchies have three general dynamic characteristics: problematic 
preferences, unclear technology, and fluid participation. The term 
“problematic preferences” refers to the fact that people usually do not 
define their preferences in a precise manner. Thus as the preferences are 
drawn into clearer view and more precisely stated, they conflict. Second, 
members of organized anarchies generally do not understand the processes 
of the organization well and usually cannot place their own values within 
that framework. Third, participants continually drift in and out of the 
process, making the boundaries less clear, the learning curve steep, and the 
relationship tenuous. Four separate streams [exist]: problems, solutions, 
participants, and choice opportunities. Each stream has a life of its own 
and is largely unrelated to the other three.” (Dickey 2012, 213) 
There are several aspects of multiple streams theory that align well with the findings of 
the study. Multiple streams theory can provide an explanation for an otherwise 
unexplained phenomenon in the study, which was the long period of time that CMHC 
and ODBC co-existed before ODBC began to be more popular with the public, mental 
health professionals, and Congress. If multiple streams theory is correct, then the initially 
imprecisely articulated positions of support for CMHC and ODBC would have taken 
some years to become articulate, at which time it would have been easier for individuals 
to choose one of these alternatives over the other. However, the main relevance of 
multiple streams theory to the study lies in the inter-relationships between participants 
themselves. The groups analyzed in the study—the general public, mental health 
professionals, and Congress—were not as closely integrated. The public’s opinions of 
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CMHC and ODBC followed some of the same patterns as those displayed by mental 
health professionals, but time-series analysis indicated the likely causal independence of 
these two streams of opinion. The only observable dependence appeared to be that of 
Congressional opinion on public opinion, and this relationship was not of great 
magnitude. 
The use of VAR and ARDL, techniques in which the past values of a dependent 
variable are also treated as an independent variable, suggested the explanatory usefulness 
of participant independence. In other words, the policy preference process of each of the 
three groups—the general public, mental health professionals, and members of 
Congress—was more due to its own past values than to influence from the other two 
communities. Thus, each community seemed fairly self-contained and might have 
constituted an anarchic organization of its own, with the exception of the relationship 
between public and Congressional opinion.  
Both multiple streams theory and disjointed incrementalism were relevant to the 
findings of the study. However, further work is needed to interrelate these two theories 
with the kinds of findings that emerged from the present study. Some relevant 
suggestions for future scholarship appear later in this chapter.  
  
8.5 Implications of the Findings 
 The study’s main implications are theoretical. However, these implications have 
some practical consequences as well. For example, given the relationship between 
popular support for ODBC, Congressional support for ODBC, and the eventual veto of 
the CMHC concept and enshrinement of the ODBC approach, it seems that any party that 
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wants to influence policy change should make a direct appeal to the public. While this 
approach sounds uncontroversial, it is worth unpacking in greater detail, because it has 
some specific implications of interest.  
 It is possible that, in the context of the present study, the pharmaceutical 
industry’s spending and marketing budgets did not have a direct impact on the public. It 
is certainly plausible that the pharmaceutical industry of the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s was 
not reaching the mass of the American public. If so, then targeted product or service 
advertising might be more profitably repackaged as what might be called opinion-
shaping. Again, the lack of a clear causal link between ODBC-M and ODBC meant that 
the collective opinion of mental health professionals vis-à-vis ODBC did not drive the 
public’s opinion of ODBC. Therefore, it would have been a waste of money for the 
pharmaceutical industry to spend on shaping opinion among the mental health 
community, on the presumption that such an approach would trickle down to ordinary 
voters and thereby into the legislative machinery. Rather, the findings of the study 
suggest that the pharmaceutical industry would have been better served by trying to share 
the public zeitgeist directly, that is, without the mediation of experts or the assumption 
that advertising is sufficient to shape the zeitgeist. 
 Another important implication of the study is related to the nature of American 
democracy. There were two favorable markers of democratic function to emerge from the 
findings. First, the length of time that elapsed between the debut of thorazine in the 
United States and the country’s tipping towards ODBC is indicative of a democratic 
period of policy exploration that is accounted for through the theory of disjointed 
incrementalism. The passage of this length of time need not be negatively construed. 
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Rather, it is possible to interpret this period as facilitating a truly democratic debate. On 
the other hand, it could also be the case that changes related to mental health policy did 
not necessarily reflect the workings of democracy, insofar as there was a low intensity of 
public demand for a specific policy approach. Legislative changes related to mental 
health policy can therefore be considered as the outputs of merely bureaucratic or 
technocratic change as well as the outputs of genuinely democratic processes.  
 Second, the existence of a relationship between public opinion and Congressional 
action is also favorable to both democratic theory and function. The existence of such a 
link should not be taken for granted, especially as there are topics—including gun control 
and the Israel / Palestine issue—on which there has historically been a divergence 
between majority opinion and Congressional opinion. The fact that the consolidation of 
the ODBC alternative appears to reflect genuine popular consensus that was echoed by 
Congress is therefore a welcome development. In addition, the finding that Congressional 
opinion swung into line between ODBC so shortly after the public had also consolidated 
behind ODBC also demonstrates the robust functioning of American democracy.  
       
8.6 Recommendations for Future Scholarship 
 There are numerous recommendations for future scholarship that can be made. 
These recommendations have been presented in two parts. The first set of 
recommendations pertains to future scholarship that can remediate the specific limitations 
of the present study. The second set of recommendations is more general, in that it is not 
rooted in the approaches taken or not taken in the present study.  
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 The corpus analysis undertaken in the present study was necessarily limited by the 
fact that (a) only one researcher was responsible for coding each corpus artifact for a 
displayed policy preference and (b) the coding scheme required all articles to reflect a 
specific preference. Both of these limitations can be remediated in future studies. In 
particular, future studies should convene a panel of subject-matter experts for coding 
purposes, and scholars ought to be willing to exclude corpus artifacts that do not draw 
unanimous coding from members of such a panel. Second, future studies could consider a 
more complex system of coding, one in which not every corpus artifact must be coded in 
a binary way. Using emerging techniques in corpus analysis and sentiment measurement, 
it might be possible to assign articles and other corpus artifacts a continuous score (for 
example, ranging from 0 to 10) based on the strength of an expressed preference. Using a 
continuous coding scheme, preference levels for more than one policy alternative can be 
incorporated. Such an approach presumes manual coding. However, scholars should also 
consider machine coding that can measure sentiment across corpora, perhaps through the 
use of custom algorithms.      
 Several of the suggestions for future research offered above presume relatively 
new approaches and methodologies. While empirical analysis has always been a part of 
political science, some of the approaches suggested in this section presume the use of 
techniques that are not necessarily in the mainstream of political science. Corpus analysis 
is, in particular, associated with the field of machine learning, in which large bodies of 
data can be analyzed for sentiment and other characteristics using algorithms. While there 
is an obvious political science angle to such applications, existing examples of corpus 
analysis in political science, such as the work of L’Hôte (2014) rely upon dated forms of 
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analysis. For example, L’Hôte utilized hand-coding of sentiment and also did not utilize 
time-series analysis. Some of the approaches demonstrated in the current study, 
particularly in the realm of time-series analysis, have important applications in political 
science and ought to be built upon by empirically oriented researchers.  
 When working with corpora, researchers have the advantage of working with 
smaller units of time, which, in turn, raises the quality of statistical findings. In the 
current study, corpus data from 1952 to 1981 were tabulated in a quarterly format, but 
annualized once it was necessary to analyze corpus variables alongside annualized data 
such as Congressional support for ODBC and CMHC. In future studies, the use of mixed 
data sampling regression (MIDAS) techniques could allow for higher-frequency data 
(such as quarterly data) to be included alongside lower-frequency data (such as annual 
data)  
 There are also several general recommendations for future scholars that can be 
made. One such recommendation is the incorporation of the theory of disjointed 
incrementalism (Lindblom, 1959) into a qualitative or mixed-methods analysis of the 
development of American mental health policy. One of the core claims of disjointed 
incrementalism theory is that possible policy alternatives are worked through and 
examined in detail, with changes being explored and recommended in an incremental 
rather than revolutionary manner. Although disjointed incrementalism is a good 
theoretical fit for the results obtained in the present study, the quantitative nature of the 
study made it possible to examine steps 3-6 in Etzioni’s (1967) synopsis of disjointed 
incrementalism. These steps concern the ways in which policy alternatives are worked 
through, amended, and evaluated in an incremental fashion. The current study found 
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evidence for a time-based shift in the relative preferences for CMHC and ODBC, but, 
because of the quantitative nature of the study, a fully satisfactory qualitative account of 
how support for ODBC hardened over time could not be presented. This topic should be 
taken up by qualitative or mixed-methods researchers who are interested in applying the 
substance of disjointed incrementalism theory to the phenomenon of mental health policy 
preference formation.  
 In such projects, what is necessary is a narrative account of the actual changes in 
the discourse surrounding ODBC. The use of qualitative coding could reveal ways in 
which, for example, ODBC was first supported in general terms, then examined in terms 
of its specific components. Any evidence of incrementalism in the evolution of a policy 
preference for ODBC, and in the decline of a policy preference for CMHC, could 
illustrate the usefulness of disjointed incrementalism theory as part of an explanation in 
the evolution of American mental health policies and preferences.  
    
8.7 Summative Conclusion 
 In the United States, the emergence of an outpatient-centered, drug-based model 
of mental health care was physically feasible from the 1950s onwards, with the 
introduction of thorazine and other first-generation antipsychotics. However, it was not 
until 1981, with President Reagan’s veto of the Mental Health Systems Act, that 
American mental health policy tipped over definitely into the outpatient-centered, drug-
based model, even though a major disincentive to institutionalization came in the form of 
the 1965 passage of Medicaid, after which services rendered to institutionalized people 
were no longer compensated by the government. In this quantitative study of the 
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formation of policy preference, the delay between the feasibility of the outpatient-
centered, drug-based model and its adoption was explored through five research 
questions answered through corpus analysis and time-series statistics: How do shifts in 
(1) the sentiments of the American public; (2) the opinions of psychiatrists, 
psychologists, and other mental health experts; (3) formal and informal lobbying efforts 
by pharmacological companies and other commercial stakeholders in mental health; (4) 
the policy of individual states; and (5) the policy of the federal government explain the 
delay between the appearance of thorazine and the adoption of the current model of 
American mental health care?  These questions were answered through techniques such 
as Chow breakpoint analysis, Markov switch models, vector auto-regression (VAR), and 
auto-regressive distributed lag (ARDL) models. It was found that both the outpatient-
centered, drug-based model of mental health and community mental health centers vied 
for popularity with the public, Congress, and mental health professionals for several 
years, thus delaying a transmission of a firm preference for the outpatient-centered, drug-
based model of mental health from the public to Congress. This finding was explored 
through the theories of multiple streams and disjointed incrementalism. The study 
demonstrated the existence of a robustly democratic period of policy articulation and 
explanation followed by a transference of public preference into governmental 
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METHODOLOGICAL APPENDIX: LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
The study had numerous limitations. These limitations can be addressed under 
distinct categories, namely coding, analysis, and interpretation. Limitations in each of 
these categories will be discussed in some detail. It should be noted that several 
suggestions for overcoming these limitations have been embedded in the 
recommendations for future scholarship presented above.   
 In terms of coding, the method of corpus analysis utilized in this study was highly 
reliant on the researcher’s judgment. Each article, speech, or other artifact considered in 
the corpus analysis had to be assigned a preference—that is, in terms of CMHC or 
ODBC. This approach was particularly limited when it came to parsing articles or other 
corpus artifacts that were nuanced and supportive of both alternatives. Because every 
corpus item had to have a preference code, some of the artifacts included in analysis 
might have been incorrectly interpreted. Future scholars should consider extending the 
coding of preferences to a larger group of scholars, and only retaining preference codes in 
cases in which all parties agree to the classification of a particular artifact.      
 The study was also limited by the coding scheme itself. The coding scheme 
required each corpus artifact to be unambiguously coded as being either in support of, or 
against, a specific policy alternative. This coding scheme could have resulted in 
misinterpretations. In addition, corpus artifacts that contained support for both CMHC 
and ODBC might not have been reliably or validly measured, as only one of these 
preferences was associated with each alternative.   
 Another limitation of coding concerned the amount of time dedicated to each 
artifact in the corpus. Because of the very large number of items included in the corpus, 
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only a brief amount of time could be devoted to coding each individual item. Time could 
have resulted in the miscoding of some of the items included in corpus analysis.  
 In terms of analysis, the existence of relatively few data points in the study was 
also a limitation. While the corpus analysis was able to benefit from a quarterly approach, 
one in which nearly 200 quarters were included, the Congressional, pharmaceutical 
industry spending, and institutionalization rate data were all annual. Collapsing data into 
an annual format means the loss of added data points that would be present if years were 
transformed into quarters or even months. It is possible that the number of years in the 
dataset reduced the quality of some of the statistical findings of the study.    
 Also in terms of analysis, one of the limitations of the study was the failure to use 
MIDAS regression techniques where appropriate. Because some of the data (including 
the institutionalization rate, the advertising and marketing budgets for the pharmaceutical 
companies, and the Congressional data) were in annual format, corpus data that were 
tabulated in a quarterly manner for RQs 1 and 2 were transformed into annualized data 
for some of the OLS regressions that took place in the analyses of the third, fourth, and 
fifth research questions of the study. In these applications, MIDAS ought to have been 
considered instead of OLS, and MIDAS is specifically designed (Ghysels, Santa-Clara, 
and Valkanov 2006) for use in regression models in which a dependent variable occurs at 
a lower frequency than an independent variable. 
 Another analytical limitation of the study was the use of multiple models. In some 
cases, the use of multiple models was also a strength of the study, as the combination of 
models triangulated the findings. However, the use of multiple models was also a 
limitation insofar as it can be difficult to interpret findings that are parsed differently by 
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different models. For example, in the analyses presented for RQ5, the Granger-causality 
testing results were somewhat different than the ARDL results in terms of their 
implications for the relationship between public opinion and subsequent Congressional 
opinion. Had the researcher possessed a greater level of expertise in time-series analysis, 
it is possible that the number of models could have been reduced to the most justified 
models. Of course, given that the current study was, in many ways, both novel and 
exploratory, such as approach would also have resulted in less rich findings to add to the 
meagre empirical research base on the relationship between preferences and mental 
health policy.  
 In terms of interpretation, one of the limitations of the study lay in the difficulty 
of drawing causal conclusions or even strong inferences about the relationship between 
variables. The very nature of the study made it extraordinarily difficult to extrapolate 
from the data analysis to real-world explanations. To some extent, this limitation was 
overcome by eschewing cross-sectional methods (such as OLS) in favor of time-series 
methods, and, within time-series, drawing upon VARs, ARDLs, and related techniques 
that are more conducive to the analysis of causality. However, outside the context of a 
very well-designed experiment, there is always a possibility that results taken to be causal 
in nature and actually correlational. Such a possibility cannot be ruled out with respect to 
the current study.       
 The study was not conceived as a mixed-methods study, but as a quantitative 
study. Where possible, qualitative insights—particularly from the theoretical literature—
were included in the analysis. However, in retrospect, more such insights could have been 
included in the study, particularly with respect to adding context to the quantitative 
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findings. Unfortunately, the task of corpus analysis and the accompanying statistical 
analysis left little room for anything more than what would have been cherry-picked 
qualitative analysis of changing trends in policy preferences. The recommendations for 
future scholarship made in the previous section of this chapter offer more substantive 
guidance to future scholars who are willing to apply the theory of disjointed 
incrementalism to a qualitative analysis of the evolution of American mental health 
policy preferences. It would be better for future scholars to devote substantive space to 
such a qualitative analysis rather than attempting to shoehorn it into a quantitative 
approach to policy preference formation analysis.  
 A final limitation of the study was the late-stage emergence of disjointed 
incrementalism as part of theoretical framework of the study. The statistical analyses 
undertaken for the study were painstaking and complex, and they appeared to demand an 
explanatory framework such as disjointed incrementalism. However, before the analyses 
were undertaken, disjointed incrementalism was not visualized as a possible explanatory 
framework for the study.  
This omission is defensible, because disjointed incrementalism only made sense 
in light of the data analysis. The existence of strong preferences for both CMHC and 
ODBC for several years, followed by the triumph of ODBC, strongly suggested the need 
for a theoretical framework that could account for the passage of long amounts of time 
before the emergence of a consensus preference. If it had found instead that there had 
been very weak support for CMHC, and strong support for ODBC, during the entire time 
period of the dataset, then a theory such as disjointed incrementalism would have had 
very little explanatory power. A different kind of theory—one capable of better 
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accounting for a long delay between the formation of a strong preference and its 
legislative adoption—would then have been necessary. 
The fact that disjointed incrementalism was an emergent, rather than pre-selected, 
theory, might have contributed to the limits of the study. Had disjointed incrementalism 
been identified as a theoretical framework at the very beginning of the study, before data 
were collected and analyzed, then the choice of this theory might have influenced various 
aspects of study design itself. For example, had disjointed incrementalism been part of 
the study’s framework from the beginning, then more attention would have been paid to 
attempting to discover why CMHC and ODBC were able to coexist for such a long 
period of time, in terms of the preferences of the public, Congress, and mental health 
professionals. A new quantitative variable or variables would have been coded as part of 
the process of trying to explain the long co-existence of CMHC and ODBC. Thus, the 
late identification of disjointed incrementalism as a theoretical framework might have 
limited some aspects of the study’s design and subsequent explanatory power.      
 
